UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS



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PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS PAST AND PRESENT

UNTSO
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
June 1948 - To present

UNMOGIP
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
January 1949 - To present

UNEF I
First United Nations Emergency Force
November 1956 - June 1967

UNOGIL
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
June 1958 - December 1958

ONUC
United Nations Operation in the Congo
July 1960 - June 1964

UNSF
United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)
October 1962 - April 1963

UNYOM
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
July 1963 - September 1964

UNFICYP
United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus
March 1964 - To present

DOMREP
Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic
May 1965 - October 1966

UNIPOM
United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
September 1965 - March 1966

UNEF II
Second United Nations Emergency Force
October 1973 - July 1979

UNDOF
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
June 1974 - To present

UNIFIL
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
March 1978 - To present

UNGOMAP
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
April 1988 - March 1990

UNIIMOG
United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
August 1988 - February 1991

UNAVEM I
United Nations Angola Verification Mission I
January 1989 - June 1991

UNTAG
United Nations Transition Assistance Group
April 1989 - March 1990

ONUCA
United Nations Observer Group in Central America
November 1989 - January 1992

UNIKOM
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
April 1991 - To present

UNAVEM II
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
June 1991 - To present

ONUSAL
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
July 1991 - To present

MINURSO
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
September 1991 - To present

UNAMIC
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
October 1991 - March 1992

UNPROFOR
United Nations Protection Force
March 1992 - To present

UNTAC
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
March 1992 - September 1993

UNOSOM I
United Nations Operation in Somalia I
April 1992 - April 1993

ONUMOZ
United Nations Operation in Mozambique
December 1992 - To present

UNOSOM II
United Nations Operation in Somalia II
May 1993 - To present

UNOMUR
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
June 1993 - To present

UNOMIG
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
August 1993 - To present

UNOMIL
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
September 1993 - To present

UNMIH
United Nations Mission in Haiti
September 1993 - To present

UNAMIR
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
October 1993 - To present

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

HEADQUARTERS: Government House, Jerusalem

DURATION: June 1948 to present

STRENGTH: 220 military observers

FATALITIES: 28 (as of 14 October 1993)

CHIEF OF STAFF: Major-General Krishna Narayan Singh Thapa (Nepal)

BACKGROUND

From its early days, the United Nations has been concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. Since 1948, there have been five full-fledged wars directly connected with the conflict, and five United Nations peace-keeping operations have been established in the region. Of these, three are still deployed.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has its origins in the problem of Palestine, which was brought before the United Nations early in 1947. At the time, Palestine was a Territory administered by the United Kingdom under a Mandate from the League of Nations, with a population of about 2 million, two thirds of whom were Arabs and one third, Jews.

In November 1947, the General Assembly endorsed a plan for the partition of the Territory, providing for the creation of an Arab State and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem to be placed under international status. The plan was not accepted by the Palestinian Arabs and Arab States.

On 14 May 1948, the United Kingdom relinquished its Mandate over Palestine and the State of Israel was proclaimed. On the following day, the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by Arab States, opened hostilities against Israel.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNTSO

On 29 May, the Security Council, in its resolution 50 (1948), called for a cessation of hostilities in Palestine and decided that the truce should be supervised by the United Nations Mediator, with the assistance of a group of military observers. This resolution formed the basis for the establishment of the first United Nations peace-keeping operation which became known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The first group of observers arrived in the region between 11 and 14 June 1948 and were immediately deployed in Palestine and some of the Arab countries.

UNTSO'S OPERATIONS

While UNTSO was initially used in supervising the original truce of 1948, its function was radically altered in 1949 with the conclusion of four General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the four neighbouring Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria). Its main responsibility then was to assist the parties in supervising the application and observance of those Agreements. Its headquarters was established at Government House in Jerusalem, where it remains today.

Following the 1967 war, UNTSO established two cease-fire observation operations, in the Israel-Syria sector and in the Suez Canal zone. In 1972, a similar operation was set up in southern Lebanon. When United Nations peace-keeping forces were later deployed, in the Sinai in 1973, on the Golan Heights in 1974 and in southern Lebanon in 1978, UNTSO observers were attached to the new forces to assist them in their operations.

Today, UNTSO observers continue to be assigned to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights in the Israel-Syria sector. They man eleven observation posts located in the area of separation maintained by the Force and in the vicinity of the lines on both sides. They also conduct the fortnightly inspections of the areas of limitation in armaments and forces provided for under the disengagement agreement of 1974. This group

of UNTSO observers is formed into Observer Group Golan (OGG). The Observer Detachment Damascus (ODD), a separate UNTSO unit, serves UNTSO in Syria and performs support functions for OGG.

In the Israel-Lebanon sector, UNTSO observers who have been detailed to assist the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) form the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL). This Group, which is under operational control of the UNIFIL commander, maintains five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Armistice Demarcation Line and operates five mobile teams in parts of the UNIFIL area of operation that are under Israeli control and where UNIFIL infantry units are not deployed.

UNTSO continues to maintain its presence in the Egypt-Israel sector, where its observers are organized as Observer Group Egypt (OGE). The Group has its headquarters in Ismailia, operates outposts in the Sinai and conducts patrols in most parts of the peninsula. OGE maintains liaison for UNTSO with the Egyptian authorities.

In addition, UNTSO maintains offices in Amman, Beirut and Gaza.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Over the years, UNTSO has also made available its personnel to assist in the setting up of other United Nations peace-keeping operations not connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The rapid deployment of experienced United Nations observers has been most valuable in setting up the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963, the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) and the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) in 1988, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in 1991, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992 and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) also in 1992.

COMPOSITION

UNTSO's military observers come from 19 contributing countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland and United States.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

Since its establishment in 1948, UNTSO has been financed from the regular budget of the United Nations. Its costs are therefore assessed as part of each biennial programme budget. The annual cost of the operation is approximately $31 million.

PS/DPI/6/Rev.4 — October 1993

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

LOCATION: The cease-fire line between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir

HEADQUARTERS: Rawalpindi (November-April); Srinagar (May-October)

DURATION: January 1949 to present

STRENGTH: 39 military observers

FATALITIES: 6 (as of 14 October 1993)

CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER: General Ricardo Jorge Galarza-Chans (Uruguay)

BACKGROUND

For nearly four decades, the United Nations has been concerned with the conflict between India and Pakistan over the status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In August 1947, India and Pakistan became independent. Under the scheme of partition provided by the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir was free to accede to India or Pakistan. Its accession to India became a matter of dispute between the two countries and fighting broke out later that year.

The question first came before the Security Council in January 1948, when India complained that tribesmen and others, with Pakistan's support and participation, were invading Kashmir and extensive fighting was taking place. Pakistan denied the charges and declared that Kashmir's accession to India was illegal.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNMOGIP

On 20 January, the Security Council adopted resolution 39 (1948) establishing a three-member United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and mediate the dispute. On 21 April 1948, by its resolution 47 (1948), the Council decided to enlarge the membership of UNCIP and recommended various measures, including the use of observers, to stop the fighting. The cease-fire between India and Pakistan came into effect on 1 January 1949, and a first group of UN military observers arrived in the area on 24 January. On 18 July 1949, India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement establishing a cease-fire line to be supervised by the observers. These observers formed the nucleus of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

UNMOGIP'S ACTIVITIES

Following the termination of UNCIP, the Security Council, by its resolution 91 (1951) of 30 March 1951, decided that UNMOGIP should continue to supervise the cease-fire in Kashmir. Since that time, UNMOGIP has functioned as an autonomous operation, directed by the Chief Military Observer. UNMOGIP's functions were to observe and report, investigate complaints of cease-fire violations and submit its findings to each party and to the Secretary-General.

In early August 1965, hostilities again broke out on a large scale along the cease-fire line in Kashmir, and eventually spread to the international border between India and West Pakistan. The Security Council called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held before the hostilities began.

In Kashmir, the supervision called for by the Council was exercised by UNMOGIP. In addition, since the hostilities extended beyond the Kashmir cease-fire line, the Secretary-General established an administrative adjunct of UNMOGIP, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), as a temporary measure for the sole purpose of supervising the cease-fire along the India-Pakistan border outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Following the withdrawal of troops in February 1966, UNMOGIP reverted to its original task, while UNIPOM was terminated.

At the end of 1971, full-scale hostilities again broke out between India and Pakistan. By the time fighting had ended and a cease-fire had gone into

effect, a number of positions on both sides of the 1949 cease-fire line had changed hands. In July 1972, India and Pakistan signed an agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir which, with minor deviations, followed the same course as the cease-fire line established by the Karachi Agreement of 1949. India took the position that the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed, since it had related specifically to the cease-fire line under the Karachi Agreement and did not extend to the actual line of control that had come into existence in December 1971. Pakistan, however, did not accept this position.

PRESENT SITUATION

Given the disagreement between the two parties about UNMOGIP's mandate and functions, the Secretary-General's position has been that UNMOGIP can be terminated only by a decision of the Security Council. In the absence of such a decision, UNMOGIP has been maintained with the same administrative arrangements. Its task is to observe, to the extent possible, developments pertaining to the strict observance of the cease-fire of 17 December 1971 and to report thereon to the Secretary-General. The military authorities of Pakistan have continued to lodge with UNMOGIP complaints about cease-fire violations. The military authorities of India have lodged no complaints since January 1972 and have restricted the activities of the United Nations observers on the Indian side of the Line of Control. They have, however, continued to provide accommodation, transport and other facilities to UNMOGIP.

The Observer Group's Headquarters alternates between Srinagar in summer (mid-May to mid-November) and Rawalpindi in winter. An operational staff office is maintained in one of those two cities when it is not hosting the headquarters. The supervision of the cease-fire in the field is carried out by a number of field observation teams stationed on both sides of the Line of Control and also along the border between Pakistan and Kashmir.

COMPOSITION

The strength of UNMOGIP is 38 military observers from eight countries: Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Uruguay.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

UNMOGIP is financed from the regular budget of the United Nations. The annual cost of the operation is approximately $7 million.

PS/DPI/9/Rev.4 — October 1993

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

UNFICYP

UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

LOCATION: Cyprus

HEADQUARTERS: Nicosia

DURATION: March 1964 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 1,273 troops and support personnel, 12 military observers and 38 civilian police

CURRENT STRENGTH: 1,208 troops and support personnel, 12 military observers and 35 civilian police

FATALITIES: 165 (as of 14 October 1993)

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. Joe Clark (Canada)

FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Michael F. Minehane (Ireland)

BACKGROUND

Cyprus became independent on 16 August 1960 with a Constitution that was intended to balance the interests of the island's Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. A treaty of August 1960, entered into by Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, guaranteed the basic provisions of the Constitution and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus.

The application of the provisions of the Constitution, however, encountered difficulties from the very beginning and led to a succession of constitutional crises. The accumulated tension between the two communities resulted in the outbreak of violence on the island on 21 December 1963.

On 27 December, the United Nations Security Council met to consider a complaint by Cyprus charging intervention in its internal affairs and aggression by Turkey. Turkey maintained that Greek Cypriot leaders had tried for more than two years to nullify the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community and denied all charges of aggression.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNFICYP

On 15 February 1964, after all attempts to restore peace on the island had failed, the representatives of the United Kingdom and of Cyprus requested urgent action by the Security Council. On 4 March 1964, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 186 (1964), by which it recommended the establishment of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) with a mandate to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting, and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. Since then, the Council has periodically extended UNFICYP's mandate, usually for periods of six months at a time.

MAINTENANCE OF CEASE-FIRE AND MILITARY STATUS QUO

In connection with the hostilities in July and August 1974, the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and have required the Force to perform certain additional functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire.

Following a de facto cease-fire, which came into effect on 16 August 1974, UNFICYP inspected the deployment of the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces, and cease-fire lines and a buffer zone were established between the areas controlled by the opposing forces. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres across the island. The buffer zone between the lines varies in width from less than 20 metres to some 7 kilometres, and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

Strict adherence to the military status quo in the buffer zone, as recorded by UNFICYP at the time, has become a vital element in preventing a recurrence of fighting. UNFICYP maintains surveillance through a system of 43 observation posts, and through air

vehicle and foot patrols. The Force maintains a patrol track, which runs the length of the buffer zone and is used for surveillance, monitoring of agricultural activities, resupply of observation posts and rapid reaction to incidents.

The task of UNFICYP is significantly complicated by the absence of a formal cease-fire agreement. As a result, UNFICYP is confronted with hundreds of incidents each year. The most serious incidents tend to occur in areas where the cease-fire lines are in close proximity, particularly in Nicosia and its suburbs. The Force investigates and acts upon all violations of the cease-fire and the military status quo. Its reaction in each case depends on the nature of the incident and may include the deployment of troops, verbal and written protests and follow-up action to ensure that the violation has been rectified or will not recur.

HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

Another major function entrusted to UNFICYP is to encourage the fullest possible resumption of normal civilian activity in the buffer zone. To this end, it facilitates the resumption of farming in the buffer zone; assists both communities on matters related to the supply of electricity and water across the lines; endeavours to facilitate normal contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; facilitates provision of emergency medical services; and facilitates delivery of mail across the lines. UNFICYP visits Greek Cypriots and the small Maronite community living in the northern part of the island. It also visits Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part. UNFICYP also cooperates with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in providing relief assistance.

RESTRUCTURING OF UNFICYP

Until recently, UNFICYP was the only United Nations peace-keeping operation not financed from assessed contributions by States Members of the Organization. In accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964), the costs of the Force were met by the Governments providing the military contingents and by voluntary contributions received for this purpose by the United Nations. In addition, the Government of Cyprus provided, at no cost, areas for the headquarters, camps and other premises of UNFICYP.

Under those arrangements, the troop-contributing Governments made available to the United Nations troops whose regular pay and allowances and normal *matériel* expenses they had agreed to pay themselves. The United Nations was responsible for the operational costs for administrative and logistic support (e.g., rations, fuel, hire of vehicles, maintenance of premises, salaries and travel of non-military personnel) and for extra and extraordinary costs incurred by the troop-contributing Governments for which they sought reimbursement on the basis of separate agreements concluded by the United Nations with each of those Governments. These costs could be paid only from the voluntary contributions received for this purpose. Voluntary contributions, however, had consistently fallen short of the required funds, leaving the Special Account for UNFICYP with a total deficit of approximately $200 million for the period from the inception of the Force to June 1993. As a result, reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries were paid only up to December 1981.

The Secretary-General repeatedly voiced his profound concern about the worsening financial situation confronting UNFICYP. He suggested that the Force should be put on a sound and secure financial basis and that the best way to finance UNFICYP would be for its costs to be met from assessed contributions.

Due to the deteriorating financial situation of the Force and frustration over the lack of progress towards a lasting political solution to the Cyprus problem, a number of troop-contributing Governments decided, in 1992, to reconsider their participation in UNFICYP. In his May 1992 report on UNFICYP activities, the Secretary-General spoke of the need to consult with the troop-contributing countries on their intentions on participation in the Force, including the timing of any reductions or withdrawals of their contingents, and on the possible future options for UNFICYP. On 21 September, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the troop-contributing Governments had given firm indications of their intention to reduce "the operational commitment" of their contingents, and he outlined a plan for a possible restructuring of UNFICYP.

In December 1992, the size of the Force was significantly reduced by the withdrawal of the Danish battalion (323 personnel) and reductions in the British, Austrian and Canadian contingents of 198, 63 and 61 personnel, respectively. This reduced UNFICYP's strength by approximately 28 per cent.

In his 30 March 1993 report, the Secretary-General stated that these reductions necessitated a major restructuring and reorganization of UNFICYP. The required operational and organizational adjustments had been put in place on 16 December 1992. He went on to say that further withdrawals announced by Canada and the United Kingdom would reduce the

Force's strength from 1,513 to approximately 850 personnel and, unless the situation was redressed, UNFICYP would cease to be viable in June 1993. The Secretary-General presented his proposals for a further restructuring of the Force, stressing that they would be practical only if the Security Council changed the financing of UNFICYP from voluntary to assessed contributions.

In its resolution 831 (1993) of 27 May 1993, the Security Council decided that those costs of the Force which were not covered by voluntary contributions should be treated as expenses of the Organization, effective from the next extension of the Force's mandate on or before 15 June 1993 (*see* Financial Aspects *below*).

The Council also decided that UNFICYP should be restructured to a strength of three infantry battalions of approximately 350 personnel each — the minimum number required to maintain effective control of the buffer zone — with the addition of a limited number of military observers for reconnaissance. It further decided to conduct a comprehensive reassessment of the Force when it reviewed UNFICYP's mandate in December 1993.

The restructured UNFICYP continues to interpose itself between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot forces and to supervise the cease-fire lines that define the buffer zone, by observing and reporting any violations of the cease-fire and the military status quo. For operational purposes, the Force is divided into three sectors and six line companies. Between June and September 1993, the Force's strength had temporarily dipped below 1,000 and the Force Commander had implemented an emergency contingency plan reorganizing UNFICYP in two sectors. In June 1993, the Canadian battalion was withdrawn and, in September 1993, a battalion of some 350 personnel from Argentina was deployed allowing the Force Commander to implement the restructuring plan approved by the Security Council.

COMPOSITION OF UNFICYP

The current authorized troop strength of UNFICYP is 1,323 troops and support personnel, military observers and civilian police. The operational elements of the Force are provided by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. There are also 34 international civilian personnel and 381 locally recruited staff.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

By its resolution 47/236 of 14 September 1993, the United Nations General Assembly decided that for the period beginning 16 June 1993 the costs of the Force not covered by voluntary contributions should be treated as expenses of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17 of the United Nations Charter.

In a letter dated 15 April 1993 addressed to the Secretary-General, the Government of Cyprus had conveyed its offer to contribute, on a continuing basis, a voluntary contribution equal to one third of the annual cost of UNFICYP, which had been estimated by the Secretary-General at approximately $45 million. In a subsequent letter dated 10 May 1993, the Government of Cyprus had confirmed that its voluntary contribution for the 12-month period beginning 16 June 1993 would be increased to $18.5 million, provided that UNFICYP was restructured in accordance with the Secretary-General's proposed plan.

A second pledge was received from the Government of Greece which, by a letter dated 7 May 1993, had informed the Secretary-General of its decision to increase its annual voluntary contribution to UNFICYP to $6.5 million, should the financing system of UNFICYP be converted to assessed contributions and the structure and strength of the Force remain unchanged. Therefore, a total of $25 million is expected from voluntary contributions towards the estimated annual cost of UNFICYP for the period beginning 16 June 1993.

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE

LOCATION: Syrian Golan Heights

HEADQUARTERS: Damascus

DURATION: June 1974 to present

CURRENT STRENGTH: 1,107 troops assisted by the militaryobservers of UNTSO's Observer Group Golan

FATALITIES: 31 (as of 14 October 1993)

FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Roman Misztal (Poland)

BACKGROUND:

On 6 October 1973, war erupted again in the Middle East between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Suez Canal area and the Sinai and between Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights. On 24 October, as fighting between Egypt and Israel reached a critical stage, the Security Council decided to set up a second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). The Force was immediately moved into place between the Israeli and Egyptian armies in the Suez Canal area, and its arrival effectively stabilized the situation.

In the Israel-Syria sector tension remained high, and from March 1974 the situation became increasingly unstable. Against this background, the United States undertook a diplomatic initiative, which resulted in the conclusion of an Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces. The Agreement provided for an area of separation and for two equal zones of limited forces and armaments on both sides of the area, and called for the establishment of a United Nations observer force to supervise its implementation. The Agreement was signed on 31 May 1974.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNDOF

Later on the same day, the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974) by which it set up the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). As provided in the Agreement on Disengagement, UNDOF's mandate was to maintain the cease-fire between Israel and Syria, to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces, and to supervise the areas of separation and limitation. Since then, the Security Council has periodically extended UNDOF's mandate for periods of six months at a time.

UNDOF'S ACTIVITIES

Advance parties of the Force arrived in the area on 3 June 1974, and within two weeks its total strength was brought to near its then authorized level of about 1,250. Following the completion of the disengagement operation and the delineation of the lines bounding the area of separation, UNDOF set up a series of checkpoints and observation posts within that area. In addition, two base camps were established, one on the east side of the area of separation and the other on the west side.

In the area of separation UNDOF operates static positions and observation posts, which are manned 24 hours a day, and conducts patrols by vehicle or on foot along predetermined routes by day and night. Temporary outposts and additional patrols are set up from time to time to perform specific tasks.

Under a programme undertaken by the Syrian authorities, civilians have continued to return to the area of separation, the population of which has doubled since the the establishment of UNDOF. The Syrian Arab Republic has stationed police in the area of separation in exercise of its administrative responsibility. UNDOF has adjusted its operations accordingly to take account of these developments and to continue to carry out effectively its supervisory tasks under the Agreement on Disengagement.

UNDOF headquarters maintains close liaison with the Israeli and the Syrian authorities through their senior military representatives. At the local level, the com-

manders of the UNDOF units maintain liaison with one side or the other through liaison officers designated by the parties.

UNDOF conducts fortnightly inspections of armament and force levels in the area of limitation. These inspections are carried out with the assistance of liaison officers from the parties, who accompany the inspection teams. The findings of the inspection teams are communicated to the two parties. The inspections have generally proceeded smoothly with the cooperation of the parties concerned, although on both sides restrictions are regularly placed on the movement of the teams in some localities.

UNDOF has performed its tasks effectively, with the cooperation of the parties, and the area has remained generally quiet.

HUMANITARIAN FUNCTIONS

In addition to its normal peace-keeping functions, UNDOF has carried out activities of a humanitarian nature. At the request of the parties, UNDOF has from time to time exercised its good offices in arranging for the transfer of released prisoners and the bodies of war dead between Israel and Syria. It has assisted the International Committee of the Red Cross by providing it with facilities for the hand-over of prisoners and bodies, for the exchange of parcels and mail and for the passage of persons and personal effects across the area of separation. Within the means available, UNDOF has also provided medical treatment to the local population.

COMPOSITION

UNDOF was originally composed of Austrian and Peruvian infantry units and Canadian and Polish logistic elements transferred from the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). The Peruvian contingent was withdrawn in July 1975 and replaced by an Iranian contingent. This contingent was in turn withdrawn in March 1979 and replaced by a Finnish contingent. Since then, UNDOF has been composed of contingents from Austria, Canada, Finland and Poland, as well as a number of military observers, detailed from UNTSO. In addition, UNTSO observers assigned to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission have assisted UNDOF in the execution of its tasks.

In 1993, the Government of Finland decided to withdraw its contingent by the end of the year. Poland offered, and the Security Council agreed, to replace the Finnish infantry battalion. Canada also agreed to assume all logistics functions. UNDOF will thus comprise infantry battalions from Austria and Poland and a logistic unit from Canada. UNTSO observers will assist UNDOF as before.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

From its inception, UNDOF has been financed from the special account established for UNEF II. Following the termination of UNEF II in July 1979, the account remained open for UNDOF. The annual cost to the United Nations of the operation is approximately $36 million. As at 31 October 1993, total contributions outstanding to the Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation to 30 November 1993 amounted to approximately $23 million.

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

LOCATION: Southern Lebanon

HEADQUARTERS: Naqoura

DURATION: March 1978 to present

STRENGTH: Some 5,266 troops assisted by 57 military observers of UNTSO's Observer Group Lebanon, and approximately 520 international and local civilian staff

FATALITIES: 193 (as of 14 October 1993)

FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Trond Furuhovde (Norway)

BACKGROUND

In the early 1970s, tension along the Israeli-Lebanon border increased, especially after the relocation of Palestinian armed elements from Jordan to Lebanon. Palestinian commando operations against Israel and Israeli reprisals against Palestinian bases in Lebanon intensified. On 11 March 1978, a commando attack in Israel resulted in many dead and wounded among the Israeli population; the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) claimed responsibility for that raid. In response, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon on the night of 14/15 March, and in a few days occupied the entire southern part of the country except for the city of Tyre and its surrounding area.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIFIL

On 15 March, the Lebanese Government submitted a strong protest to the Security Council against the Israeli invasion, stating that it had no connection with the Palestinian commando operation. On 19 March, the Security Council adopted resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), in which it called upon Israel immediately to cease its military action and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory. It also decided to establish immediately a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon for an initial period of six months, subject to extension. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was set up with the mandate to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. The first UNIFIL troops arrived in the area on 23 March 1978.

UNIFIL'S ACTIVITIES

Until now, however, it has not been possible for UNIFIL to carry out in full its original mandate. From its inception, the Force had to operate under extremely difficult conditions. The PLO and the Government of Israel never fully accepted the UNIFIL mandate with all its implications. Given these attitudes, the Force was prevented from deploying fully in the area evacuated by the Israeli forces between April and June 1978. In fact, the enclave along the border was turned over to the "de facto forces" (Christian and associated militias supported and supplied by Israel). Israel thus retained a degree of military power in the area and continued its fight against the PLO and its Lebanese allies. UNIFIL's efforts to implement its mandate in these conditions inevitably met with only partial success and caused the Force to suffer significant casualties.

In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon again. This invasion changed UNIFIL's situation drastically. For three years, UNIFIL in its entirety remained behind the Israeli lines, with its role limited to providing protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population to the extent possible.

In 1985, Israel carried out a partial withdrawal, but it retained control of an area in southern Lebanon, manned by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and by Lebanese de facto forces (DFF), the so-called "South Lebanon Army". IDF/DFF remain targets for attacks by armed groups opposed to the occupation. For their part, IDF/DFF react vigorously to these attacks, often with heavy weapons and with air support from Israel.

UNIFIL has thus been prevented from carrying out its mandate. In the circumstances, it endeavours, to

the best of its ability, to prevent its area of operations from being used for hostile activities and to protect civilians caught in the conflict.

UNIFIL's operations are based on a network of positions which are manned 24 hours a day. The Force maintains 45 checkpoints, whose function is to control movement on the principal roads in UNIFIL's area; 95 observation posts, whose function is to observe movement on and off the roads; and 29 checkpoints/observation posts which combine the functions of control and observation. Each is assigned responsibility for ensuring that hostile activities are not undertaken from the area surrounding it. This involves not only keeping watch from the position but also patrolling by foot or vehicle in its vicinity. In addition, unarmed military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) man five observation posts and operate five mobile teams in the area under Israeli control. The UNTSO observers are under the operational control of UNIFIL's Commander.

UNIFIL's network of positions and the patrols mounted from them also play a central role in the Force's performance of its humanitarian task. They provide the civilian population with protection and with a source of help if they are subjected to harassment. Within available resources, UNIFIL also provides civilians with medical supplies, water, food, fuel, electricity, engineering work and escort for farmers. UNIFIL medical centres and mobile teams have provided care to an average of 2,500 civilian patients per month and a field dental programme has also been provided.

In accordance with its mandate of assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the UNIFIL area, UNIFIL and the Lebanese military authorities worked out arrangements for the transfer to the Lebanese army of responsibility for the western part of the Force's Ghanaian battalion sector. The hand-over, which involved the vacating of eight UNIFIL positions, was completed in early April 1992. In a follow-up hand-over, additional area comprising three villages, including the former Ghanaian battalion headquarters at Marakah, was handed over to the Lebanese Army on 16 February 1993.

In July 1993, in his report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that although UNIFIL had not been able to make progress towards the implementation of its mandate, its contribution to stability in the region and the protection it provided to the local population remained nevertheless important. He recommended to extend UNIFIL's mandate for a further period of six months, that is until 31 January 1994. The Security Council approved this recommendation.

COMPOSITION OF UNIFIL

In the course of 1992, the strength of UNIFIL was reduced by 10 per cent. At present, UNIFIL has some 5,266 troops provided by Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Norway, Poland and Sweden. In addition, 57 military observers from UNTSO's Observer Group Lebanon assist the Force in the performance of its tasks. UNIFIL employs 526 civilian staff, of whom 161 are recruited internationally.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The annual cost to the United Nations of UNIFIL is approximately $146 million. The costs of the operation are met by the assessed contributions of the United Nations Member States. As at 31 October 1993, total contributions outstanding to the UNIFIL Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation to 31 January 1994 amounted to approximately $232 million.

PS/DPI/8/Rev.4 — October 1993

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION

LOCATION: The demilitarized zone along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait

HEADQUARTERS: Umm Qasr

DURATION: April 1991 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 3,645 military personnel

CURRENT STRENGTH: 252 military observers, 109 other military personnel and some 80 international and 106 local civilian staff

ACTING CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER: Brigadier-General Vigar Aabrek (Norway)

BACKGROUND

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. The same day, the United Nations Security Council condemned the invasion and demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal. A few days later, the Council instituted economic sanctions against Iraq. The Council subsequently adopted a number of resolutions on various aspects of the situation and, on 29 November 1990, it decided to give Iraq until 15 January 1991 to implement those resolutions; if not, Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait were authorized to use "all necessary means" to uphold and implement the Council's resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area. The deadline passed and the next day the armed forces of those States began air attacks against Iraq, followed on 24 February by a ground offensive. Hostilities were suspended on 27 February, by which time the Iraqi forces had vacated Kuwait. On 3 April 1991, while still maintaining the economic sanctions against Iraq, the Security Council adopted resolution 687 (1991), which set an elaborate series of conditions for a cease-fire and established the machinery for the supervision of those conditions. Following Iraq's acceptance of that resolution's provisions, the cease-fire became a formal one.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIKOM

By resolution 687 (1991) the Council established, among other things, a demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, to be monitored by a United Nations observer unit, and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Council for approval a plan for the unit's immediate deployment. The Secretary-General reported back on 5 April 1991, and on 9 April the Security Council approved his plan for the setting up of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) (resolution 689 (1991)). It decided further that the modalities for the Mission should be reviewed every six months.

The mandate of the Mission is to monitor the Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway between Iraq and Kuwait and the DMZ; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in, and surveillance of, the demilitarized zone; and to observe any hostile action mounted from the territory of one State against the other. The Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway is about 40 kilometres (25 miles) long. The DMZ, which is about 200 kilometres (125 miles) long, extends 10 kilometres (6 miles) into Iraq and 5 kilometres (3 miles) into Kuwait.

The military observers of UNIKOM are unarmed. UNIKOM does not have the authority or the capacity to take physical action to prevent the entry of military personnel or equipment into the DMZ. Responsibility for the maintenance of law and order rests with the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait in their respective parts of the zone. In the DMZ, the police are allowed only sidearms.

UNIKOM'S ACTIVITIES

The UNIKOM advance party arrived in the area on 13 April 1991. By 6 May, the Mission was fully deployed. UNIKOM then monitored the withdrawal of the armed

forces that were still deployed in its assigned zone. That withdrawal having been completed, the DMZ established by the Security Council came into effect at 2000 hours GMT on 9 May, and UNIKOM assumed in full its observation responsibilities.

UNIKOM's concept of operations is based on a combination of patrol and observation bases, observation points, ground and air patrols, investigation teams and liaison with the parties at all levels.

UNIKOM enjoys full freedom of movement throughout the DMZ and observes the length and breadth of the zone. It verifies that no military personnel and equipment are within the zone and that no military fortifications and installations are maintained in it. For operational purposes, UNIKOM has divided the DMZ into three sectors. Each sector has a headquarters and six observation posts/patrol bases, from which the observers patrol their assigned sectors and visit temporary observation points established in areas of particular activity or where roads and tracks enter the DMZ. In fact, all movements, including supply runs, are used for observation. UNIKOM patrols the Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway by helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft. There are also air patrols in the DMZ, especially in the southern sector, where mines and unexploded ordnance limit UNIKOM's ability to carry out ground patrols.

Iraqi and Kuwaiti authorities, including police, function in their respective part of the DMZ. However, UNIKOM established the principle that they should maintain a reasonable distance (about 1,000 metres) from the boundary line shown on UNIKOM's map. If their functions should require them to approach closer than 1,000 metres, the authorities are expected to consult UNIKOM in advance. Such consultation enables UNIKOM to take measures to avoid incidents.

UNIKOM has also maintained contact and provided technical support to other United Nations missions working in Iraq and Kuwait, in particular to the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission and to the United Nations office dealing with the return of property from Iraq to Kuwait. UNIKOM has provided movement control in respect of all United Nations aircraft operating in the area.

UNIKOM headquarters is located at Umm Qasr. The Mission maintains liaison offices in Baghdad and Kuwait City and a logistic base at Doha (Kuwait).

From May 1991 to January 1993, UNIKOM observed mainly three types of violations: minor incursions on the ground by small groups of soldiers, overflights by military aircraft, and the carrying by policemen of weapons other than sidearms. UNIKOM also investigated a number of complaints by Iraq and Kuwait.

REINFORCEMENT OF UNIKOM DECIDED

On 11 January 1993, following a series of incidents on the newly demarcated boundary between Iraq and Kuwait involving Iraqi intrusions into the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ and unauthorized retrieval of property from Kuwaiti territory, the Security Council issued a statement, in which it, *inter alia*, condemned such actions and invited the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities for restoring UNIKOM to its full strength and to consider in an emergency the need for rapid reinforcement, as well as any other suggestions with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of UNIKOM.

In response, the Secretary-General submitted, on 18 January, a report on this subject. He recalled that UNIKOM had been established as an observation mission. In case of violations, the observers, who were unarmed, reported and made representations, or representations were made at a higher level either in the field or at United Nations Headquarters. Under its original mandate, UNIKOM had neither the authority nor the means to enforce Security Council decisions.

The Secretary-General noted that the January 1993 border incidents had been closely monitored by UNIKOM and reported to United Nations Headquarters. In addition, the Mission made immediate representations to Iraqi personnel on the spot as well as to the Iraqi military authorities. Representations were also made at United Nations Headquarters.

The Secretary-General concluded that UNIKOM had thus performed the function for which it was designed and for which its strength was sufficient. If, however, the Security Council should decide that UNIKOM's present mandate did not permit an adequate response to such violations as had occurred and that UNIKOM should be able to prevent and redress them, the Secretary-General continued, then UNIKOM would require a capacity to take physical action. Such action could be taken to prevent or, if that failed, redress: (a) small-scale violations of the DMZ, (b) violations of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, for example by civilians or police; and (c) problems that might arise from the presence of Iraqi installations and Iraqi citizens and their assets in the DMZ on the Kuwaiti side of the newly demarcated boundary.

The Secretary-General noted that these tasks could not be performed by unarmed observers. In their place, UNIKOM would have to be provided with infantry in sufficient numbers. He estimated that three

infantry battalions would be required, giving UNIKOM a strength of 3,645, including support elements. UNIKOM would be provided with the weapons integral to its infantry battalions, but not authorized to initiate enforcement action. It would use force only in self-defence, which would include resistance to attempts to prevent it by force from discharging its duties.

The Secretary-General emphasized that the scenario for a reinforced UNIKOM was based on the assumption that the Government of Iraq as well as the Government of Kuwait would cooperate with the restructured Mission. In the absence of such cooperation, it would become impossible for UNIKOM to carry out its functions, in which case the Security Council would need to consider alternative measures.

Subsequently, the Security Council, by its resolution 806 (1993) of 5 February 1993, approved the Secretary-General's report and requested him to plan and execute a phased deployment of the strengthening of UNIKOM. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report to it on any step he intended to take following an initial deployment.

In his 2 April 1993 report, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his intention, in the first phase, to retain the military observers and to reinforce them by one mechanized infantry battalion to be deployed in the northern sector of the DMZ. The Mission's logistic support elements will also be slightly reinforced. On 13 April, the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council concurred with his recommendations.

COMPOSITION

The authorized strength of the military observers is 300, of whom 48 are on stand-by in their countries. UNIKOM's military observers are provided by Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, China, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Until March 1993, administrative and logistic support was provided by Canada (engineers), Denmark (logistics) and Norway (medical). Canada withdrew its engineer unit at the end of March 1993 and the Secretary-General has accepted an offer from Argentina to replace it. Chile withdrew its helicopter unit at the end of October 1992; it was replaced by a civilian unit, under contract to UNIKOM. Two fixed-wing aircraft operated by civilians have been made available by the Government of Switzerland. In addition, UNIKOM includes some 80 international and 106 local civilian staff.

Initially, to provide essential security during the setting-up phase, UNIKOM included five infantry companies, drawn from the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). These troops were withdrawn by the end of June 1991.

As to the reinforcement of UNIKOM in accordance with Security Council resolution 806 (1993), the Secretary-General, despite all efforts, could not for some time identify a Member State which would provide a suitably equipped mechanized infantry battalion. On 24 October 1993, however, the Secretary-General reported that Bangladesh had offered to provide an infantry battalion. Kuwait, on its part, has agreed to make the requisite equipment available, including the armoured vehicles, heavy transport and other equipment.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The annual cost to the United Nations of a reinforced UNIKOM is estimated at approximately $75 million. The costs of the Mission are met by the assessed contributions of the United Nations Member States. As at 31 October 1993, total contributions outstanding to the UNIKOM Special Account amounted to approximately $31 million.

PS/DPI/3/Rev.5 — October 1993

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II

LOCATION: Angola

HEADQUARTERS: Luanda

DURATION: June 1991 to present

STRENGTH: 50 military observers, 18 police observers, 11 military paramedics, 43 international civilian staff and 75 local staff

FATALITIES: 3 (as of 14 October 1993)

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CHIEF OF MISSION: Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye (Mali)

CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria)

BACKGROUND

The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) was originally established by the Security Council on 20 December 1988 at the request of the Governments of Angola and Cuba. Its task was to verify the phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in accordance with the timetable agreed between the two Governments. The withdrawal was completed by 25 May 1991 — more than one month before the scheduled date. On 6 June, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that UNAVEM I had carried out, fully and effectively, the mandate entrusted to it.

Meanwhile, on 17 May 1991, the Government of Angola requested the Secretary-General to ensure the participation of the United Nations in verifying the implementation of the Peace Accords for Angola ("Acordos de Paz"), initialled by the Angolan Government and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) on 1 May 1991, and consequently to prolong UNAVEM's presence in Angola. In accordance with the Accords, the United Nations was to verify the arrangements agreed by the Angolan parties for the monitoring of the cease-fire and for the monitoring of the Angolan police during the cease-fire period. On 30 May, following the Secretary-General's recommendation, the Security Council adopted its resolution 696 (1991), entrusting a new mandate to UNAVEM (thereafter UNAVEM II) and establishing the Mission for a period of 17 months, until the general elections were held in Angola in the fall of 1992.

VERIFICATION OF CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS

The United Nations verification operation began as soon as the Angolan Peace Accords were formally signed on 31 May 1991. Advance parties of observers were deployed to the field on 2 June 1991. Subsequently, UNAVEM II teams of unarmed military observers were deployed at some 46 locations ("assembly areas") where the troops of the two sides were assembled during the cease-fire, as well as at several "critical points" (certain seaports, airports and border posts). In essence, their task was to verify that joint monitoring groups, composed in equal numbers of representatives of the Angolan Government and of UNITA and responsible for monitoring on the spot the observance of the cease-fire, carried out their responsibilities. Working closely with these monitoring groups, UNAVEM II verification teams provided support in the investigation and resolution of alleged violations of the cease-fire. They responded to requests for assistance and used their good offices to resolve problems within monitoring groups. In addition, UNAVEM II took the initiative in monitoring some aspects of the Accords, such as the regular counting of troops and weapons in the assembly areas, as well as monitoring of unassembled troops, demobilized troops, and troops selected to join the new Angolan Armed Forces. The neutrality of the Angolan police was to be verified by monitoring teams also composed of members designated by the Government of Angola and by UNITA. Their work was verified by UNAVEM II police observers. The monitoring teams and UNAVEM observers were to

visit police facilities, examine activities of the police and, if necessary, investigate alleged violations of political rights. The Angolan police monitoring teams were established in all 18 Angolan provinces only in June 1992, although UNAVEM II police observers were present in the designated areas by October 1991.

On many occasions the United Nations conveyed to the two sides suggestions to overcome difficulties related to the assembly and the demobilization of troops, proper custody of weapons and the monitoring of the police, as well as other matters relating to the peace process. At the request of the two parties, the United Nations launched an emergency food programme to relieve food shortages in the assembly areas.

ENLARGEMENT OF UNAVEM II'S MANDATE

The Peace Accords for Angola provided for "free and fair elections for a new Government" under "the supervision of international election observers". On 5 December 1991, the Secretary-General received two letters signed by the Minister for External Relations of Angola. One of the letters contained a request for United Nations technical assistance to help the Angolan Government to prepare for and conduct the forthcoming elections. The other letter contained a formal request to the Secretary-General to send United Nations observers to follow the Angolan electoral procedure until its completion in the fall of 1992. It was later announced that elections would be held on 29 and 30 September 1992.

An agreement on technical assistance was signed with the Angolan Government in January 1992. As regards United Nations observation of the first-ever elections in Angola, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council on 20 December 1991 that he intended to recommend that the Council authorize such a mission. On 6 February 1992, the Secretary-General informed the Council of his decision to appoint Miss Margaret Joan Anstee, a national of the United Kingdom, as his Special Representative to coordinate the current and projected activities of the United Nations in connection with the Angola Peace Accords, and as the Chief of UNAVEM II. On 3 March, following the Special Representative's visit to Angola, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his report with recommendations concerning the United Nations role in observing the forthcoming elections. On 24 March, the Security Council, by its resolution 747 (1992), decided to enlarge UNAVEM II's mandate to include election observation in Angola.

OBSERVATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESS

In March 1992, the office of the Special Representative was established in Luanda, the capital of Angola, to coordinate all United Nations activities related to the Angolan peace process. In addition to its deployed military and police observers and civilian staff, UNAVEM II was enlarged to include an Electoral Division, headed by a Chief Electoral Officer. Offices of the Electoral Division were established in Luanda, in the six Angolan regions and in the capitals of all 18 provinces. Approximately 100 international staff and the requisite number of local staff were deployed for the regional and provincial electoral offices.

The United Nations role was to observe and verify the elections, not to organize them. The electoral process was organized and directed by the National Electoral Council (NEC), on which all legalized political parties in Angola were represented, and supported by technical assistance provided by experts and consultants from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The electoral process comprised four phases: the registration of voters from 20 May to 10 August; the electoral campaign from 29 August to 28 September; the presidential and legislative elections on 29 and 30 September; and the counting of the votes, investigation of complaints and announcement of the final results by the President of NEC on 17 October.

In his report to the Security Council dated 9 September, the Secretary-General stated that the results of the registration exercise had surpassed expectations, with NEC reporting the registration of 4.86 million eligible voters, representing some 92 per cent of an estimated voting population of 5.3 million.

The electoral campaign was conducted without major violence, although there were reports of intimidation by some political parties, notably UNITA and the Movimento Popular para a Libertaçao de Angola (MPLA), as well as difficulties of access to certain areas, particularly those controlled by UNITA. The 18 political parties which had presented candidates campaigned actively. There were complaints, especially from the smaller parties, about the continued existence of the Government and UNITA armies, the slow progress in demobilization and in forming the new Angolan Armed Forces, and lack of access to the Government-controlled radio and television, whose partiality was criticized.

UNAVEM II electoral observers monitored the campaign, contributed to civic education programmes and provided information on UNAVEM II's role. In addition, UNAVEM II and UNDP organized the air support

operation, consisting of 45 helicopters and 15 fixed-wing aircraft, to overcome the logistical difficulties in reaching the more inaccessible polling stations. For the observation and verification of the voting on 29 and 30 September 1992, UNAVEM II deployed 400 electoral observers. Operating largely as two-person mobile teams, the observers covered all 18 provinces and most of the 164 municipalities, and visited about 4,000 of some 6,000 polling stations.

As regards its mandate in military matters, UNAVEM I continued to carry out its verification functions at the assembly areas up to and after the announced disbandment of the two former armies of FAPLA (Government) and FALA (UNITA) on 27 September 1992. As the elections drew near, demobilization formally accelerated. By 7 October, a total of 96,620 Government troops had been demobilized, representing 80 per cent of the projected figure. However, a much lower proportion of ex-FALA troops were demobilized.

United Nations police observers continued their verification of police neutrality, with the Angolan joint monitoring groups being almost entirely dependent on UNAVEM II for transport and communications. Little progress was made in developing a representative national police force. Soon after the elections, however, UNITA withdrew its cooperation.

SITUATION DETERIORATES

On 1 October 1992, the Secretary-General's Special Representative issued a statement in which she noted that the great majority of the registered voters had cast their ballots in peaceful and orderly conditions, despite organizational and logistical difficulties.

However, complaints were raised on 3 October and thereafter by UNITA and some other parties of widespread, massive and systematic irregularities and fraud during the elections. The Secretary-General urged Dr. Jonas Savimbi of UNITA not to reject the elections, pending investigation of his complaints, and emphasized the urgency of a meeting between him and President José Eduardo dos Santos. The complaints were investigated by NEC, with the active assistance of UNAVEM II. Investigative commissions were sent to all 18 provinces, but found no conclusive evidence of systematic fraud.

Meanwhile, a major violation of the Peace Accords occurred on 5 October, when 11 former UNITA generals, including the commander of UNITA's army, withdrew from the new, unified Angolan Armed Forces, in protest at what they called "fraud and cheating" in the elections.

In view of these developments, the Security Council sent to Angola, from 11 to 14 October, an ad hoc Commission, composed of representatives of Cape Verde, Morocco, the Russian Federation and the United States, to support implementation of the Peace Accords. Notwithstanding all diplomatic efforts, however, the political and military situation in the country continued to deteriorate.

On 17 October 1992, the President of NEC announced the official election results. More than 91 per cent of those registered had voted. MPLA had won the legislative elections, with 53.74 per cent of the votes, against UNITA's 34.1 per cent. In the presidential elections, President dos Santos had received 49.57 per cent, against Dr. Savimbi's 40.07 per cent; since neither had achieved 50 per cent, the Electoral Law required a second round. The Secretary-General's Special Representative issued a statement on 17 October, saying "there was no conclusive evidence of major systematic or widespread fraud, or that the irregularities were of magnitude to have a significant effect on the results officially announced on 17 October". She emphasized that, "with all deficiencies taken into account, the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 can be considered to have been generally free and fair".

Immediately after the election results were announced, UNITA launched a nationwide operation to occupy municipalities by force and remove the Government's local administrative structures. On 27 October, the Secretary-General conveyed to the Security Council his serious concern at the rising tension. The Council once again called upon both parties to abide by all their commitments under the Peace Accords, in particular the confinement of their troops and collection of weapons, demobilization and the formation of the unified Angolan Armed Forces. It requested UNITA to respect the results of the elections and urged the leaders of the two parties to engage in immediate dialogue to enable the second round of the presidential elections to be held.

On 30 October, the Security Council, faced with further alarming reports of resumed hostilities in many parts of the country, adopted resolution 785 (1992), extending the existing mandate of UNAVEM II until 30 November 1992, and endorsing the statement by the Secretary-General's Special Representative on the elections having been generally free and fair.

Barely 23 hours later, on 31 October, heavy fighting broke out between the Government and UNITA forces, especially in the major cities. The Secretary-General's efforts, supported by a number of

Member States, resulted in a cease-fire which came officially into effect on 2 November. UNAVEM II, which kept its military, police and civilian presence intact at 67 locations throughout the country, worked to maintain the cease-fire, patrolling trouble spots and using its good offices to foster dialogue between the parties.

DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

Diplomatic efforts continued after the cease-fire to arrange a meeting between President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi. Immediately after the cease-fire, the Government stipulated four conditions for resuming political dialogue between the two leaders: (a) commitment to uphold the cease-fire, pursue dialogue and renounce violence; (b) commitment to the principles of the Peace Accords; (c) acceptance of the results of the September 1992 legislative elections; and (d) greater United Nations involvement in the peace process and the second round of the presidential election.

On 5 November 1992, the Secretary-General sent Mr. Marrack Goulding, then Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, to Angola to assist in implementing the cease-fire, put the peace process back on track and explore the future role of UNAVEM II. After the meetings in Angola, the Secretary-General's envoys concluded that the desire for a larger United Nations involvement constituted the main common ground between the two sides. Also, as a result of a telephone conversation and an exchange of letters with Mr. Goulding, Dr. Savimbi confirmed, in a letter dated 12 November, that UNITA accepted the results of the legislative elections so as to permit the implementation of the peace process.

SECRETARY-GENERAL EVALUATES SITUATION

On 25 November 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a detailed report on the situation in Angola, and recommended extension of the mandate of UNAVEM II for a further two-month period, until 31 January 1993. In the report, the Secretary-General stated that although it was too soon to analyse the causes of the deteriorating situation in Angola, it was already clear that a "root cause" was the incomplete fulfilment of key provisions in the Peace Accords. Among those failings were the less than effective demobilization and storage of weapons; the delay in creating the unified Angolan Armed Forces, which only formally came into being a few days before the elections; the failure to re-establish effective central administration in many parts of the country; and the delay in setting up a neutral police force. It had also been difficult to create in 16 months, after as many years of civil war, an atmosphere of mutual confidence, tolerance and respect.

Yet, the Secretary-General emphasized, "it is also too soon to despair of the Angolan peace process", noting the renewed commitment to the process by both parties. At the same time, he made it clear that he could not recommend an enlargement of UNAVEM II's mandate and strength unless both sides could convince him that they would be genuine in their adherence to, and fulfilment of, the Peace Accords, especially the key provisions relating to the dissolution of the existing armies and the creation of unified and non-partisan military and police forces.

On 30 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 793 (1992), extended UNAVEM II's mandate until 31 January 1993. The Council demanded, *inter alia*, that the Government of Angola and UNITA scrupulously observe the cease-fire, stop military confrontations and all offensive troop movements and create the conditions for completing the peace process in Angola. It appealed to the two parties to engage in a dialogue aimed at national reconciliation and at the participation of all parties in the democratic process, and to agree on a clear timetable for the fulfilment of their commitments under the Peace Accords.

Meanwhile, the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative resulted in a meeting, under UNAVEM II auspices on 26 November 1992 in Namibe, between senior delegations from the two sides, where they pledged themselves to full acceptance of the validity of the Peace Accords, to an effective cease-fire throughout the country and the immediate cessation of all offensive movements, and to the need for a larger United Nations involvement. However, almost immediately, this progress was followed by a set-back when, on 29 November, UNITA forces took the northern cities of Uije and Negage. Attempts to restore dialogue between the two sides, including the Secretary-General's personal invitation to President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi to meet with him at an agreed location, failed.

THREE OPTIONS FOR UNAVEM II

On 8 January 1993, the Secretary-General reported that the situation in Angola had severely deteriorated since the beginning of the year. There were outbreaks of

heavy fighting in at least 10 provincial capitals and other population centres, with each side blaming the other for initiating those hostilities. In his further report submitted to the Council on 21 January, the Secretary-General stated that "to all intents and purposes, Angola has returned to civil war, and is probably in an even worse situation than that which prevailed before the Peace Accords were signed in May 1991". The conflict engulfed towns and population centres in a way unprecedented during the previous 16 years, and there were "disturbing but unconfirmed reports" that new supplies of arms might be entering the country.

In addition, the Secretary-General stated, the widespread fighting and the absence of government administration in much of the countryside had led to widespread hunger and the flight of large numbers of people from the towns involved in the conflict. "An already serious humanitarian situation has become catastrophic in many areas", he pointed out, and the capacity of international humanitarian agencies to provide assistance had been severely disrupted.

According to the report, the crisis arising after the September 1992 elections thrust UNAVEM II into a central mediating role. However, with the outbreak of violent and widespread hostilities, and the total collapse of the joint monitoring mechanisms, "UNAVEM II's original mandate has become less and less relevant". Even its mediating role had been increasingly limited by the deteriorating security situation. At the same time, UNAVEM II teams in the field faced mounting dangers, which became so extensive that 45 of UNAVEM's 67 locations had to be evacuated.

The Secretary-General outlined three options for the future of UNAVEM II. The first option was to maintain the Mission at its current strength; the second was to reduce UNAVEM's provincial deployment to approximately six locations. The Secretary-General's preferred option was to confine UNAVEM II's current deployment to the capital, Luanda, and to one or two outstations, but with the capability to deploy to six provincial sites if needed, to support his Special Representative's peacemaking efforts. At the same time, the Council stressed its readiness to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process.

On 29 January, the Security Council, by its resolution 804 (1993), extended the mandate of UNAVEM II for a period of three months, until 30 April 1993. It did so with the proviso that, as a provisional measure based on security considerations, the Secretary-General could concentrate UNAVEM II's deployment in Luanda and, at his discretion, in other provincial locations, with the levels of personnel and equipment he deemed appropriate to allow for the subsequent expeditious redeployment of UNAVEM II as soon as this became feasible. By other provisions of the resolution, the Council demanded, *inter alia*, that the two parties cease fire immediately, restore continued and meaningful dialogue and agree on a clear timetable for the full implementation of the Peace Accords. Subsequently, the Secretary-General decided to temporarily decrease the strength of the Mission to what it is at present (see "Composition" below).

FURTHER EFFORTS TO RESTORE PEACE

In January 1993, fighting intensified throughout the Angolan national territory between the Angolan Government and UNITA forces, particularly in the central city of Huambo. After repeated efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to arrange a dialogue between the two sides, the Government and UNITA agreed to a cease-fire meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to discuss the fulfilment of various prerequisites for the effective re-launching of the peace process in Angola.

During the first round of Addis Ababa talks, which were held from 27 to 30 January 1993 under United Nations auspices and the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, the Government of Angola and UNITA reached agreement on a number of items, but some key issues remained to be solved before a cease-fire could be arranged. The parties accordingly agreed to meet again in Addis Ababa on 10 February, in order to resolve the outstanding questions. Later, at the request of UNITA, which indicated that its delegation was encountering logistical difficulties, and with the agreement of both sides, the date for the second meeting was postponed to 26 February 1993. Subsequently, the meeting in Addis Ababa had to be cancelled, due to the failure of UNITA to send its delegation there.

In the light of the steadily worsening situation and the collapse of the Addis Ababa negotiations, the Secretary-General asked his Special Representative to come to New York from 9 to 12 March 1993 for consultations. In her briefing to the Security Council, Miss Anstee outlined several options for UNAVEM II. Following informal consultations, the Security Council, by resolution 811 (1993) of 12 March, demanded an immediate cease-fire throughout the country. The Council also, *inter alia*, called on the two parties, particularly UNITA, to produce early evidence that real

progress had been made towards implementing the Peace Accords, and invited the Secretary-General to seek to organize a meeting between the Government and UNITA at the highest possible level before 30 April 1993.

Consequently, the Secretary-General instructed Miss Anstee to consult with the Government and with UNITA on a date and venue for the resumption of direct talks under the auspices of the United Nations. As a result of these consultations, agreement was reached to meet in Abidjan on 12 April 1993 at the invitation of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire.

The Abidjan meeting began as scheduled, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, and lasted six weeks. Regrettably, while very nearly reaching success, it ended, on 21 May 1993, without full agreement on the text of the Protocol of Abidjan.

In his 25 May report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General described the breakdown of the Abidjan talks as "a major and tragic setback to the peace process". Having stated that it would be unthinkable for the United Nations to abandon Angola at this critical juncture, he recommended a further interim extension of UNAVEM II, on a reduced basis, and in a manner which would respond to the evolution of the military and political situation. Such a mission would provide good offices and mediation, with the goal of restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace process along the lines of the Peace Accords. At the same time, the Secretary-General stressed that with the humanitarian situation deteriorating daily, it would also be important during this interim period to devote increasing resources to coordination of humanitarian relief activities throughout Angola. To this end, a United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, headed by a senior official with extensive operational experience, was set up in Luanda in late April, under the over-all authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

On 27 May 1993, the Secretary-General announced that he had agreed to accede to Ms. Anstee's wish to be released from her responsibilities. Subsequently, he appointed Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali, as his Special Representative for Angola, effective 28 June.

On 1 June, the Security Council, by its resolution 834 (1993), decided to extend UNAVEM II's mandate for a period of forty-five days until 15 July 1993 and stressed the importance of the functions of good offices and mediation by UNAVEM II and the Special Representative. The Council also welcomed the steps taken by the Secretary-General to strengthen United Nations humanitarian activities in Angola.

On 15 July 1993, the mandate of UNAVEM II was further extended by Security Council resolution 851 (1993) for a period of two months until 15 September. In recommending the extension, the Secretary-General noted that UNAVEM II had become an essential factor in a continuous United Nations effort to facilitate the resumption of negotiations, to support humanitarian activities in the country, as well as an indispensable channel for communication between the parties. By the same resolution, the Council reiterated its demand that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of the elections and abide fully by the Peace Accords. On 15 September, the Security Council, by resolution 864 (1993), further extended the existing mandate of UNAVEM II for a period of three months.

TRAGIC HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

In July-August 1993, the situation in Angola worsened further despite all efforts by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, as well as a series of diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the OAU, several African leaders and the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States). According to the Secretary-General's 13 September report to the Security Council, some 3 million people, particularly the most vulnerable population groups — children, women and the elderly — suffered from the consequences of the conflict. It was estimated that more than 1,000 persons died every day from the direct or indirect effects of the war.

From the outset of the renewed civil conflict in Angola, the United Nations agencies and programmes have made intensive efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to all Angolans in need. The United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) in the office of the Special Representative has played a major coordinating role in this process. On 21 May 1993, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs launched an appeal for Angola, seeking some $226 million in emergency humanitarian assistance. To date, approximately $60 million has been received, including $54 million in food aid.

In the coastal provinces and other areas considered secure, the relief programme initiated by the United Nations, in cooperation with national and international non-governmental organizations, has brought food aid and other emergency assistance to large numbers of Angolans displaced by the war or affected by the country-wide economic decline. How-

ever, the implementation of relief operations in the interior of the country and in zones of active conflict, where the needs are particularly acute, has encountered serious difficulties. It was only in October 1993, due to persistent efforts by UNAVEM II as well as the humanitarian agencies and following a general decrease in the intensity of fighting countrywide, that relief flights were able to reach besieged cities such as Kuito and Huambo, whose populations had been cut off from international assistance for many months.

SITUATION OF UNAVEM II

UNAVEM II continued to be deployed at five locations (Luanda, Lubango, Namibe, Benguela and Sumbe), with its military and police observers patrolling the areas, maintaining liaison with the respective local authorities, rendering support to humanitarian assistance operations, conducting investigations and other activities. In this connection, the Secretary-General stated in his 13 September report that the present number of international civil staff was inadequate to carry out effectively the various tasks required under UNAVEM II's mandate, especially that of mediation and good offices, and suggested that the number be increased to at least 59 persons. In adopting resolution 864 (1993) of 15 September, the Council reiterated its readiness to consider expanding substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process.

SANCTIONS AGAINST UNITA IMPOSED

By the same resolution, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, decided that all States should prevent the sale or supply of weapons, ammunition and military equipment as well as petroleum products to the territory of Angola other than through points of entry named by the Government of Angola. The embargo was to enter into force in 10 days unless a cease-fire was established. The Council also expressed its readiness to consider the imposition of further measures, including trade measures against UNITA and restrictions on the travel of UNITA personnel, unless by 1 November 1993 the Secretary-General reported that an effective cease-fire had been established and that agreement had been reached on the full implementation of the Peace Accords and relevant resolutions of the Security Council. It also decided to establish a committee to monitor the sanctions. The oil and arms embargo came into force at midnight on 25-26 September 1993.

EXPLORATORY TALKS

In the meantime, the United Nations has continued its efforts to facilitate the resumption of the peace process in consultation with the Angolan parties and interested countries, including, in particular, the observer countries to the Peace Accords. Following extensive consultations, the Government of Angola and UNITA began exploratory talks in Lusaka, Zambia, on 25 October 1993 under the auspices of the United Nations. These talks were made possible by positive steps taken by both sides, including UNITA's proclamation of a unilateral cease-fire and its acceptance of the general legal framework as well as submission by the Government of a peace plan.

As requested by Security Council resolution 864 (1993), the Secretary-General reported back on 27 October. He stated that not enough progress had been made towards implementing the Peace Accords and relevant Council resolutions, and therefore recommended that the Security Council impose additional measures against UNITA. However, the Secretary-General said the Council should postpone such action until 1 December in view of the fact that UNITA and the Angolan Government were holding political talks.

The Secretary-General recommended that UNAVEM II's authorized strength be increased from 50 to 175 military observers, from 18 to 60 police monitors, and from 11 to 14 military paramedics. Extra international and local staff would also be needed. The additional personnel would be deployed in the event of a breakthrough, and would enhance the Mission's ability to verify major developments on the ground and to provide good offices. He appealed to the Government of Angola and UNITA to make full use of the present opportunity and to consolidate the progress made so far in the search for a solution to the conflict in Angola. He also appealed to the international community for further generous support to meet the growing humanitarian needs, noting that stocks of relief supplies were inadequate.

In his statement of 1 November 1993, the President of the Security Council affirmed, on behalf of the Council, complete support for the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in their efforts aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis and encouraged the Secretary-General to carry out urgent contingency planning for the possible augmentation of the strength of the Mission.

COMPOSITION OF UNAVEM II

The strength of UNAVEM II is 50 military observers, 18 police observers, 11 military paramedics, 43 international civilian staff and 75 local staff deployed at Luanda, Lubango, Namibe, Benguela and Sumbe. Military and police personnel are contributed by Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and Zimbabwe.

Originally, UNAVEM II's authorized strength was 350 military observers and 90 police observers. There were also a civilian air unit and a medical unit, as well as some 87 international and 155 local civilian staff. In May 1992, the Secretary-General recommended, and the Security Council agreed, to increase the police strength of the Mission to 126 officers. Military and police observers were provided by Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, former Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe. In addition, during the polling, the Electoral Division fielded a total of 400 electoral observers. They were of some 90 nationalities and included staff members from the United Nations system and observers contributed by Member States. UNAVEM II's military and police observers also participated in observation of the electoral process.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The General Assembly appropriated approximately $107 million for the maintenance of UNAVEM II for the 17-month period from 1 June 1991 to 31 October 1992. For the period from 1 November 1992 to 15 September 1993, the General Assembly further appropriated a total amount of some $37 million. In addition, the Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to commit up to $1.9 million per month for a three-month period after 15 September, should the Security Council decide to extend UNAVEM II's mandate beyond that date.

The costs of the operation are met by assessed contributions from the Member States. As at 31 October 1993, total contributions outstanding to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I and UNAVEM II) amounted to approximately $31 million.

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

ONUSAL

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR

LOCATION: El Salvador

HEADQUARTERS: San Salvador

DURATION: July 1991 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: Approximately 1,000 military and police personnel, 170 international civilian staff, and 187 local staff

FATALITIES: 2 (as of 14 October 1993)

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CHIEF OF MISSION: Mr. Augusto Ramírez-Ocampo (Colombia)

BACKGROUND

The establishment of ONUSAL came about as a result of a complex negotiating process, initiated by the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in September 1989 and conducted by the parties under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General. The objective of the negotiations was to achieve a series of political agreements aimed at resolving the prolonged armed conflict in El Salvador by political means as speedily as possible, promoting democratization in the country, guaranteeing unrestricted respect for human rights and reunifying Salvadorian society. It was envisaged that implementation of all agreements that might be signed between the two parties would be subject to verification by the United Nations.

The first substantive agreement was achieved on 26 July 1990, when the Government of El Salvador and FMLN signed, at San José, Costa Rica, the Agreement on Human Rights. This Agreement provided for the establishment of a United Nations verification mission to monitor nationwide respect for and the guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms in El Salvador. According to the Agreement, the Mission was to take up its duties as of the cessation of the armed conflict. Shortly after signing the Agreement, however, the two parties independently requested that the Mission be set up even before a cease-fire.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ONUSAL

On 20 May 1991, following the Secretary-General's recommendation, the Security Council, by its resolution 693 (1991), decided to establish the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), as an integrated peace-keeping operation, to monitor all agreements concluded between the Government of El Salvador and FMLN. The Mission's initial mandate was to verify the compliance by the parties with the San José Agreement on Human Rights.

At that stage, the tasks of the Mission included actively monitoring the human rights situation in El Salvador; investigating specific cases of alleged human rights violations; promoting human rights in the country; making recommendations for the elimination of violations; and reporting on these matters to the Secretary-General and, through him, to the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.

VERIFICATION OF THE SAN JOSÉ AGREEMENT

ONUSAL was launched on 26 July 1991, at which time it absorbed a small preparatory office established in San Salvador in January 1991. In assuming its initial tasks, ONUSAL adopted a two-phase approach. During the preparatory phase, from July through September, ONUSAL set up its regional offices and laid the operational and conceptual bases for its future work. On 1 October 1991, ONUSAL

entered its second phase of operations, in which it began to investigate cases and situations involving allegations of human rights violations and to follow them up systematically with the competent State organs and with FMLN. The purpose of these activities has been to establish the veracity of such allegations and, where required, to follow the actions taken to identify and punish those responsible and to deter such violations in future. During this phase, ONUSAL has significantly expanded its contacts with the parties, establishing flexible, stable coordination mechanisms with them. In addition, the Mission initiated both a human rights education programme and an information campaign on human rights.

FIRST ENLARGEMENT OF ONUSAL'S MANDATE

Meanwhile, steady progress was made in the negotiations on other political agreements aimed at ending the armed conflict in El Salvador. On 31 December 1991, following more than two weeks of protracted negotiations at United Nations Headquarters in New York, the parties signed the Act of New York which, combined with the agreements previously signed at San José (26 July 1990), Mexico City (27 April 1991) and New York (25 September 1991), completed the negotiations on all substantive issues of the peace process. The parties also agreed that the final peace agreements would be signed at Mexico City on 16 January 1992.

The Agreements included two in particular, requiring a substantial enlargement of ONUSAL's mandate. These were the Agreement on the Cessation of the Armed Conflict, according to which ONUSAL was to verify all aspects of the cease-fire and the separation of forces, and the Agreement on the National Civil Police, which envisaged that ONUSAL should monitor the maintenance of public order during the transition period while the new National Civil Police was being set up.

On 14 January 1992, following the Secretary-General's recommendation, the Security Council, by its resolution 729 (1992), unanimously decided to enlarge ONUSAL's mandate and to increase its strength in order to fulfil verification requirements of the agreements. After signature of the "Peace Agreement" in Mexico City on 16 January 1992, the Secretary-General took immediate steps to enable the Mission to implement its expanded mandate.

ONUSAL STRUCTURE

The Human Rights Division was established in ONUSAL's first phase of operation to verify the implementation of the Agreement on Human Rights. Following the enlargement of ONUSAL's mandate on 14 January 1992, two new Divisions were established — a Military Division and a Police Division.

All ONUSAL Divisions are under the overall direction of the Chief of Mission, whose office, composed of a team of political affairs officers, is directly responsible for monitoring and promoting the implementation of all the political aspects of the Peace Agreement.

The Human Rights Division, which continues to be responsible for verifying the implementation of the Human Rights Agreement, comprises approximately 40 human rights observers, legal advisers and educators. The Regional Coordinators of the Division also deal with all the political aspects of the Mission's mandate, and report directly to the Chief of Mission in this respect. The active verification carried out by the Division is directed not only at an objective recording of facts, but also at the exercise of good offices aimed at assisting efforts by Salvadorians to find a remedy to violations. The Division also cooperates with Salvadorian institutions to strengthen their ability to work in promoting human rights and seeks to strengthen its relations with human rights non-governmental organizations.

The Military Division, established on 20 January 1992 with an authorized strength of 380 military observers, was responsible for verifying the Agreement on the Cessation of the Armed Conflict, dealing with the redeployment of the Armed Forces of El Salvador to the positions they would maintain in normal peace time, and the concentration of the FMLN forces in agreed "designated locations" in the areas of conflict. Its function was to monitor the troops of both parties in these locations, verify the inventories of weapons and personnel, authorize and accompany the movements of both forces, and receive and investigate complaints of violations. The Division was reduced in number following the culmination, on 15 December 1992, of the cease-fire process. It was further reduced after 31 May 1993, given the advances in the peace process (see COMPOSITION below). A number of verification tasks still remain to be carried out by ONUSAL military observers within the framework of the Peace Agreement, and the Division is also engaged in the coordination of the Plan for the Prevention of Accidents from Mines.

The creation of a new police force — the National Civil Police (PNC), to replace the old public security

structures — is one of the fundamental components of the Peace Agreements. The Police Division of ONUSAL, composed mostly of specialists in the organization and operation of civilian police forces, monitors National Police activities during the transition from armed conflict to national reconciliation, thereby providing the Salvadorian people with a sense of security. Although never realized, the authorized strength of the Police Division is 631. Its current strength is 279. The deployment of police observers throughout the territory of El Salvador began on 7 February 1992.

ONUSAL police observers also supervised and provided instruction to the Auxiliary Transitory Police (PAT), which operated between October 1992 and July 1993. PAT was responsible for maintaining public order and security in the former zones of conflict until their substitution by the new National Civil Police. It was made up of recruits from the National Public Security Academy, which began its activities on 1 September 1992. ONUSAL monitors the admission examinations to the Academy and recommends improvements where necessary. The effective monitoring of the functioning of the Academy has been strengthened by the presence of an ONUSAL observer in the Academic Council. ONUSAL also provides support to the Academy to strengthen its training courses on human rights.

The Police Division assumed additional functions as territorial deployment of the National Civil Police began in March 1993. In response to a request submitted by the Government and in close coordination with the international technical team that provides advice to the Director-General of PNC, the Division is evaluating the performance of the new police force in the field and providing it with technical advice and logistical support.

The Division assists in efforts to locate illegal arms caches and supports the Human Rights Division. Police observers conduct special inquiries when required and ensure that appropriate security measures are provided for FMLN leaders, as established by the Accords.

ADJUSTMENTS TO THE TIMETABLE

Under the timetable for the implementation of the Peace Agreements, the process of ending the armed conflict was to have been completed by 31 October 1992. By that time, the Government of El Salvador was to have completed several major commitments of a political and institutional nature and FMLN was to have demobilized all its combatants, destroyed their armament and reintegrated them into civilian life under programmes provided by the Government.

However, the tightness of the timetable, together with the complexity of the issues involved, led to major delays in completing certain commitments crucial for the overall implementation of the peace process. Consequently, adjustments had to be made, on 17 June and again on 19 August 1992, to those parts of the timetable that had been affected. In both these adjustments, the fulfilment of certain key commitments had to be postponed beyond 31 October 1992. Among them were the provision of agricultural land in the former zones of conflict, which was originally to have been completed by the end of July 1992, and the establishment of the National Public Security Academy, which was due on 1 May 1992.

On 30 September 1992, FMLN informed the United Nations that, in order to maintain the link in the original timetable between the key undertakings of the two parties, it would suspend demobilization of its forces until new dates had been set for the start of the transfer of land and other aspects of the Agreement that had fallen behind schedule. On 13 October, the Secretary-General presented a proposal regarding the solution of the land issue, which was accepted by FMLN and the Government on 15 and 16 October, respectively.

While an agreement on the land issue was reached, it became evident that the complete dismantling of the FMLN military structure by 31 October 1992 would be difficult to achieve. On 23 October, the Secretary-General proposed to the parties a new target date of 15 December 1992. FMLN accepted the proposal contingent upon its acceptance by the Government. The Government, however, reserved its position on some aspects of the proposal and suspended the restructuring, reduction and demobilization of its Armed Forces.

In these circumstances, the Secretary-General sent Mr. Marrack Goulding, then Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, and Mr. Alvaro de Soto, Senior Political Adviser to the Secretary-General, to San Salvador in late October 1992 to assist in overcoming difficulties. He was informed subsequently that these consultations with the parties led to arrangements for the formal ending of the armed conflict on 15 December. The arrangements also included agreement by President Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador to complete implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on Purification of the Armed Forces. The establishment of the Ad Hoc Commission was provided for by the Peace Agree-

ments. It was set up on 19 May 1992, and submitted its report to President Cristiani and to the Secretary-General on 22 September. However, difficulties emerged, *inter alia*, regarding the timetable for the implementation of those recommendations.

ONUSAL closely followed all issues related to the creation of the new National Civil Police, the political participation of FMLN, the restoration of public administration in former zones of conflict, and reforms of the judicial and electoral systems. In addition, the Mission participated as an observer in the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), mandated to oversee the implementation of all political agreements reached by the parties.

END OF THE ARMED CONFLICT

On 23 December 1992, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the armed conflict between the Government of El Salvador and FMLN had been brought formally to an end on 15 December in accordance with the agreed adjustments in the timetable for implementing the Peace Agreements. This event, which had been preceded the previous evening by the legalization of FMLN as a political party, was marked by a ceremony presided over by President Cristiani and attended by the Secretary-General and a number of international statesmen.

The Secretary-General described the event as "a defining moment in the history of El Salvador, whose long-suffering people can now look forward to a future in which political, economic and social arguments will be settled through the processes of democracy and not by war." At the same time, he stressed that it did not mark the end of the peace process in El Salvador. It was important, he stated, that both parties, and the international community, should persevere in their efforts to ensure implementation of the remaining provisions of the Peace Agreements.

SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF ONUSAL'S MANDATE

ONUSAL's mandate was enlarged a second time after the Government of El Salvador, on 8 January 1993, formally requested United Nations observation of the elections for the presidency, the Legislative Assembly, mayors and municipal councils, due in March 1994. The Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the request and stated that, given the importance of these elections, it was his intention to recommend that the Council accept it.

A technical mission visited El Salvador from 18 to 28 April 1993 to define the terms of reference, concept of operations and financial implications of expanding the ONUSAL mandate. The Secretary-General summarized the main findings of the mission in his 21 May 1993 report to the Security Council, and stated that the elections were likely to be the culminating point of the entire peace process. The Salvadorian Supreme Electoral Tribunal would receive full cooperation from ONUSAL should the Security Council approve his recommendation that the Mission be authorized to observe the electoral process.

The main tasks of the electoral observers would be the following: monitoring electoral irregularities, receiving complaints and conveying them, as appropriate, to electoral authorities; observing political meetings and demonstrations; following up and assessing electoral advertising and electoral-related reporting in the media. The information thus collected would be the basis for analysing trends and acting upon them as required. On election day, the number of observers would increase so as to permit monitoring at every polling site. ONUSAL would verify the counting of votes and make projections for its own use and possibly for sharing with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The electoral observation would continue after election day to cover all aspects related to the counting of votes and possible challenges to results. The observation would conclude with the official proclamation of final results by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.

The Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report by its resolution 832 of 27 May 1993 and decided to enlarge ONUSAL's mandate to include observation of the electoral process. It also requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to this effect. By the same resolution, the Council welcomed the continuing adaptation by the Secretary-General of the activities and strength of ONUSAL, taking into account progress made in implementing the peace process.

In order to carry out its duties, the Electoral Division is being established in five stages. The preparatory stage, from 1 to 30 June 1993, was devoted to organization at the central and regional levels; during the period July to December, the main tasks are verifying citizens' registration and following political activities; from December 1993 to March 1994, efforts are to be concentrated on observation of the electoral campaign; the Division will then observe the elections, set for 20 March 1994, the counting of votes and the

announcement of results. Should the first round yield a definitive result, the activities of the Division will conclude on 31 March 1994. Should a second round of elections for the presidency be necessary, observation will continue from 1 to 30 April 1994.

COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH

In the report of 21 May 1993, the Secretary-General stated that the first phase of the timetable for implementation had successfully been brought to a close. The priority assigned to military aspects in the preceding period had shifted to other provisions of the agreements. Implementation of several key commitments had continued to progress. However, the deployment of the National Civil Police was behind schedule and difficulties continued to plague the transfer of land and other programmes essential to the reintegration of former combatants on both sides. The Military Division continued its verification of the destruction of FMLN weapons and the reduction of the Armed Forces of El Salvador. In the area of human rights, the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights had opened regional offices.

The Secretary-General also reported that he had received the report of the Commission on the Truth on 15 March 1993. The Commission — established in accordance with the Mexico Agreements of 27 April 1991 to investigate serious acts of violence that had occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society was deemed to require an urgent public knowledge of the truth — was composed of three international personalities appointed by the Secretary-General after consultation with the parties: Belisario Betancur, former President of Colombia; Reinaldo Figuerdo Planchart, former Foreign Minister of Venezuela; and Thomas Buergenthal, former President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and of the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights. The Commission was to transmit a final report with its conclusions and recommendations to the parties and to the Secretary-General, who would make it public and would take the decisions and initiatives that he deemed appropriate. The parties undertook to carry out the Commission's recommendations.

The Commission received over 22,000 complaints of "serious acts of violence" which had occurred between January 1980 and July 1991. These were classified as violence by agents of the State; massacres of peasants by the Armed Forces; assassinations by death squads; violence by FMLN; and assassinations of judges. The Commission listed its recommendations under four headings: recommendations arising directly from the results of the Commission's own investigations; eradication of structural causes directly connected with the incidents investigated; institutional reforms to prevent the repetition of such events; and measures for national reconciliation.

According to the Secretary-General, the question of implementing these recommendations had given rise to controversy and remained outstanding. He instructed that a detailed analysis be made of the Commission's recommendations, examining whether any of them was outside the Commission's mandate or incompatible with the Constitution and identifying what action was required by whom and in what time-frame. The Secretary-General conveyed that analysis to the Government, FMLN and COPAZ on 20 May 1993, and requested each of them to inform him by 20 June 1993 of the action it had taken or planned to take to implement the recommendations for which it was designated as an addressee and to promote the implementation of the other recommendations. The Secretary-General later reported, on 14 October 1993, that the Commission's recommendations had been the subject of active exchanges of views and communications between the Secretariat and the Government, FMLN and COPAZ. Although some action had been taken on a large number of recommendations made by the Commission on the Truth, no implementation had been reported with regard to others. At a high-level meeting on 8 September 1993, in which ONUSAL participated, the Government and FMLN agreed on the need to step up the implementation process with a view to "sweeping the table clear" before the electoral campaign began.

DISCOVERY OF FMLN ARMS CACHES

On 23 May 1993, an explosion at an automobile repair shop in Managua, Nicaragua, led to the discovery of a weapons cache which the Nicaraguan authorities linked to a constituent group of FMLN. The Secretary-General, in a letter to the Security Council dated 8 June, emphasized that the maintenance of clandestine arms deposits, for whatever reason, was a cause of serious concern and that the non-inclusion of these arms in the final inventory presented by FMLN to ONUSAL raised serious questions of confidence and trust. He noted, however, that FMLN was cooperating with ONUSAL in locating and eliminating possible remaining arms caches in El Salvador. Furthermore, at ONUSAL's request, FMLN had agreed to the destruction on 4 June of a group of sophisticated weapons located in El Salvador. Their destruction had been scheduled to

coincide with full compliance by the Government, due at the end of June, with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on the Purification of the Armed Forces.

Reporting to the Council on 29 June 1993, the Secretary-General stated that he had made continuous efforts directly and through ONUSAL to establish the facts, to ensure that all remaining clandestine caches were declared to it and their contents destroyed and to limit the repercussions on the peace process of this very serious violation of the Peace Agreements. He also stated that the right of FMLN to maintain its status as a political party in these circumstances had been questioned in some quarters. However, the cancellation or suspension of FMLN's status as a political party could place in jeopardy the progress which had so far been achieved and could itself deal a severe blow to the peace process. Fortunately, FMLN's prompt and complete acceptance of its responsibility for the events and its full cooperation in the ensuing investigation, the Secretary-General observed, had paved the way for a restoration of the confidence that should accompany the peace process.

On 12 July, the Security Council took note of the Secretary-General's report and noted FMLN's promise to disclose all its holdings of arms and munitions and subsequently to destroy them by 4 August 1993. The members of the Council stressed that the complete disarmament of FMLN, and the reintegration of its members into the civil, political and institutional life of the country, formed an essential part of the peace process. They shared the assessment that it was an indication of the strength and irreversibility of the peace process that a serious incident of this nature had not been allowed to derail the implementation of the Peace Agreements. They agreed with his view that the cancellation or suspension of FMLN's status as a political party could deal a severe blow to the peace process.

On 13 July, the Council welcomed confirmation by the Secretary-General on 7 July that the Government had complied with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on the Purification of the Armed Forces.

COMPLETION OF A PROCESS

The Secretary-General submitted a further report to the Security Council on 30 August 1993, stating that the overall process of verification and destruction of FMLN weapons and equipment mandated by the Peace Agreements had been completed on 18 August 1993. The process had included two distinct phases. The first covered the period until the accidental explosion of the illegal arms cache in Managua on 23 May 1993. The second phase covered ONUSAL's operations with respect to arms discovered in the immediate aftermath of the Managua incident and those declared by FMLN in compliance with its renewed commitment to disclose all its remaining weapons.

In accordance with the agreements, ONUSAL had had to rely on the data voluntarily provided by the parties as its main source of information. A comparative analysis based on other official and unofficial sources was made in order to make a realistic assessment of the FMLN inventory. Taking these elements as a point of reference and on the basis of ONUSAL's verification of the destruction of weapons discovered or declared by FMLN, the Secretary-General stated that by all available indications the FMLN military structure had been effectively dismantled. Its former combatants had been demobilized and had been reintegrated, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, institutional and political life of the country, as established in the Peace Agreements.

The Secretary-General concluded his report by expressing the hope that the activities leading to the March 1994 elections would develop in an atmosphere of normalcy, thus reinforcing the peace process which in general had been exemplary.[1]

COMPOSITION

At its peak strength in February 1992, ONUSAL's Military Division comprised 368 military observers. By the end of January 1993, as the peace process progressed, it was reduced to a strength of 95 and was further reduced after 31 May 1993. On 31 October 1993, the Division comprised 30 military observers. On 1 October 1993, the strength of the Police Division was reduced from 326 observers to 279. Electoral Division personnel are being phased in as required by the electoral process and their assignment will conclude with the official proclamation of final results by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.

ONUSAL military observers are provided by Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Venezuela. In addition, four medical officers are provided by Argentina. Police observers come from Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Guyana, Italy, Mexico, Spain and Sweden. The Human Rights Division and other civilian staff of ONUSAL consists largely of staff members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, as well as personnel seconded from Member States.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The rough annual cost of ONUSAL to the United Nations is $35 million and is met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 31 October 1993, total contributions outstanding to the ONUSAL Special Account amounted to approximately $26 million.

Notes

[1]On 30 November 1993, after having considered a further report of the Secretary-General submitted on 23 November 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 888 (1993), decided to extend the mandate of ONUSAL until 31 May 1994. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report by 1 May 1994 on the operations of ONUSAL so that the Council might review the Mission's size and scope after 31 May 1994, taking into account his recommendations for the "fulfilment and completion of its mandate".

PS/DPI/13/Rev.4 — October 1993

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

MINURSO

UNITED NATIONS MISSION FOR THE REFERENDUM IN WESTERN SAHARA

LOCATION: Western Sahara

HEADQUARTERS: Laayoune

DURATION: September 1991 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: Approximately 1,700 military observers and troops, 300 police officers and about 800 to 1,000 civilian personnel

CURRENT STRENGTH: 226 military observers, 98 military support personnel, 26 police officers and 103 international and local civilian staff members

FATALITIES: 4 (as of 14 October 1993)

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan (Pakistan)

FORCE COMMANDER: Brigadier-General André Van Baelen (Belgium)

BACKGROUND

In 1985, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in cooperation with the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), initiated a joint mission of good offices in the search for a solution of the question of Western Sahara. On 11 August 1988, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Special Envoy of the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU presented, in separate meetings, to the parties to the conflict in Western Sahara, namely Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), a document referred to as "the settlement proposals". The document contained proposals for a just and definitive solution of the question of Western Sahara in conformity with 1960 General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). This would be accomplished by means of a cease-fire and the holding of a referendum without military or administrative constraints, to enable the people of Western Sahara, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, to choose between independence and integration with Morocco.

On 27 June 1990, the Security Council, in its resolution 658 (1990), approved a report of the Secretary-General, which contained the full text of the settlement proposals as accepted by the two parties on 30 August 1988, as well as an outline of the Secretary-General's plan for implementing those proposals.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

The implementation plan provided for a transitional period during which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, acting under the authority of the Secretary-General, would have sole and exclusive responsibility over all matters relating to the referendum, including its organization and conduct. The Special Representative would be assisted in his tasks by a deputy special representative and by an integrated group of United Nations civilian, military and civilian police personnel. This group would be known as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

According to the plan, the transitional period would begin with the coming into effect of a cease-fire and end with the proclamation of the results of the referendum. Following the announcement of a cease-fire, MINURSO would verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory; monitor the confinement of Moroccan and the Frente POLISARIO troops to designated locations; take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees; oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (International Committee of the Red Cross); implement

the repatriation programme (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees); identify and register qualified voters; organize and ensure a free referendum; and proclaim the results.

The plan stipulated that MINURSO would consist of the Special Representative and his office, and civilian, military and security units. The civilian component would range in size from about 800 to 1,000 personnel, depending on the requirements of the various phases of the transitional period. At full strength, the military component would consist of approximately 1,700 personnel, and the Security Unit of about 300 police officers.

ESTABLISHMENT OF MINURSO

On 29 April 1991, the Security Council, in its resolution 690 (1991), decided to establish MINURSO, in accordance with a report of the Secretary-General which further detailed the implementation plan. In approving the plan, the Security Council also accepted the timetable proposed in the Secretary-General's report. It was envisaged that the transitional period would begin no later than 16 weeks after the General Assembly approved the MINURSO budget and would last for 20 weeks. MINURSO would remain in the Territory for up to 26 weeks from the coming into effect of the cease-fire. The Secretary-General indicated, however, that the periods of time allowed for the various processes were estimates that could require adjustment.

The budget for MINURSO was approved by the General Assembly on 17 May 1991.

CEASE-FIRE

On 24 May 1991, in accordance with the plan, the Secretary-General proposed that the cease-fire should enter into effect on 6 September. Both parties accepted that date. During the following three months, however, it became clear that it would not be possible to complete before 6 September a number of tasks that were to be completed before the cease-fire. It also became clear that, notwithstanding the parties' earlier acceptance of the settlement plan, substantial areas of difference between them remained. One party therefore was not able to agree that the transition period should begin on 6 September 1991.

Meanwhile, hostilities had broken out in the Territory, interrupting an informal cease-fire that had been in effect for over two years. In these circumstances, the Secretary-General decided that the formal cease-fire should come into effect on 6 September as initially agreed, on the understanding that the transition period would begin as soon as the outstanding tasks had been completed. The Security Council supported his proposal that, during this delay, 100 military observers should be deployed in the Territory to verify the cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities in certain areas. The number of military observers was subsequently increased to 228 and certain logistics and administrative support staff were also sent to the field.

The primary function of MINURSO in its present limited deployment has been restricted to verifying the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. This is done by direct observation of military forces and activities carried out by either party and verifying complaints of alleged cease-fire violations. United Nations military observers are deployed to ten team sites/observation posts in the northern and southern sectors of the Territory. The team sites, covering the main points of concern in the Territory, are the key element in monitoring the cease-fire. United Nations military observers operate in mobile patrols. Helicopter-borne patrols are also conducted to enhance MINURSO monitoring capability and react at short notice to complaints and violations.

The headquarters of the Mission has been established in the capital, Laayoune, with two regional headquarters in the northern and southern sectors of the Territory. A liaison office has been established in Tindouf to maintain contact with the Algerian authorities and the Frente POLISARIO.

DIFFERENCES REMAIN

According to the settlement plan, the referendum in Western Sahara should have taken place in January 1992. However, it has not been possible to proceed in conformity with the original timetable. While both parties — the Government of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO — have reiterated their confidence in the United Nations, their commitment to the settlement plan and their willingness to restore the momentum of the peace process, they continue to have divergent views and different interpretations of some of the key elements contained in the plan, including those with regard to the question of criteria for eligibility to vote in the referendum.

Criteria for voter eligibility were enunciated by former Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar on 19 December 1991. While considering them to be unduly restrictive, Morocco nevertheless accepted them. For its part, the Frente POLISARIO maintained that, in the initial agreement, the two parties had agreed that the list of Saharans counted in the census

conducted by the Spanish administration in the Territory in 1974 would be the exclusive basis of the electorate. In its view, the criteria of 19 December 1991 would unduly expand the electorate beyond the 1974 census list and were incompatible therefore with the relevant provisions of the settlement plan.

In the hope to break this deadlock, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, Mr. Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, held, in August and September 1992, a series of separate talks with the two parties on the interpretation and application of the criteria. The purpose of such talks was to find ways of ensuring that both parties arrived at the same interpretation of the criteria.

In spite of intensive efforts by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his Special Representative to find mutually acceptable solutions, it has not so far been possible to put the implementation plan back on track. Moreover, an attempt to organize a meeting of 38 Western Saharan tribal chiefs in Geneva, at the end of November 1992, had to be cancelled because of the differences relating to the powers of some participants designated by the Moroccan party.

In his 26 January 1993 report to the Security Council on the situation in Western Sahara, the Secretary-General stated that the cancellation of the meeting in Geneva demonstrated the futility of the efforts undertaken "with vigor and resource" by his Special Representative over the past eight months to seek a way out of the existing deadlock. He suggested three possible options available under the circumstances.

A first option suggested the continuation and, if possible, intensification of talks. The Secretary-General believed, however, that the chances for success under this option were very slim.

A second option required the immediate implementation of the settlement plan on the basis of the instructions for the review of applications for participation in the referendum, appearing in the annex to the 19 December 1991 report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. This could mean, the Secretary-General pointed out, that the implementation would have to proceed without the cooperation of one of the parties.

A third option was to adopt an alternative approach not based on the settlement plan. Requesting guidance from the Security Council on how best to proceed, the Secretary-General stated that, depending on the Council's decision, the role and strength of MINURSO might have to be adjusted.

On 2 March, the Security Council, by its resolution 809 (1993), invited the Secretary-General to intensify efforts in order to resolve outstanding issues, and to make the necessary preparations for the referendum and to consult accordingly with the parties for the purpose of commencing voter registration starting with the updated lists of the 1974 census. The Secretary-General was requested to report to the Council on the prospects and modalities for holding the referendum by the end of the current year at the latest. He was also requested to include proposals for the necessary adjustments to the present role and strength of MINURSO. The Council urged the two parties to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in implementing the settlement plan for Western Sahara and to resolve their differences regarding the criteria for voter eligibility.

On 21 May, the Secretary-General, in an interim report, informed the Security Council about the consultations his Special Representative had initiated with the parties on a possible compromise regarding the interpretation and application of the voter eligibility criteria, and about his decision to visit the region in the first week of June "to make one more effort to seek a compromise solution".

The Secretary-General also reported that discussions had been held with the parties on a number of issues relating to an early registration of voters. After both sides confirmed their desire to proceed promptly with the registration of voters and to cooperate with MINURSO in this regard, it was decided to establish an Identification Commission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. On 23 April, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Erik Jensen (Malaysia) as Chairman of the Commission.

SECRETARY-GENERAL VISITS THE AREA

During a visit to the area from 31 May to 4 June 1993, the Secretary-General presented to the parties a comprehensive text outlining a compromise solution with regard to the interpretation and application of the criteria for voter eligibility. Another round of meetings was held by the Secretary-General's Special Representative from 5 to 20 June 1993. During these and subsequent consultations, both parties reaffirmed their commitment to the implementation of the peace plan in its entirety and their determination to move towards an early referendum. Both sides stressed that they did not reject the proposed compromise but expressed reservations on certain provisions of the text. In spite of its reservations Morocco has since acquiesced in the compromise in its present form. While finally conveying its acceptance of all the eligibility criteria of 19 December 1991, the

Frente POLISARIO has expressed substantial reservations on the proposed compromise concerning their interpretation and application and requested several amendments to the text.

On 28 July 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that shortly after his visit to the area, the two parties agreed to initiate direct talks and to ask for the assistance of the United Nations in holding this meeting. The delegations of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO met from 17 to 19 July 1993 at Laayoune, in the presence of the Special Representative as United Nations observer. The Secretary-General described this event as an encouraging sign and expressed his hope that such talks would be resumed soon.

The Secretary-General also informed the Council that, in the meantime, the Chairman of the Identification Commission had travelled to the region in order to prepare for the initiation of the process of identification and registration of voters. He also assembled the members of the Commission and a team of registration officers. The former group arrived in Laayoune in June. The Commission began work on establishing with the authorities of both parties the detailed procedures for identification and registration, starting in the Laayoune and Tindouf areas.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REMAINS HOPEFUL

The direct talks between the Government of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, initiated in July 1993 at Laayoune, were scheduled to resume on 25 October 1993 in New York. While ground rules laid down for the resumption of talks gave to each party the right to choose the composition of its delegation, the POLISARIO delegation "found it impossible" to meet with the other party because of the presence of former POLISARIO officials in the Moroccan delegation. Despite efforts by the Secretary-General's Special Representative to find ways of overcoming the procedural difficulties, the talks did not take place.

On 27 October, the Secretary-General issued a statement in which he deeply regretted the failure of the parties to meet. At the same time, he remained hopeful that a dialogue between the two parties "may be resumed in due course". In the meantime, the Secretary-General was determined to continue efforts for the implementation of the settlement plan and to proceed with the identification and registration of potential voters in the referendum.

COMPOSITION OF MINURSO

The strength of MINURSO, in its present limited deployment, includes some 226 military observers and 98 military support personnel provided by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Tunisia, United States and Venezuela. Also, a first contingent of civilian police, numbering 26 officers, led by the Police Commissioner of MINURSO, Colonel Jürgen Friedrich Reimann, arrived in the mission area in early June 1993. Their primary responsibility is to ensure security and order at identification and registration sites. Police officers are contributed by Austria, Belgium, Germany, Malaysia and Togo. In addition, 103 civilian staff members, 69 of whom are internationally recruited, are assigned to MINURSO in support of its mandate.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The rough annual cost of MINURSO, in its present deployment, is approximately $37 million. The operation is funded by assessed contributions of United Nations Member States. As at 31 October 1993, total contributions outstanding to the MINURSO Special Account amounted to approximately $20 million.

PS/DPI/17/Rev.3 — October 1993

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993[1]

UNPROFOR

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

LOCATION: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

HEADQUARTERS: Zagreb, Croatia

DURATION: March 1992 to present

STRENGTH: Approximately 25,500 military personnel, 660 civilian police, 695 international civilian staff and 974 local staff

FATALITIES: 59 (as of 14 October 1993)

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CHIEF OF MISSION: Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg[2] (Norway)

FORCE COMMANDER: Lieutenant-General Jean Cot (France)

BACKGROUND

Serious fighting in Croatia began in June 1991 when that republic and its northern neighbour, Slovenia, declared themselves independent from Yugoslavia,[3] and Serbs living in Croatia, supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), opposed this move. Efforts by the European Community to stop the hostilities in mid-1991 and to resolve the crisis in the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia had proved unsuccessful.

The United Nations became actively involved in the situation in Yugoslavia on 25 September 1991 when the Security Council, meeting at the ministerial level, unanimously adopted its resolution 713 (1991) expressing deep concern at the fighting in that country and calling on all States to implement immediately a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia". The Council commended and fully supported the efforts already undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia. By its resolution, the Council invited the Secretary-General to offer his assistance in consultation with the Government of Yugoslavia and all those promoting the peace efforts.

On 8 October 1991, then Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar appointed Mr. Cyrus Vance, former United States Secretary of State, as his Personal Envoy for Yugoslavia. Thereafter, the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy maintained constant contact with all the parties to the conflict, with the Presidency of the European Community, with the Chairman of the CSCE-participating States, with Lord Carrington, then Chairman of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia, and with other interested parties in their efforts to find a solution to the crisis. It soon became clear that the most valuable contribution the United Nations could make at that stage was a peace-keeping operation to create the necessary conditions for the pursuit of political negotiations for a peaceful settlement.

As part of the collective effort to stop the fighting and to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy undertook several missions to Yugoslavia and discussed with all parties concerned, among other things, the feasibility of deploying a United Nations peace-keeping operation. On 23 November, the Personal Envoy convened in Geneva a meeting which was attended by the Presidents of Serbia and of Croatia and the Secretary of State for National Defence of Yugoslavia, as well as Lord Carrington. During the meeting, the Yugoslav parties reached agreement on an immediate cease-fire and on a number of other issues. Each of the Yugoslav parties expressed the wish to see the speedy establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation. However, while progress was made on the other issues, the cease-fire broke down almost immediately.

On 27 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 721 (1991), approved the efforts of the

Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, and endorsed the statement made by the Personal Envoy to the parties that the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia could not be envisaged without full compliance by all parties with the Geneva agreement. During subsequent weeks of intensive negotiations with the parties concerned, the implementation of the Geneva agreement was pursued and the general principles were defined for a United Nations peace-keeping operation. On 15 December, the Security Council, by its resolution 724 (1991), approved the Secretary-General's report which contained a plan for a possible peace-keeping operation. A small group of military officers, civilian police and United Nations Secretariat staff travelled to Yugoslavia to prepare for the implementation of this plan.

Thereafter the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy focused their efforts on consolidating the cease-fire and on securing unconditional acceptance of the United Nations plan by all parties to the conflict, including assurances of their readiness to cooperate fully in its implementation. Keeping the Security Council informed of these efforts and the developments in the country, the Secretary-General reported on several occasions that, despite widespread support in Yugoslavia for a United Nations peace-keeping operation, the necessary conditions for its establishment still did not exist.

On 2 January 1992, as part of his attempts to remove the remaining obstacles, the Personal Envoy convened in Sarajevo a meeting between military representatives of the Republic of Croatia and representatives of the JNA, at which the Implementing Accord on the unconditional cease-fire was signed. With the Security Council's concurrence, the newly elected Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali then sent to Yugoslavia a group of 50 military liaison officers, with the task of using their good offices to promote maintenance of the cease-fire by facilitating communication between the two sides and by helping them to resolve difficulties that might arise. In the meantime, the Personal Envoy, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations and their team continued their efforts to secure the cooperation of all Yugoslav parties in implementing the United Nations plan for a peace-keeping operation.

On 15 February 1992, notwithstanding the fact that certain political groups in Yugoslavia were still expressing objections to the United Nations plan, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). In making this recommendation, he stressed that, in his view, the danger that a United Nations peace-keeping operation would fail for lack of cooperation from the parties was less grievous than the danger that delay in its dispatch would lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire and to a new conflagration.

On 21 February, the Security Council, by its resolution 743 (1992), approved the report and established UNPROFOR for an initial period of 12 months. The Council confirmed that the Force should be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis within the framework of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia. It requested the Secretary-General to deploy immediately those elements of UNPROFOR which could assist in developing an implementation plan for the earliest possible full deployment of the Force.

On 7 April, after receiving a report from the Secretary-General on 2 April that all the Force Commander's interlocutors had emphasized the need for the earliest possible deployment of UNPROFOR, the Security Council, by its resolution 749 (1992), authorized the full deployment of the Force.

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE: FEBRUARY 1992 — FEBRUARY 1993

The operational mandate of UNPROFOR extends to five Republics of the former Yugoslavia — Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia[4], Montenegro and Serbia — and it has a liaison presence in the sixth, Slovenia.

Croatia

United Nations Protected Areas. UNPROFOR is deployed in certain areas in Croatia, designated as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), in which the United Nations Security Council judged that special interim arrangements were required to ensure that a lasting cease-fire was maintained. The UNPAs are areas in which Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter-communal tensions have led to armed conflict in the recent past. There are three UNPAs: Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina. For United Nations purposes, they have been divided into four sectors: East, North, South and West.

The original United Nations plan in Croatia rests on two central elements: (a) the withdrawal of the JNA from all of Croatia and the demilitarization of the

UNPAs; and (b) the continuing functioning, on an interim basis, of the existing local authorities and police, under United Nations supervision, pending the achievement of an overall political solution to the crisis.

UNPROFOR's mandate is to ensure that the UNPAs are demilitarized, through the withdrawal or disbandment of all armed forces in them, and that all persons residing in them are protected from fear of armed attack. To this end, UNPROFOR is authorized to control access to the UNPAs, to ensure that the UNPAs remain demilitarized, and to monitor the functioning of the local police there to help ensure non-discrimination and the protection of human rights. Outside the UNPAs, UNPROFOR military observers are to verify the withdrawal of all the JNA and irregular forces from Croatia, other than those disbanded and demobilized there. In support of the work of the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations, UNPROFOR is also to facilitate the return, in conditions of safety and security, of civilian displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs.

UNPROFOR initially established its headquarters in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina; it is now headquartered in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia.

Enlargements of mandate in Croatia. Since the establishment of UNPROFOR, there have been several enlargements of its mandate in Croatia. On 30 June 1992, the Security Council, by its resolution 762 (1992), authorized UNPROFOR to undertake monitoring functions in the "pink zones" — certain areas of Croatia controlled by the JNA and populated by then largely by Serbs, but which were outside the agreed UNPA boundaries. It also recommended the establishment of a Joint Commission chaired by UNPROFOR and consisting of representatives of the Government of Croatia and of the local authorities in the region, with the participation of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), to oversee and monitor the restoration of authority by the Croatian Government in the "pink zones".

On 7 August 1992, the Security Council, by its resolution 769 (1992), authorized the enlargement of UNPROFOR's strength and mandate to enable the Force to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform immigration and customs functions at the UNPA borders at international frontiers.

The third enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia came about on 6 October 1992, when the Security Council adopted its resolution 779 (1992), authorizing UNPROFOR to assume responsibility for monitoring of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula near Dubrovnik. By the same resolution, the Council approved the Secretary-General's action to ensure the control by UNPROFOR of the vitally important Peruca dam, situated in one of the "pink zones" in Croatia.

Renewed hostilities. On 22 January 1993, the Croatian Army launched an offensive in a number of locations in the southern part of UNPROFOR's Sector South and the adjacent "pink zones". The Croatian Government stated that it took this action out of impatience with the slow progress of negotiations in respect of various economic facilities in and adjacent to the UNPAs and "pink zones". On 27 January, the Croatian Army attacked and captured the Peruca dam. The Serbs responded to the Croatian offensive by breaking into a number of storage areas, which were under joint control under a double-lock system in the UNPAs, and by removing their weapons, including heavy weapons.

UNPROFOR warned both the Croatian Government and the Serb authorities not to attempt further incursions into the UNPAs. The Force also sought to limit the damage caused by the fighting, and made repeated representations to the parties concerned with a view to preventing escalation and bringing about a cease-fire.

On 25 January, the Security Council adopted its resolution 802 (1993), in which it demanded an immediate cessation of hostile activities by Croatian armed forces within or adjacent to the UNPAs and their withdrawal from these areas, an end to attacks against UNPROFOR personnel, return of all heavy weapons seized from UNPROFOR-controlled storage areas, and strict compliance by all parties with the terms of cease-fire arrangements. It called upon all parties to cooperate fully with the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia[5] and to refrain from any actions which might undermine efforts aimed at reaching a political settlement.

As to the implementation of this resolution, the Croatian Government on 26 January informed the Force Commander of UNPROFOR that, upon compliance by the Serb side with the various provisions of the resolution, they would remove their military, but not their police, from the areas they had taken. For its part, the Serb side stated that Croatia must return to its pre-22 January positions before the implementation of the remainder of the resolution could be considered.

Eventually, after several rounds of talks held under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Government of Croatia and the Serb local authorities signed an agreement regarding the implementation of resolution 802 (1993).

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Although the mandate of UNPROFOR originally related only to Croatia, it was envisaged that after the demilitarization of the UNPAs, 100 UNPROFOR military observers would be redeployed from Croatia to certain parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, in light of the deteriorating situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-General decided to accelerate this deployment by sending 40 military observers to the Mostar region of that Republic on 30 April 1992. In May, despite all diplomatic efforts by the European Community, the Secretary-General's representatives and UNPROFOR to negotiate a lasting cease-fire, the conflict — between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats on the one side and the Bosnian Serbs on the other — intensified. On 14 May, when risks to their lives reached an unacceptable level, the observers were withdrawn from the area and redeployed in the UNPAs in Croatia. About two thirds of UNPROFOR headquarters personnel also withdrew from Sarajevo on 16 and 17 May, leaving behind some 100 military personnel and civilian staff who lent their good offices to promote local cease-fires and humanitarian activities.

In a series of resolutions and statements, the Security Council appealed to all parties to bring about a cease-fire and a negotiated political solution, and demanded, *inter alia*, that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by JNA, as well as by the Croatian Army, cease immediately and that all local irregular forces be disbanded and disarmed.

On 30 May, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council, in its resolution 757 (1992), imposed wide-ranging sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which by then consisted of Serbia and Montenegro), in order to help achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict. It also demanded that all parties create the conditions necessary for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue using his good offices to achieve this objective.

Security arrangements at Sarajevo airport. In keeping with the Council's request, UNPROFOR pursued negotiations with the parties to the conflict aimed at stopping the fighting around the airport and reopening it for humanitarian purposes. On 6 June 1992, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that UNPROFOR had negotiated, on 5 June, an agreement for the handing over to the Force of the Sarajevo airport. On 8 June, the Security Council, by its resolution 758 (1992), approved the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength and authorized the Secretary-General to deploy military observers and related personnel and equipment to Sarajevo to supervise the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons and the concentration of heavy weapons at agreed locations in the city.

Following intensive work by UNPROFOR to establish modalities of implementation of the 5 June agreement, and a visit to Sarajevo by President François Mitterrand of France on 28 June, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council, on 29 June, that Bosnian Serb forces had been withdrawing from the Sarajevo airport, and both sides — the Serb and the Bosnia Presidential forces — had begun to concentrate their heavy weapons in locations to be supervised by UNPROFOR. On the same day, the Council, by resolution 761 (1992), authorized deployment of additional elements of UNPROFOR to ensure the security and functioning of the airport. By 3 July, despite continued fighting in the area, United Nations observers and troops were deployed at the airport and at other locations in Sarajevo, and the airport was reopened for the humanitarian airlift.

Protection of humanitarian convoys. On 13 August 1992, the Security Council, disturbed by the situation prevailing in Sarajevo, which severely complicated UNPROFOR's efforts to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, adopted resolution 770 (1992). The Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, called on States to "take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary" to facilitate, in coordination with the United Nations, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In further discussions, however, it was decided that that task should be entrusted to UNPROFOR. On 10 September, following consultations with a number of Governments, the Secretary-General submitted a further report to the Security Council recommending the expansion of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He proposed that UNPROFOR's task, under its enlarged mandate, would be to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular to provide protection, at UNHCR's request, where and when UNHCR considered such protection necessary. In addition, UNPROFOR could be used to protect convoys of released civilian detain-

ees if the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) so requested and if the Force Commander agreed that the request was practicable. UNPROFOR would be deployed in four or five new zones. In each zone there would be an infantry battalion group, whose headquarters would also include civilian staff to undertake political and information functions and liaison with UNHCR. UNPROFOR troops would follow normal peacekeeping rules of engagement, which authorize them to use force in self-defence, including situations in which armed persons attempt by force to prevent them from carrying out their mandate.

In resolution 776 (1992), which was adopted on 14 September 1992 and which made no reference to Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina for these purposes. A separate Bosnia and Herzegovina Command was established within UNPROFOR to implement resolution 776 (1992), in addition to Sector Sarajevo.

"No-fly zone". In a further development, the Security Council, on 9 October 1992, adopted its resolution 781 (1992) banning all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, except for those of UNPROFOR and other flights in support of United Nations operations including humanitarian assistance. The Council requested UNPROFOR to monitor compliance with the ban, and that it place observers, where necessary, at airfields in the former Yugoslavia. The Council also requested that the Force employ "an appropriate mechanism for approval and inspection" to ensure that the purpose of other flights to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina was consistent with its resolutions. It also called on States to provide technical assistance to UNPROFOR in its monitoring efforts. On 10 November, the Security Council adopted its resolution 786 (1992) authorizing the expansion of UNPROFOR's strength by 75 military observers to enable it to monitor airfields in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Border control. On 16 November 1992, the Security Council adopted its resolution 787 (1992), in which, among other things it considered that, in order to facilitate the implementation of the relevant Council resolutions, observers should be deployed on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and requested the Secretary-General to present his recommendations on this matter. The resolutions in question were: resolution 713 (1991), which, *inter alia*, established a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia; resolution 752 (1992), which, *inter alia*, demanded that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by units of the JNA as well as elements of the Croatian Army, cease immediately; resolution 757 (1992), which imposed comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and resolution 787 (1992), which, *inter alia*, demanded that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including infiltration into the country of irregular units and personnel, cease immediately.

On 21 December, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his recommendations. In the report, he indicated that in order to ensure compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, it would be necessary to give UNPROFOR a mandate which would include the right not only to search but also to turn back or confiscate military personnel, weapons, or sanctioned goods whose passage into or out of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be contrary to the decisions of the Council. He pointed out that a symbolic presence at selected crossing points would "not only fail to fulfil the Council's requirements, but would also undermine the already strained credibility of UNPROFOR". He proposed, therefore, an enlargement of UNPROFOR with some 10,000 additional troops to provide for a 24-hour observation and search operation at 123 crossing points on Bosnia and Herzegovina's border with neighbouring countries.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

On 11 November 1992, the President of Macedonia conveyed to the Secretary-General a request for the deployment of United Nations observers in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in view of his concern about the possible impact on it of fighting elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Such deployment was also recommended by Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. With the Security Council's approval, the Secretary-General sent to Macedonia from 28 November to 3 December a group of military, police and civilian personnel to assess the situation and prepare a report concerning a possible deployment of UNPROFOR in that Republic.

On 9 December, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report in which he recommended an expansion of the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR to establish a United Nations presence on Macedonia's borders with Albania and the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). He indicated that the Force's mandate would be essentially preventive, to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia and threaten its territory. The Secretary-General recommended that the enlargement of UNPROFOR comprise an estimated battalion of up to 700 all ranks, 35 military observers, 26 civilian police monitors, 10 civil affairs staff, 45 administrative staff and local interpreters. This contingent is to operate under UNPROFOR's "Macedonia Command" with headquarters in Skopje, the capital of Macedonia. The Security Council, by its resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December, approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the establishment of UNPROFOR's presence in Macedonia.

Subsequently, on 18 June 1993, the Security Council welcomed the United States offer to provide about 300 troops to reinforce UNPROFOR's presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In adopting resolution 842 (1993), the Council authorized the deployment of the additional personnel.

Secretary-General reviews UNPROFOR's activities

As already noted, UNPROFOR was established on 21 February 1992 by Security Council resolution 743 (1992) for an initial period of 12 months. On 10 February 1993, before the mandate of the Force expired, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report in which he summarized the activities of UNPROFOR and presented his recommendations on its future.

Croatia. In analysing the situation in Croatia, the Secretary-General described UNPROFOR's experience there as a mixed one. Its principal success had been in ensuring the complete withdrawal of the JNA from the territory of Croatia, including the Prevlaka Peninsula. Until the fourth week of January 1993, UNPROFOR's presence had also helped to prevent a recurrence of hostilities in the UNPAs and "pink zones". However, non-cooperation by the local Serb authorities had prevented UNPROFOR from achieving the demilitarization of the UNPAs and the disarming of the Serb Territorial Defence and irregular forces in these areas and in the "pink zones". As a result, UNPROFOR had not been able to establish the conditions of peace and security that would have permitted the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in these areas. Nor had it been able to establish the border controls called for in resolution 769 (1992).

The civilian aspects of UNPROFOR's activities, notably the efforts of United Nations civilian police to prevent discrimination and abuse of the human rights of residents in the UNPAs, had not proved fully successful despite UNPROFOR's best efforts. An atmosphere of terror and intimidation existed in many parts of the four sectors through much of the first ten months of the mandate period. However, since November 1992, the situation had shown improvement in all but a few areas. The maintenance of law and order was gradually enhanced through the reorganization and redeployment of the local police.

However, while the non-cooperation of the local Serb authorities had seriously impeded implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan, the Croatian offensive on and after 22 January 1993, referred to above, had significantly altered the situation on the ground. The President of Croatia, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, declared that the willingness of his Government to agree to an extension of UNPROFOR's mandate was dependent on progress in a number of areas. He also urged the Council to grant UNPROFOR an enforcement mandate. For its part, the Serb leadership in the UNPAs had rearmed and remobilized its forces in response to the Croatian offensive and had received substantial reinforcements of Serb fighters from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Serb militias had broken into storage depots holding heavy weapons placed there under the peace-keeping plan. The Serb side had also refused to enter into negotiations with the Croat side, or to return the heavy weapons taken from storage, unless the Croatian armed forces withdrew to the positions they occupied before the offensive. Such a withdrawal, in turn, was categorically rejected by the Croatian authorities.

In addition, the Secretary-General continued, the circumstances in which the peace-keeping plan was drafted and agreed in late 1991 and early 1992 had themselves changed. The plan was envisaged as an interim arrangement pending an overall political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. The Government of Croatia claimed there was no longer any "overall political solution" to negotiate. The only issue was the return of the UNPAs and the "pink zones" to Croatian control. The Serb leadership in the UNPAs, however, refused to consider these territories to be a part of Croatia and rejected talks on this basis, recalling that the plan was explicitly not intended to prejudge a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. Further, the Serbs argued that two parties to the original plan, the President of Serbia and the Federal Yugoslav military authorities in Belgrade, no longer had recognized legal status in the

areas where UNPROFOR was deployed. Therefore, the mandate and deployment of UNPROFOR now needed to be discussed anew with the Serbs representing the so-called "Republic of Serb Krajina".

In these circumstances, the Secretary-General saw three options with regard to UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia: (1) to renew the mandate entrusted to UNPROFOR by resolution 743 (1992), with no change; (2) to modify that mandate; and (3) to give UNPROFOR no mandate in Croatia and confine its operations to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Macedonia.

Referring to option one, the Secretary-General stated that the Government of Croatia made it clear that it could agree to a renewal of UNPROFOR's present mandate only if certain conditions were met, including the complete disarmament of all paramilitary forces and militia in the UNPAs and the "pink zones" with a destruction of their heavy weapons, voluntary and unconditional return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs, maintenance of tight controls by the Force in those border areas where the boundaries of the UNPAs coincide with internationally recognized frontiers of Croatia; and restoration of Croatian authority in the "pink zones". The Government's position, in effect, required UNPROFOR either to negotiate results which — as a peace-keeping force relying on the cooperation of the parties — it had no power to compel the other side to accept, or to risk unilateral military action by the Government. In addition, the Croatian offensive had had a devastating effect on cooperation between UNPROFOR and the local Serb authorities, who felt "betrayed" by what they saw as UNPROFOR's failure to protect them, and had put in doubt the feasibility of a return to the original plan.

On the second option, the Secretary-General warned against any modification resulting in enforcement action, saying that such action would involve the danger of placing UNPROFOR in direct conflict with the Serbs. Enforcement would also require additional military forces and equipment which could not be deployed immediately upon the passage of an enforcement resolution by the Security Council. The mere passage of an enforcement resolution risked threatening the safety and security of United Nations peace-keeping personnel currently deployed in the UNPAs and some, perhaps most, troop-contributing countries might in these circumstances review their participation in UNPROFOR. Enforcement, the Secretary-General stated, "would be a fundamental contradiction of the nature and purpose of UNPROFOR's deployment in Croatia, as a peace-keeping force entrusted with the implementation of a plan agreed by all parties." As to an alternative modification of the mandate which would convert UNPROFOR into a buffer force deployed along the present front lines in order to prevent a recurrence of hostilities, the Secretary-General did not believe that such an approach would receive the consent of the Government of Croatia.

Speaking of option three, the Secretary-General believed that the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the UNPAs would almost certainly result in the resumption of large-scale hostilities in the areas of its deployment, nullifying the political effort and the material resources invested in ending the conflict that had raged for nearly a year before the deployment of UNPROFOR.

In the Secretary-General's judgement, the difficulties which UNPROFOR and the Security Council faced with regard to the Force's mandate in Croatia could be attributed to two principal factors: the inability to implement the peace-keeping plan; and the lack of an agreed settlement to the conflict between the Republic of Croatia and the Serb populations living in the UNPAs and the "pink zones". Unless these two factors were addressed, the Secretary-General concluded, a sound basis would not exist for renewing UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia. Urgent efforts needed to be made to resolve the problems arising from the Croatian offensive, to establish a basis for completing the implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan and to agree on a framework for negotiating, within the principles of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, a settlement of the underlying dispute. The Secretary-General added that he had asked the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference to address these questions urgently with a view to establishing as soon as possible a basis on which a substantive recommendation could be made for an extension of UNPROFOR's mandate.

In the meantime, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council decide to extend UNPROFOR's existing mandate for an interim period up to 31 March 1993, in order to give the Co-Chairmen the necessary time.

Bosnia and Herzegovina. Speaking of UNPROFOR activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it had a more limited mandate, the Secretary-General noted in his February 1993 report that the Force had succeeded in keeping Sarajevo airport open, despite interruptions as a result of hostile military action against humanitarian aircraft. In the period from 3 July 1992 to 31 January 1993, the humanitarian airlift organized by UNHCR under UNPROFOR protection brought in 2,476 aircraft

carrying 27,460 tons of food, medicines and other relief goods.

The operation to protect humanitarian convoys throughout the Republic had been persistently thwarted by obstruction, mines, hostile fire and the refusal of the parties on the ground, particularly, but not exclusively, the Bosnian Serb party, to cooperate with UNPROFOR. None the less, from the deployment of additional UNPROFOR battalions for this purpose in November 1992 until January 1993, a total of some 34,600 tons of relief supplies had been delivered to an estimated 800,000 beneficiaries in 110 locations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Although the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been violated by all three parties on nearly 400 occasions since its imposition, it had achieved its principal purpose of preventing the use of air power in military combat in the Republic. UNPROFOR observers, using AWACS information made available by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had found no evidence to suggest that any party has flown combat air missions, or conducted hostilities from the air, since the interdiction regime was established by the Council.

UNPROFOR's efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-General pointed out, had been characterized by a regrettable tendency on the part of the host Government to blame it for a variety of shortcomings, whether real or imagined. Criticism of UNPROFOR's performance in the Republic had largely been directed at its failure to fulfil tasks that the Force had not been mandated, authorized, equipped, staffed or financed to fulfil. There had been a number of attacks on the Force by the Government and by elements answerable to it, both in public statements and declarations and, more seriously, through violence, resulting in several UNPROFOR fatalities.

As to UNPROFOR's mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-General stated that it might need to be altered significantly when the outcome was known of the ongoing talks led by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Referring to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Secretary-General considered it premature to draw conclusions about the practicability of the mandate and the effectiveness of the UNPROFOR Macedonia Command in this first preventive deployment operation in the history of United Nations peace-keeping.

Interim extension of UNPROFOR's mandate

On 19 February 1993, having considered the Secretary-General's report, the Security Council adopted resolution 807 (1993), by which it extended UNPROFOR's mandate for an interim period until 31 March 1993. The Council demanded, *inter alia*, that the parties and others concerned comply fully with the United Nations peace-keeping plan in Croatia and their other commitments, and refrain from positioning their forces near the UNPAs and in the "pink zones". It invited the Secretary-General to take all appropriate measures to strengthen the security of the Force, in particular by providing it with the necessary defensive means.

The Council urged the parties and others concerned to cooperate fully with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in the discussions under their auspices in order to ensure full implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping mandate in Croatia. It also demanded the full and strict observance of all relevant Security Council resolutions relating to the mandate and operations of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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Croatia

Mandate renewed. In accordance with Security Council resolution 807 (1993) mentioned earlier, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia held several rounds of talks in New York and Geneva with representatives of the Government of Croatia and the Serb populations living in the UNPAs and the "pink zones". In his 25 March 1993 report to the Council, the Secretary-General stated that while some progress had been made in these talks, fundamental differences remained between the two sides. Having said that more time would be needed to bring the negotiations to a meaningful conclusion, he recommended the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate for a further interim period of three months. He urged the parties to cooperate in implementing UNPROFOR's existing mandate, and to resolve any remaining differences in a spirit of compromise and cooperation.

On 30 March, the Security Council, by adopting its resolution 815 (1993), extended the mandate of UNPROFOR for an additional interim period until 30 June 1993. It also decided to reconsider within one month, or at any time at the request of the Secretary-General, UNPROFOR's mandate in light of developments of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the situation on the ground. The Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it on how the United Nations peace plan for Croatia could be effectively implemented.

On 25 June, the Secretary-General submitted his further report on the situation in Croatia, in which he drew attention to the failure of the parties to permit implementation of the United Nations plan and to cooperate in establishing a political process leading to an early settlement.

He noted, nevertheless, that the presence of UNPROFOR was indispensable for controlling the conflict, fostering a climate in which negotiations between the parties could be promoted, preventing the resumption or escalation of conflict, providing a breathing-space for the continued efforts of the peacemakers and for supporting the provision of essential humanitarian assistance. He also informed the Council that the termination of UNPROFOR's mandate at that point, in the judgement of his Special Representative, would risk the resumption of a major conflict in the region and cause severe adverse consequences for humanitarian relief operations. The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force by a further three months, to 30 September 1993.

In its resolution 847 (1993) of 30 June 1993, the Security Council decided to extend UNPROFOR's mandate for an additional interim period terminating on 30 September 1993, and requested the Secretary-General to report after one month on progress towards implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions.

On 16 August, the Secretary-General reported to the Council on this matter. He recommended that no action be taken at that stage and said that he would submit a further recommendation to the Council in the latter half of September 1993.

Implementation of resolution 802. Since the renewed outbreak of hostilities in Croatia, precipitated by the Croatian incursion into the UNPAs and "pink zones" on 22 January 1993, intensive efforts have been made within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and by UNPROFOR to bring about a cease-fire and a restoration of the prior status in accordance with Security Council resolution 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993.

On 8 April 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that representatives of the Government of Croatia and the Serb local authorities had signed, on 6 April, an agreement regarding the implementation of this resolution.

The agreement was to enter into force when the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia received from both parties assurances regarding the stationing of police in the areas from which the Croatian Government's armed forces were withdrawn, and their agreement that UNPROFOR should exclusively fulfil all police functions in those areas during an interim period. The Croats orally gave that assurance at the time of signature; the Serb assurance required the approval of their Assembly. That approval has not been forthcoming and the agreement therefore has not entered into force.

The parties also agreed to begin talks, under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, within 15 days of implementation of the agreement in order to resolve outstanding obstacles to the full implementation of the United Nations plan for Croatia.

The Force Commander of UNPROFOR has assessed the additional resources required to implement the agreement and has recommended that UNPROFOR be augmented by two mechanized infantry battalions of some 900 all ranks each, one engineer company of up to 150 troops all ranks, and 50 additional military observers. The Secretary-General recommended that, once the agreement enters into force, the Security Council approve the recommended changes to UNPROFOR's strength and mandate.

However, on 6 July 1993, new tensions arose following the decision of the Croatian Government to take unilateral actions aimed at rebuilding and reopening the Maslenica bridge on 18 July. Though, in pursuance of the Erdut/Zagreb agreement concluded on 15/16 July 1993, which required the withdrawal of Croatian armed forces and police from the area of the Maslenice bridge by 31 July 1993, UNPROFOR had moved 2,000 troops into the areas adjacent to those from which the Croatian forces were to withdraw, these troops could not be deployed because the Croatian military authorities would not allow UNPROFOR full access to the areas concerned.

On 2 August 1993, following Croatia's failure to withdraw from the area and Serb shelling thereof, one of the pontoons of the Maslenica bridge sank. However, the Co-Chairmen concluded that there was still

enough common ground to continue negotiations. Accepting the invitation of the Co-Chairmen, the parties began negotiations in Geneva on 12 August 1993, on a cease-fire which would include the elements of the original Erdut/Zagreb agreement. Despite intensive discussions in Geneva, Zagreb and Knin between the representatives both of the Co-Chairmen and of the parties, an overall cease-fire agreement has not yet been achieved.

On 9 September, after several days of grave incidents in the UNPAs and "pink zones", and rising tensions, shelling intensified on both sides of the confrontation line, and the Croatian Army once again carried out a military incursion in the area of Medak, where three Serb villages were seized. The hostilities worsened on 10 and 11 September. Following the intervention of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the Force Commander of UNPROFOR, and a call from the Security Council, the parties finally agreed to a cease-fire on 15 September. UNPROFOR moved some 500 to 600 troops into the area to replace the Croatian armed forces which eventually withdrew to positions occupied before the incursion began. When UNPROFOR gained access to the area it found that most houses had been deliberately destroyed during the withdrawal. Eighteen corpses were recovered, most of them riddled with multiple bullet wounds or incinerated.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

"No-fly zone" enforcement. On 16 March 1993, the Secretary-General reported that three aircraft dropped bombs on two villages east of Srebrenica on 13 March, before leaving in the direction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It was the first time since the Security Council instituted the "no-fly zone" in Bosnia and Herzegovina that aircraft were used in combat activity in that country. UNPROFOR has not been able to determine to whom the aircraft belonged. On 17 March, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, strongly condemned all violations of its relevant resolutions and underlined the fact that since the beginning of the monitoring operations in early November 1992, the United Nations had reported 465 violations of the "no-fly zone". The Council demanded from the Bosnian Serbs an immediate explanation of the violations and particularly of the aerial bombardment of the two villages, and requested the Secretary-General to ensure that an investigation was made of the reported possible use of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to launch air strikes against Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 27 April, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that on 24 March the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had been requested to provide any information relevant to the incidents. The only response received was a note verbale conveying a statement by the Government of that country, in which it stated that "airplanes and helicopters of the Air Forces of the Army of Yugoslavia have not violated the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the no-fly zone came into effect".

On 31 March, the Security Council adopted its resolution 816 (1993), by which it extended the ban on military flights to cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized Member States, seven days after the adoption of the resolution, acting nationally or through regional arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, "all necessary measures" in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure compliance with the ban on flights, and proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of flights. It also requested the Member States concerned, the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR to coordinate closely on those measures and on the starting date of the implementation, which was to be no later than 14 days from the date of the resolution, and to report on the starting date to the Council.

On 9 April, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council a letter from the Secretary-General of NATO, Dr. Manfred Wörner, informing him that the North Atlantic Council had adopted the "necessary arrangements" to ensure compliance with the ban on military flights and that it was prepared to begin the operation at noon GMT on 12 April 1993. Dr. Wörner also reported that so far France, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States had offered to make aircraft available for the operation. In order to commence the enforcement on time, aircraft from France, the Netherlands and the United States were initially deployed in the region and liaison cells were established at UNPROFOR's headquarters in Zagreb and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kiseljak). In addition, UNPROFOR would send a liaison team to the command headquarters of the NATO countries concerned.

The operations authorized by resolution 816 (1993) started, as scheduled, on 12 April at 12.00 GMT. Subsequently, the Secretary-General was informed by NATO that all the countries offering to make

aircraft available for the operation would participate fully in it.

"Safe areas". In March 1993, fighting intensified in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Bosnian Serb paramilitary units attacking several cities in the area, including Srebrenica. The military attacks resulted in a heavy loss of life among the civilian population and severely impeded United Nations humanitarian relief efforts in the area. In mid-March, UNHCR reported that thousands of Muslims were seeking refuge in Srebrenica from surrounding areas which were being attacked and occupied by Serb forces, and that 30 or 40 persons were dying daily from military action, starvation, exposure to cold or lack of medical treatment. In April, despite the strong political pressure from the international community and the Security Council, and the efforts by UNPROFOR and UNHCR in the field, the fighting persisted and the humanitarian situation in the area continued to deteriorate.

On 16 April, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted resolution 819 (1993), in which it demanded that all parties treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a "safe area" which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act. It demanded the immediate withdrawal of Bosnian Serb paramilitary units from areas surrounding Srebrenica and the cessation of armed attacks against that town. The Council requested the Secretary-General to take steps to increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and to arrange for the safe transfer of ill and wounded, and demanded the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular to the civilian population of Srebrenica.

By other provisions of the resolution, the Council condemned and rejected the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb party to force the evacuation of civilians from Srebrenica and other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its campaign of "ethnic cleansing". It also decided to send a mission of Council members to ascertain, firsthand, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Following the adoption of the resolution, UNPROFOR's Force Commander, the Commander of the Serb forces and the Commander of the Bosnian Muslim forces signed, on 17 April, an agreement for the demilitarization of Srebrenica. On 21 April, UNPROFOR's Force Commander reported that 170 UNPROFOR troops, civilian police and military observers had been deployed in Srebrenica to collect weapons, ammunition, mines, explosives and combat supplies and that by noon on 21 April they had successfully demilitarized the town.

As requested in resolution 819 (1993), the Security Council's fact-finding mission, composed of representatives of France, Hungary, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and Venezuela, visited the region from 22 to 27 April. Having considered the mission's report and recommendations, the Security Council adopted resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May, in which it declared that, in addition to Srebrenica, Sarajevo and other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and their surroundings, should be treated as safe areas by all the parties concerned. The Council further declared that in those areas armed attacks must cease, all Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units must withdraw and all parties must allow UNPROFOR and the international humanitarian agencies free and unimpeded access to all safe areas. It authorized the strengthening of UNPROFOR's mandate by an additional 50 military observers to monitor the humanitarian situation in those areas.

On 4 June, the Security Council, by its resolution 836 (1993), acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, further expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR to enable it to protect the safe areas, including to deter attacks against them, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Bosnian Government and to occupy some key points on the ground. The Council authorized UNPROFOR, acting in self-defence, to take necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys. The Council also decided that Member States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements, might take, under its authority, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas, to support UNPROFOR.

In response to the Council's invitation to report to it on the requirements for implementing the resolution, the Secretary-General, in his report dated 14 June, indicated that it would be necessary to deploy additional troops on the ground and to provide air support. While the Force Commander of UNPROFOR had estimated an additional troop requirement of approximately 34,000 to obtain deterrence through strength, the Secretary-General stated that it was possible to start implementing the resolution under a "light option", with a minimal troop reinforcement of around 7,600. That

option represented an initial approach and had limited objectives. It assumed the consent and cooperation of the parties and provided a basic level of deterrence.

As to the air support, the Secretary-General reported that he had initiated contacts with Member States and had invited NATO to coordinate with him the use of air power in support of UNPROFOR. The Secretary-General pointed out that the first decision to initiate the use of air resources in this context would be taken by him in consultation with the members of the Security Council.

In adopting resolution 844 (1993) of 18 June, the Security Council authorized an additional reinforcement of UNPROFOR initially by 7,600 troops and reaffirmed the use of air power, in and around the declared safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support the Force.

On 18 August, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that following the necessary training exercises in coordination with NATO, the United Nations had the operational capability for the use of air power in support of UNPROFOR.

Hostilities in central Bosnia. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was further aggravated when, in May 1993, intense fighting between the Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces erupted in central Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the calls by the Security Council, efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee and UNPROFOR, hostilities between the two former allies have continued since then. The fighting has intermittently blocked the main supply routes for humanitarian assistance into northern Bosnia, and has further restricted the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and UNHCR in the area. In this connection, UNPROFOR and UNHCR have initiated a humanitarian "Operation Lifeline" to keep the main routes open to help ensure the survival of up to 2.7 million people in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the winter.

Border control. On 10 June 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 838 (1993), requested the Secretary-General to submit a further report on options for the deployment of international observers on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with priority being given to its borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to monitor the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council called for international observers to be drawn from the United Nations and, if appropriate, from Member States.

The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 1 July. He presented two options and their respective requirements in terms of human and other resources.

On option one, the Secretary-General said that it would be unrealistic for the Security Council to authorize international observers to establish full control over the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina as world-wide resources for additional peace-keeping troops were becoming increasingly stretched. Full border control would require a capability to deny passage and to act where borders had already been crossed. It would also mean that UNPROFOR would supersede the national authorities in respect of certain border-control functions.

Border monitoring was another option identified by the Secretary-General. Observers would only observe and report on Bosnia and Herzegovina's borders, and would not be in a position to check the nature of goods coming into and out of the Republic. Even this more limited option would require substantial additional resources, and the necessary personnel and financing might not be available, he said.

The Secretary-General went on to point out that outstanding contributions to United Nations peace-keeping accounts totaled $1,260 million in mid-June 1993, while unpaid assessments amounted to $2,236 million. He said it was "highly probable that in the coming months the Organization will not be able to meet its day-to-day obligations".

On 7 July, the President of the Security Council addressed a letter to the Secretary-General informing him that the members of the Council had considered his report and continued to believe that international observers should be deployed on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They invited the Secretary-General, bearing in mind the observations in his report, to contact Member States in order to establish whether they were ready, individually or through regional organizations or arrangements, to make qualified personnel available to act as observers along the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to continue to explore all possibilities for implementation of the border monitors concept.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

As to UNPROFOR's activities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 13 July 1993. A Nordic battalion is based at Kjojila, east of Skopje, the capital of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and a United States contingent of 315 troops arrived in Skopje in early July, deploying to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia side of the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on 20

August 1993. United Nations military observers, civilian police and civil affairs officers have also been deployed. UNPROFOR maintains close cooperation with the CSCE monitor mission. It also enjoys an excellent cooperative relationship with the host Government. In his report, the Secretary-General concluded that the Force had so far been successful in its preventive mandate in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

UNPROFOR's mandate further extended

On 20 September 1993, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council renew the mandate of UNPROFOR for a period of six months (as is usual with most United Nations peace-keeping operations). In a report dealing primarily with Croatia, the Secretary-General said that he had been "sorely tempted" to recommend the withdrawal of the Force altogether because of the criticism of UNPROFOR by both sides and the dangers and abuse to which its personnel were exposed, but that such a step could only result in further conflict.

The Secretary-General pointed out that key parts of the original United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia had been difficult, if not impossible, to implement, and had become more so since the resumption of hostilities following the Croatian incursion of 22 January 1993. He stressed that the fundamental solution to the problem had to be sought through political dialogue, that the parties themselves had to seek such a solution and take steps towards reconciliation. In this process, the principal objective of UNPROFOR could only be to keep the peace, thereby permitting negotiations to take place on an overall political settlement. To enhance the security of the Force, he requested the extension of close air support to the territory of Croatia.

While recommending the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate, the Secretary-General suggested that the Council demand that the parties in Croatia conclude an immediate cease-fire and cooperate with UNPROFOR, which must be allowed to fulfil the peace-keeping aspects of its mandate. The Secretary-General intended to report to the Council by 30 November 1993 on the progress made by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and by UNPROFOR, and might at that time make further recommendations, on the basis of developments during the two months and on the course of negotiations undertaken between the parties.

The Secretary-General also stated that should UNPROFOR's mandate be extended, he would give "favourable consideration" to a suggestion by the President of Croatia that the Force be divided into three parts — UNPROFOR (Croatia), UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and UNPROFOR (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) — while retaining its integrated military, logistical and administrative structure under the command of one Special Representative of the Secretary-General and one theatre Force Commander.

In the meantime, on 24 September, the Security Council was informed by the Croatian Government that if the mandate of UNPROFOR was not amended to promote "energetic" implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, Croatia would be forced to request UNPROFOR to leave the country not later than 30 November 1993.

On 4 October 1993, after intensive consultations and two interim extensions of UNPROFOR's mandate — for a 24-four period on 30 September, and for another four days on 1 October — the Security Council, by its resolution 871 (1993), extended the present mandate of the Force for a period of six months, through 31 March 1994. The Council took this action under Chapter VII of the Charter reiterating its determination to ensure the security of UNPROFOR and its freedom of movement.

The Council reaffirmed the crucial importance of the full and prompt implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia and called upon the signatories of the plan and all others concerned, in particular the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to cooperate in its full implementation. Declaring that continued non-cooperation in the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council would have serious consequences, the Council affirmed that full normalization of the international community's position towards those concerned would take into account their actions in implementing those resolutions, including those relating to the United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia.

The Council called for an immediate cease-fire agreement between the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs, mediated under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. It urged all parties to cooperate with UNPROFOR in reaching and implementing an agreement on confidence-building measures, including the restoration of electricity, water and communications in all regions of Croatia. Stressing the importance of restoring Croatian authority in the "pink zones", the Council called for the revival of the Joint Commission established under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR.

In addition, the Council took note of the Secretary-General's intention to establish three subordinate commands within UNPROFOR — in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia — while retaining all other existing dispositions for the direction and conduct of the United Nations operation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

The Council decided to continue to review urgently the extension of close air support to UNPROFOR in the territory of Croatia as recommended by the Secretary-General. It authorized UNPROFOR, in carrying out its mandate in Croatia, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to ensure its security and its freedom of movement.

It requested the Secretary-General to report within two months on progress towards the implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia and of all relevant Council resolutions, taking into account the position of the Croatian Government, as well as on the outcome of the International Conference negotiations. In light of that report, the Council will reconsider UNPROFOR's mandate.

COMPOSITION OF UNPROFOR

Currently, UNPROFOR is comprised of approximately 25,500 military personnel, 660 civilian police, 695 international civilian staff and 974 local staff.

In Croatia, the military and civilian police components of UNPROFOR comprise some 13,450 personnel, consisting of 12 infantry battalions (some 10,200 all ranks), 240 military observers, 600 civilian police monitors, and headquarters and support elements totalling some 2,500 all ranks.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the strength of UNPROFOR is approximately 11,400 personnel, including four infantry battalions (some 2,900 all ranks) in Sarajevo, five infantry battalion groups (about 6,300 all ranks) in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 235 military observers, 45 civilian police monitors, and headquarters and support units totalling approximately 1,950 all ranks.

UNPROFOR's Command in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia includes some 1,050 personnel, consisting of one battalion of up to 1,010 all ranks, 20 military observers and 25 civilian police monitors.

In addition, in accordance with Security Council resolution 786 (1992), monitoring of selected airfields in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is carried out by 76 military observers.

The military and/or civilian police personnel of UNPROFOR is provided by the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela.

The civilian component of the Force, which performs a wide range of political, legal, informational and administrative functions, consists of staff members of the United Nations and of locally recruited employees.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF UNPROFOR

The rough annual cost of UNPROFOR to the United Nations is approximately $1.2 billion. The costs of the operation are met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 31 October 1993, contributions outstanding to the UNPROFOR Special Account amounted to approximately $217 million.

Notes

[1] For more information on other aspects of United Nations involvement, please see the DPI Reference Paper entitled "The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia", DPI/1312/Rev.1.

[2] Mr. Stoltenberg is to be succeeded by Mr. Yasushi Akashi (Japan), until recently the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cambodia, as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the former Yugoslavia and Chief of Mission of UNPROFOR. Mr. Stoltenberg will continue his duties as Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

Notes, continued

[3] A term which, for the purposes of this publication, is used to signify the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its Republics.

[4] A term which, throughout this publication, refers to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

[5] Since August 1992, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia has provided a permanent negotiating forum for seeking a political solution to all the problems of the former Yugoslavia. The Conference has a Steering Committee, now co-chaired by Lord Owen, representing the European Community, and Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, who in May 1993 replaced Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, and who also served as the Secretary-General's Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia.

[6] On 2 July 1993, UNHCR, marking the first anniversary of the humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo, reported that a total of 45,500 metric tons of food and supplies, brought in by 4,150 flights, had been delivered.

PS/DPI/14/Rev.4 — October 1993

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

UNTAC

UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA

LOCATION: Cambodia

HEADQUARTERS: Phnom Penh

DURATION: March 1992 to 24 September 1993 (Withdrawal completed by 15 November 1993, except as indicated in footnote 1 below)

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: Some 22,000 military and civilian personnel

FATALITIES: 55

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HEAD OF MISSION: Mr. Yasushi Akashi (Japan)

FORCE COMMANDER: Lieutenant-General John M. Sanderson (Australia)

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established by the United Nations Security Council on 28 February 1992. Its mandated functions ended on 24 September 1993 following the promulgation of the new Constitution and the installation of the Government based on the will of the Cambodian people expressed through free and fair elections. According to the schedule proposed by the Secretary-General and approved by the Security Council on 27 August 1993, the date for the completion of the phased withdrawal of UNTAC from Cambodia was set for 15 November 1993.[1]

BACKGROUND

The Security Council was invited to establish UNTAC by the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, signed in Paris on 23 October 1991, at the final meeting of the Paris Conference on Cambodia. The Paris Agreements were the culmination of more than a decade of negotiations in which the United Nations had been closely involved from the outset. It was fully supported by the Council in resolution 718 (1991) of 31 October 1991.

Under the Agreements, the Supreme National Council of Cambodia (the SNC) was recognized as "the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia [were] enshrined". The SNC, under the chairmanship of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, comprised the four Cambodian parties signatory to the Agreements — Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, pácifique et coopératif (FUNCINPEC); Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF); Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK); and State of Cambodia (SOC). The SNC delegated to the United Nations "all powers necessary" to ensure the implementation of the Agreements.

UNTAC's mandate under the Agreements included aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, and the rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period. The transitional period commenced with the entry into force of the Agreements (23 October 1991) and terminated when the Constituent Assembly, elected in conformity with the Agreements, approved the new Cambodian Constitution and transformed itself into a legislative assembly, and a new Cambodian Government was created.

Prior to the establishment and deployment of UNTAC, the Secretary-General had recommended, on 30 September 1991, that the United Nations deploy a small advance mission in Cambodia to assist the Cambodian parties to maintain the cease-fire. Based

on this recommendation, the Security Council, by its resolution 717 (1991) of 16 October 1991, decided to establish the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) immediately after the signing of the Agreements. UNAMIC became operational on 9 November 1991. It consisted of civilian and military liaison staff, a military mine-awareness unit, and logistics and support personnel. On 8 January 1992, by its resolution 728 (1992), the Council expanded the mandate of UNAMIC to include training in mine-clearance for Cambodians and the initiation of a mine-clearance programme.

ESTABLISHMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNTAC

On 19 February 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report containing his proposed implementation plan. The Council approved that report and, by its resolution 745 (1992) of 28 February, established UNTAC under its authority for a period not to exceed 18 months. Upon becoming operational on 15 March 1992, UNTAC absorbed UNAMIC.

UNTAC consisted of seven distinct components: Human Rights, Electoral, Military, Civil Administration, Civilian Police, Repatriation and Rehabilitation. At maximum strength, it comprised some 22,000 international civilian and military personnel deployed throughout the country, supplemented by locally recruited staff. UNTAC was headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Yasushi Akashi (Japan). Headquarters personnel in Phnom Penh included executive managers, economic advisers and political, legal, information service and support staff.

DIFFICULTIES ARISE

On 9 May 1992, UNTAC announced that Phase I of the cease-fire, in effect since the signing of the Paris Agreements, would be followed on 13 June by Phase II of the cease-fire (the cantonment, disarming and demobilization phase). However, following this announcement, it became clear that, of the four signatory parties, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea was not cooperating. In fact, PDK refused to allow UNTAC forces to proceed with their deployment in the areas under its control and did not provide the necessary information on the number of its troops and *matériel* in compliance with the Paris Agreements. In explanation of its position, PDK introduced its own interpretation of the provisions of the Paris Agreements relating to the verification of the withdrawal and non-return of foreign forces, and to the role and powers of the SNC. Throughout the period of UNTAC's presence in Cambodia, the refusal of PDK to meet the obligations it had assumed in signing the Paris Agreements was the main obstacle to the implementation of UNTAC's mandate.

In a 12 June 1992 special report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that, despite the lack of cooperation from PDK, he had concluded that Phase II must commence on 13 June. In his view, any delay would result in a loss of momentum and would jeopardize UNTAC's ability to organize and conduct elections as scheduled. The Council endorsed the Secretary-General's position and called upon all parties to comply strictly with the commitments they had accepted, including cooperation with UNTAC.

At the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, held in Tokyo on 22 June 1992, an informal "proposal for discussion" was drawn up. The proposal set out a number of measures designed to meet some of the concerns expressed by PDK and thus to facilitate its participation in the full implementation of the Paris Agreements without further delay. In a series of meetings of the SNC, three of the four Cambodian signatory parties accepted the proposal for discussion. However, PDK did not; instead, it introduced its own proposals.

Since the actions of PDK seriously compromised the ability of UNTAC to adhere to the timetable laid down in the implementation plan, the Secretary-General, in his 14 July 1992 report to the Security Council, offered two possible courses of action: to suspend the operation until all parties complied with the Paris Agreements, or to pursue the process, thus demonstrating the international community's determination to assist the Cambodian people despite the lack of cooperation from PDK. As the Secretary-General considered the latter to be appropriate, he requested his Special Representative to press forward with the regroupment and cantonment process in a manner that would ensure that the parties cooperating with UNTAC did not suffer a military disadvantage vis-à-vis PDK. He noted, however, that this process, with the cooperation of only three of the signatory parties, could not continue indefinitely. Further efforts, therefore, would have to be made by all concerned to persuade PDK to join Phase II of the cease-fire and to cooperate with UNTAC.

By resolution 766 (1992) of 21 July, the Security Council approved the efforts of the Secretary-General to continue implementing the Paris Agreements despite the difficulties, and demanded that PDK permit the deployment of UNTAC in the areas under its control and implement Phase II of the cease-fire as well as other

aspects of the Agreements. It also requested the Secretary-General to ensure that international assistance to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia from then on benefit only the parties fulfilling their obligations under the Agreements and cooperating fully with UNTAC.

DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS CONTINUE

On 21 September 1992, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that, despite the continuing refusal of PDK to grant UNTAC access to the zones it controlled or to commit its forces to cantonment, the implementation of the mission was proceeding apace in other areas.

The Secretary-General pointed out that having carefully reviewed what UNTAC had accomplished so far, as well as the obstacles it had faced, he remained convinced that the electoral process should be carried out in accordance with the implementation timetable. As UNTAC had consistently stressed, the door remained open for full and constructive participation by PDK in the peace process. The UNTAC Military Component stood ready to undertake the cantonment of PDK forces, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK).

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General said, UNTAC would press forward with the implementation of all the other provisions of the Paris Agreements, including those concerning the verification of the withdrawal and non-return of foreign forces and the cessation of outside military assistance to the Cambodian parties. This might require an increase in the number of checkpoints within the country and along its borders with one or more of the neighbouring countries, as well as appropriate modifications in the manning of those checkpoints and an updating of their mandate. More intensive military investigations and patrols might also be required.

The Secretary-General suggested that the Council consider further action to impress upon the parties the international community's firm determination to press ahead with the implementation of the Paris Agreements. He also indicated his intention, subject to Security Council approval, to request the co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference (the Foreign Ministers of France and Indonesia) to undertake, within a definite timeframe, consultations with the aim of finding a way out of the impasse or, if that should prove impossible, exploring appropriate steps to ensure the realization of the fundamental objectives of the Agreements.

On 13 October, the Security Council, by its resolution 783 (1992), approved the Secretary-General's progress report and confirmed that the electoral process should proceed according to the implementation timetable. The Council, among other things, demanded that PDK fulfil immediately its obligations under the Paris Agreements, and invited the Governments of Japan and Thailand, which had been actively involved in finding solutions to the current problems, to continue their efforts and to report the results to the Secretary-General and to the co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference. The Council also invited the Secretary-General to ask the co-Chairmen immediately on receipt of that report to undertake appropriate consultations with a view to implementing fully the peace process. It requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council, no later than 15 November, on the implementation of resolution 783 (1992).

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTS ON CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES

In the November report, the Secretary-General informed the Council that despite intensive efforts undertaken successively by the Governments of Japan and Thailand and by the co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference, PDK continued its non-compliance with the provisions of the Paris Agreements.

Due to the difficulties encountered in implementing Phase II of the cease-fire, the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization process had been effectively suspended. The Secretary-General also pointed to the cease-fire violations and increased tension in the central and northern parts of Cambodia following artillery exchanges. In addition, UNTAC personnel and helicopters were coming under attack in areas where NADK forces were known to be present.

The Secretary-General nevertheless continued to believe that "patient diplomacy" remained the best means of getting the peace process back on track. He stated that UNTAC would continue its dialogue with PDK in an effort to meet that party's concerns and persuade it to comply with its obligations under the Paris Agreements. The various components of UNTAC would pursue the implementation of their respective mandates, giving high priority to creating and maintaining a neutral political environment. The Secretary-General expressed his hope that the Security Council would adopt measures to facilitate UNTAC's mission and impress upon the parties concerned that the international community remained committed to see the goals of the Paris Agreements realized.

On 30 November, the Security Council adopted its resolution 792 (1992) endorsing the Secretary-General's report and confirming that the elections for a constituent assembly in Cambodia would be held no later than May 1993. It condemned PDK for failing to comply with its obligations under the Paris Agreements and demanded, among other things, that it immediately fulfil those obligations, facilitate full deployment of UNTAC in the areas under its control, and not impede voter registration or the activities of other political parties in those areas.

The Council determined that UNTAC should proceed with preparations for the holding of elections in all areas of Cambodia to which UNTAC had full access as at 31 January 1993. It requested the Secretary-General to consider the implications which the failure by PDK to canton and demobilize its forces would have for the electoral process and, accordingly, to take all appropriate steps to ensure the successful implementation of the process.

The Security Council supported the 22 September decision of the SNC to set a country-wide moratorium on the export of logs from Cambodia in order to protect the country's natural resources, and requested UNTAC to take appropriate measures to secure the implementation of this moratorium. The Council also requested the SNC to consider adopting a similar moratorium on the export of minerals and gems. In addition, it called for measures to prevent the supply of petroleum products from reaching areas occupied by any Cambodian signatory party not complying with the military provisions of the Paris Agreements.

The Council invited UNTAC to establish all necessary border checkpoints, as recommended by the Secretary-General.

THE ELECTORAL PROCESS PROCEEDS

Voter registration began on 5 October 1992. On 21 December, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General announced the extension of the registration period until 31 January 1993. In a progress report on UNTAC activities, submitted to the Security Council on 25 January 1993, the Secretary-General noted the "remarkable success" of the registration process. Following its completion, including the registration of returning refugees, and the compilation of computerized voters' lists, the number of registered voters was set at over 4.6 million, or some 96 per cent of the estimated eligible population. The Secretary-General also reported that all 20 provisionally-registered political parties had officially registered to take part in the elections.

However, UNTAC's efforts to create and maintain a neutral political environment needed for the holding of elections were seriously hampered by a number of negative developments. Cease-fire violations had increased, and tension had risen in some parts of the country.

Since December 1992, there had been several incidents of temporary detention of or attacks on UNTAC personnel in PDK-controlled areas. At the same time, the Secretary-General reported, there seemed to be a growing reluctance on the part of some of the existing administrative structures in Cambodia to accept the control and supervision functions entrusted to UNTAC.

Over the preceding few months, a spate of violent incidents — politically-motivated attacks on political party offices and staff, attacks on Vietnamese-speaking persons, and killings having no particular political motivation — had also heightened a sense of insecurity among Cambodians. The Secretary-General's Special Representative publicly stated in November, that free and fair elections could not be held in circumstances where people faced threats to their lives, property and personal security for attempting to exercise their political rights.

In addition to investigating these incidents, UNTAC's Civilian Police, Military, and Civil Administration Components, together with the Human Rights Component, developed measures, including intensive patrols and static guard duty, to prevent and deal with threats to public order. UNTAC also announced that it would give priority to ensuring freedom from intimidation, freedom of party affiliation and freedom of action for political parties. On 6 January 1993, the Special Representative issued a directive establishing procedures for the prosecution of persons responsible for human rights violations; as a result, UNTAC assumed powers to arrest, detain and prosecute suspects in cases of serious violations.

ELECTION DATES ARE SET

The SNC set the dates of the constituent assembly elections for 23 to 25 May 1993. These dates were later expanded to allow for polling at mobile stations on 27 and 28 May. The dates for the political campaign were set for 7 April to 19 May. In his 13 February 1993 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that UNTAC was proceeding on schedule with electoral preparations in all areas of Cambodia to which it had access as at 31 January. While progress had been made in a number of other areas, the Secre-

tary-General noted the occurrence of a series of cease-fire violations, and an increase in politically-motivated violence in early February. He also reported that neither PDK nor the "National Unity of Cambodia Party", the political party whose formation PDK had announced in November 1992, had filed official registration to take part in the elections.

The difficulties encountered in implementing the military provisions of the Paris Agreements also gave rise to concern. Under the Agreements, peaceful conditions during this period were to be assured by the cantonment of all the forces of the four Cambodian signatory parties, the demobilization of at least 70 per cent of them before the end of voter registration and the continuing cantonment of the remainder, pending their demobilization before or shortly after the elections or their incorporation into a new national army, as decided by the newly-elected Government. However, the Secretary-General concluded that PDK's decision not to enter into Phase II of the cease-fire would make it impossible to apply those arrangements. The elections, therefore, would take place at a time when the two largest armed forces of the parties remained mostly intact, with the other two parties still having some of their forces in the field.

The Secretary-General again considered these difficulties in his progress report, submitted to the Council on 3 May 1993, and in a subsequent report of 15 May. Given the distortions that had arisen in the implementation of the peace plan, UNTAC was endeavouring to create and maintain the best possible conditions for the holding of free and fair elections. Preparations were well under way, including the selection of more than 50,000 Cambodian electoral staff. The 20 political parties were participating actively and vigorously in the electoral campaign since it had officially begun on 7 April. On 4 April, however, PDK formally announced its decision not to participate, asserting that "Vietnamese forces of aggression" continued to occupy Cambodia and that a neutral political environment did not exist. On 13 April, the PDK President wrote to Prince Sihanouk that PDK could no longer attend SNC meetings in Phnom Penh because there was insufficient security and that PDK would withdraw "temporarily" from the city.

A major challenge to the creation and maintenance of a neutral political environment was posed by the various acts of violence and intimidation. The Secretary-General referred to four categories of violence: a) killings of Cambodians, including those of Vietnamese ancestry, by the forces of PDK, NADK, in an effort both to disrupt the elections and, evidently, to pressure those of Vietnamese ancestry to leave Cambodia; b) attacks and harassment by SOC elements aimed at intimidating other political parties, primarily FUNCINPEC; c) attacks on UNTAC personnel; and d) random violence associated with banditry and lawlessness. During his second visit to Cambodia on 7 and 8 April 1993, the Secretary-General issued an urgent appeal for an end to violence.

UNTAC further refined and strengthened measures to help ensure the security of the electoral process and the safety of the Cambodian political parties and of UNTAC staff under conditions of instability. Teams of military observers worked with UNTAC Civilian Police in monitoring political rallies and gatherings throughout the country. Personnel from both components were assisting electoral staff with the civil education campaign. All units of the Military Component in all locations were directed to increase vigilance and enhance their security measures and procedures. It was also decided that, during the election itself, no polling would be conducted in areas controlled by PDK, to which UNTAC had not been permitted access, as well as some remote areas in which NADK had been operating. Other parts of the country were designated as high-, medium- and low-risk areas. Different levels of security measures were established for each level of risk. In response to the heightened threat in one province, UNTAC civilian personnel were withdrawn from some locations and the number of polling sites was reduced.

The Security Council approved the Secretary-General's reports by its resolution 826 (1993) of 20 May 1993. It also expressed its satisfaction with the arrangements made by the United Nations for the elections and fully supported the decision of the Secretary-General that the elections be held as scheduled. At the same time, the Council demanded that all parties abide by the Paris Agreements and give UNTAC the full cooperation required under it.

ELECTIONS HELD THROUGHOUT CAMBODIA

The elections were held from 23 to 28 May 1993 in all 21 provinces in Cambodia. The day after the final day of polling, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General declared, on behalf of the Secretary-General and the United Nations that, in view of the very high turnout throughout the country, the absence of violence or disruption during the polling, the success of the technical conduct of the poll and the calm and peaceful atmosphere that reigned throughout the polling period, the conduct of the poll had been free and fair. The

Security Council endorsed this declaration in its resolution 835 (1993) of 2 June 1993, called upon all parties to stand by their obligations to respect fully the results, and invited the Secretary-General to make his report on the elections available as soon as possible.

On 10 June 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that three of the four Cambodian parties signatory to the Paris Agreements had taken part in the electoral process — SOC (through the Cambodian People's Party (CPP)), FUNCINPEC, and the KPNLF/Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP). PDK, the fourth Cambodian signatory party, had failed to register as a political party, had taken no part in the elections and had threatened to disrupt it with violence. Aside from a few incidents, however, polling was conducted in a peaceful and often festive atmosphere, with voters sometimes walking several miles to cast their ballots, apparently undaunted by threats of violence or banditry, by rough terrain or the heavy rain that swept much of the country. A total of 4,267,192 voters, representing 89.56 per cent of the registered voters, had turned out to vote.

The count of the 4,011,631 valid ballots indicated that FUNCINPEC had won 1,824,188 votes, or 45.47 per cent, to CPP's 1,533,471 votes, or 38.23 per cent. BLDP won 152,764 votes, or 3.81 per cent, and the other 17 political parties won the remainder. The number of seats won in the constituent assembly was 58 for FUNCINPEC, 51 for CPP, 10 for BLDP and 1 for a fourth political party, MOLINAKA. At a meeting of the SNC, held on 10 June and presided by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General issued a statement declaring, on behalf of the Secretary-General and the United Nations, that the elections as a whole had been free and fair. The Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report and endorsed the results of the elections by resolution 840 (1993) of 15 June 1993. It also expressed full support for the newly elected constituent assembly. The 120-member assembly would draw up a constitution and then transform itself into a legislative assembly to establish a new government for all Cambodians. The Council emphasized the necessity for the assembly to complete its work as soon as possible and within the three-month time-frame stipulated in the Agreements. It requested UNTAC to continue to play its role in conjunction with the SNC during the transitional period.

POST-ELECTORAL PERIOD

Notwithstanding the successful holding of the elections and the creation of a Constituent Assembly, the post-election period was not without difficulties. In his report of 16 July 1993, the Secretary-General informed the Council that SOC had made numerous allegations of electoral irregularities and had initially withheld recognition of the election results. Every concrete allegation had been promptly investigated by UNTAC. After the elections, some SOC elements declared a short-lived "secession" in three eastern provinces which, however, collapsed after a few days. SOC did subsequently accept the results of the elections.

The duly elected Constituent Assembly began work on 14 June 1993. At the request of the Cambodian parties, UNTAC provided logistical and operational assistance, as well as technical advice, to the Assembly. The Secretary-General informed the Council that the establishment of an Interim Joint Administration (Provisional National Government), although not foreseen under the Paris Agreements, provided for a cooperative framework between all parties which held seats in the Constituent Assembly. The Administration should be viewed as an attempt to fuse three of the existing administrative structures, with Prince Sihanouk as head of State. The Secretary-General also reported that PDK had declared that it would accept the outcome of the elections.

Detailed plans were drawn up for the orderly withdrawal in three phases of the Military, Civilian Police and other components of UNTAC. In some cases the civilian tasks had already been completed; the whole of the Repatriation Component and the great majority of the staff of the Electoral Component had already been withdrawn. According to the plan, all UNTAC elements were to have withdrawn completely from the country by 15 November 1993. The Secretary-General said that, although UNTAC would soon cease to exist, Cambodia clearly required continued international assistance and support. The country still faced enormous problems of security, stability, mine-clearance, infrastructure improvement and general economic and social development.

Further details of the withdrawal plans and preparations for the post-UNTAC period were provided by the Secretary-General in his report to the Council of 26 August 1993. In order to coordinate the full range of civilian activities that would be undertaken by various agencies of the United Nations system, in accordance with their existing mandates, to promote development, provide humanitarian assistance and foster respect for human rights in Cambodia, the Secretary-General

reiterated his intention to establish in Phnom Penh an integrated office headed by a United Nations representative. The office would also deal with a number of residual issues arising from the Paris Agreements and UNTAC's presence in the country. The Secretary-General had decided at that stage not to recommend that the Security Council authorize the retention of United Nations military personnel in Cambodia after the departure of UNTAC, but would give careful consideration to such a request if the new Government were to make one. (On 7 October 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that such a request had been received. The Council agreed in principle with the Secretary-General's recommendation to establish in Phnom Penh a team of 20 military liaison officers, contributed by Governments, for a single period of six months, and requested a further detailed report on the matter.[1])

On 27 August 1993, the Security Council in its resolution 860 (1993) welcomed the Secretary-General's reports and approved the UNTAC withdrawal plan. It also decided that the period of withdrawal would end on 15 November 1993.[1]

The mandate entrusted to UNTAC was concluded on 24 September 1993. On that date, His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Head of State, formally promulgated the Constitution which the Constituent Assembly had formally adopted by a vote of 113 to 5 against, with 2 abstentions, a greater margin than the two-thirds majority specified in the Paris Agreements. Accordingly, Cambodia was a constitutional monarchy with the official name "The Kingdom of Cambodia", and was an independent, sovereign, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned State. The same day, Prince Sihanouk was elected King of Cambodia by the Royal Council of the Throne. In accordance with the Constitution and the Paris Agreements, the Constituent Assembly transformed itself into a legislative assembly. It was with great satisfaction that the Secretary-General reported to the Council on 5 October 1993 the formation of the new Government of Cambodia, based on the will of the people expressed through free and fair elections organized and conducted by the United Nations. The central objectives of the Paris Agreements had thus been realized.

The Council issued a statement on 5 October in which, among other things, it expressed its satisfaction at the auspicious developments that had taken place in Cambodia since the holding of the elections and stressed the importance of the continued support of the international community to the consolidation of peace and democracy and the promotion of development in Cambodia.

UNTAC ACTIVITIES

Human Rights Component

Function. The Paris Agreements gave UNTAC the responsibility during the transitional period for fostering an environment in which respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms were ensured and where free and fair elections might take place. UNTAC activities in this regard comprised three aspects: a human rights education programme; general human rights oversight of all existing administrative structures in Cambodia; and the investigation of allegations of human rights abuses occurring during the transitional period.

Highlights. The UNTAC Human Rights Component was active in three broad areas. First, it encouraged the SNC to adhere to relevant international human rights instruments and undertook a review of the existing judicial and penal systems in the light of international provisions. Secondly, it conducted an extensive human rights information and education campaign in close cooperation with the Information/Education Division of UNTAC (see "Information/Education Activities", below). Thirdly, it investigated human rights-related complaints and took corrective measures where necessary.

On 20 April 1992, the SNC ratified the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. On 10 September, it agreed to accede to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Human rights officers were progressively deployed in all 21 provinces in Cambodia, including in the zones controlled by FUNCINPEC and KPNLF. However, the component had no access to the zones controlled by PDK.

UNTAC developed a human rights education programme with particular reference to teacher training, dissemination of relevant international instruments, education of health professionals, training of public and political officials and support for local human rights organizations. Educational materials, posters, leaflets, stickers and other printed materials were disseminated throughout the country. As part of the effort to promote the development of an independent judiciary,

a major programme of training for judges, defence lawyers and public defenders was initiated. Training sessions for officials of the existing administrative structures and professional or activist groups were undertaken in almost every province. Participants included representatives of political parties, members of human rights associations, teacher trainees, justice officials and police. Human rights training was introduced into the Cambodian education system, and human rights studies were incorporated in the curriculum of Phnom Penh University's Law School and Medical Faculty.

Collaboration with local human rights organizations was an important aspect of UNTAC's work. UNTAC provided them with materials, training and expertise as well as small grants for basic office expenses. It organized an International Symposium on Human Rights in Cambodia, and conducted a special course for human rights advocates, including a training programme on United Nations human rights procedures and a special training programme dealing with human rights issues in the electoral process.

UNTAC closely monitored conditions of detention in civil prisons throughout Cambodia and pressed local authorities to improve the situation to the extent possible within the means available to the prison administration. It investigated all cases of prisoners whose detention might be politically motivated.

On 19 February 1993, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution providing for the first time for the operational involvement of the Centre for Human Rights in Cambodia in the post-UNTAC period. One of the major tasks of UNTAC's Human Rights Component was to prepare for this operational presence.

Electoral Component

Function. The elections were the focal point of the comprehensive settlement in Cambodia. The Paris Agreements entrusted UNTAC with the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections, to be held no later than May 1993.

As stipulated in the Agreements, the election of 120 members to the constituent assembly was held throughout Cambodia on a provincial basis in accordance with a system of proportional representation. Every person 18 years of age or older who was born in Cambodia to a parent also born in Cambodia was eligible to vote. The Agreements provided for a multiparty electoral system. Voting, therefore, was for political parties and not for individuals. However, the list of party candidates for each province was published before the elections. All political parties were registered by UNTAC in order to participate in the elections.

UNTAC designed and implemented a system for every phase of the electoral process, starting with the establishment, in consultation with the SNC, of a legal framework including electoral law and regulations to govern the electoral process and an electoral code of conduct. Other aspects of UNTAC activities included civic education and training, registration of voters and political parties, and the polling process itself. The Special Representative was assisted in these areas of responsibilities by a chief electoral officer. International staff included: electoral personnel at headquarters; personnel at the 21 provincial offices responsible for electoral operations, information, training, communications, compliance and complaints, and coordination; and district electoral supervisors at approximately 200 district offices. Their number was augmented by international personnel seconded from Member States during the polling process and by local staff, whose numbers exceeded 50,000 during the poll.

Highlights. The Electoral Law, which had been submitted by UNTAC on 1 April 1992, was adopted by the SNC on 5 August and was promulgated on 12 August. The Special Representative subsequently promulgated a number of minor revisions to the Law in order to respond to security or other considerations as they arose or were anticipated. The registration of political parties began on 15 August. On 27 January 1993, 20 out of the 22 provisionally-registered political parties applied for official registration, in accordance with the Electoral Law, by submitting a list of at least 5,000 registered voters who were members of the party.

Voter registration, which began on 5 October 1992 initially for a three-month period, was subsequently extended. When it ended on 31 January 1993, over 4.6 million Cambodians had been registered, representing nearly all the estimated eligible voters in the zones to which UNTAC then had access. For the purposes of controlling voter registration, UNTAC established a computer support system, designed to store up to 5.2 million voter registration records. The registration process was scrutinized by representatives of the political parties with the right to challenge registrants whom they deemed to be unqualified. UNTAC was not given access to PDK-controlled areas, which were considered to be populated by about 5 per cent of the total population of Cambodia.

The electoral campaign began on 7 April 1993 and ended on 19 May, with a four-day cooling off period before the elections. The 20 political parties campaigned actively and vigorously. Scores of polit-

ical meetings and rallies were held daily and peacefully with the participation of tens of thousands of people in virtually all parts of Cambodia. UNTAC itself organized multi-party meetings. According to the Special Representative, the freeness and fairness of the elections would be judged in accordance with three main criteria: the extent to which the campaign and voting were marred by violence, intimidation and harassment; the extent to which SOC, which controlled the largest zones and had the most extensive administrative structure, enjoyed unfair advantages; and the technical conduct of the poll. UNTAC raised the issue of the separation of party and State several times both in public and in private meetings with the leading figures of the Phnom Penh authorities. UNTAC took particular issue with the Phnom Penh authorities over the access of other political parties to the media and their right to freedom of movement. All political parties had access to UNTAC information media. Three political parties requested and received assistance from UNTAC with air transport facilities for campaign purposes.

During the first three days of the elections, between 23 and 25 May, some 1,400 large, medium and small fixed polling stations operated throughout the country, as well as 200 mobile teams in remote or difficult areas. A Cambodian Presiding Officer was in charge of each station, supported and assisted by one International Polling Station Officer. The mobile teams operated for the entire six-day period, while on 26 May some of the fixed stations were converted to mobile operations and worked as mobile teams on 27 and 28 May.

Most of the 963 International Polling Station Officers were repatriated immediately after the polling and counting of ballots, between 31 May and 5 June 1993. Two hundred and seventeen Polling Officers and 41 fingerprint and handwriting experts were retained for the tendered ballot count and left between 7 and 15 June. The bulk of the remaining international electoral staff — some 420 District Electoral Supervisors recruited by the United Nations Volunteer Service — departed the mission by 15 June.

Military Component

Function. The objectives of the military arrangements during the transitional period were to stabilize the security situation and build confidence among the parties to the conflict. The Military Component of UNTAC, headed by a Force Commander, was charged with the following main functions: verification of the withdrawal from Cambodia and non-return of all categories of foreign forces and their arms and equipment; supervision of the cease-fire and related measures, including regroupment, cantonment, disarming and demobilization of forces of the Cambodian parties; weapons control, including monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance, locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia, storing of the arms and equipment of the cantoned and demobilized military forces; and assisting with mine-clearance, including training programmes and mine-awareness programmes.

In addition, the Military Component was responsible for undertaking investigations of alleged non-compliance with any of the provisions relating to military arrangements, and to provide assistance in relation to the release of prisoners of war and in the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons. At maximum strength, the Component comprised more than 15,500 military personnel.

Highlights. The Military Component established checkpoints on Cambodia's borders with Viet Nam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Thailand. Checkpoints were also established at Cambodia's airports and at the port of Sihanoukville, as well as on major routes within the country. These checkpoints gave UNTAC the capacity to observe activities in zones controlled by FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and SOC. They were supplemented by regular patrols for discouraging unauthorized movements of armed persons and weapons, deterring banditry and establishing UNTAC's presence.

According to information provided by the four Cambodian parties during the visit of the military survey mission to Cambodia in November-December 1991, the regular military forces totalled over 200,000 deployed in some 650 locations. In addition, militias, totalling some 250,000, operated throughout the country. Those forces were armed with over 300,000 weapons of all types and some 80 million rounds of ammunition. Although UNTAC had cantoned by mid-November 1992 some 55,000 troops of the three cooperating parties, the refusal of PDK to participate fully in the peace process made it impossible to implement Phase II of the cease-fire and, as a result, the cantonment, disarming and demobilization of the armed forces of the four parties was suspended.

Under these circumstances, the Secretary-General proposed that the level of deployment of the Military Component be maintained until the elections, and that the Component focus its attention on enhancing UNTAC's ability to protect voter registration and, subsequently, on the electoral and polling processes,

particularly in remote or insecure areas. The deployment pattern, which was originally based on the requirements of regroupment and cantonment, was realigned to correspond with the borders of the Cambodian provinces so as to conform with the deployment, and ensuring the security, of the electoral teams. The new deployment was also intended to foster a sense of security among Cambodians in those areas with a higher potential for conflict. During the registration period, military observers accompanied electoral teams in order to negotiate, where necessary, with local authorities or forces that tried to hinder registration. To provide security for the polling period, the Military Component concluded agreements with the armed forces of the SOC, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF. Security of the polling stations and their vicinity was provided by UNTAC alone. The armed forces of the factions assisted UNTAC, conveyed information on possible or actual threats to the elections and ensured security in the zones under their control.

At the same time, the Component continued to perform many of the tasks entrusted to it since the beginning of the mission, including weapons control and assistance to the Repatriation Component, as well as its essential engineering, demining, logistics, communications and other functions. The Component continued its patrolling, observation and monitoring duties by land and water and its civil action programmes to build confidence in the countryside.

UNTAC devoted serious attention to the question of the possible presence of foreign forces in Cambodia. It repeatedly requested the Cambodian parties to provide it with verifiable information relating to foreign forces, but none did so. It also established Strategic Investigation Teams to follow up on allegations. UNTAC found no evidence of the presence of any formed units of such forces in areas to which it had access, although some seven men were identified as "foreign forces" within the meaning of the definition approved by the SNC.

The Mine-Clearance Training Unit trained Cambodians to identify, locate and destroy land mines and to mark minefields, and promoted mine awareness among the general public. By August 1993, including the work done by non-governmental organizations, more than 4 million square metres were cleared of mines and about 37,000 mines and other unexploded ordnance destroyed. Some 2,300 Cambodians were trained in mine-clearance techniques. The Cambodian Mine Action Centre continued this work in the post-UNTAC period. The Centre, established on 10 June 1992 by the SNC at the initiative of UNTAC, is a non-profit Cambodian institution which carries out programmes in mine-awareness, mine-marking, mine-clearing and related training.

Civil Administration Component

Function. In order to ensure a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair general elections, UNTAC was to exercise direct control over existing administrative structures acting in the field of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information. UNTAC was to exercise, as determined in consultation with the SNC, a lesser degree of scrutiny over other administrative structures that could influence the outcome of the elections. UNTAC's civil administration activities were governed by the Paris Agreements and the implementation plan. They were also guided by the discussion proposal drawn up by participants at the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia held in Tokyo in June 1992.

In exercising its operational responsibilities, the Civil Administration Component used three complementary means of control: control *a posteriori*, control *a priori* and appraisal. Control *a posteriori* was achieved through the receipt of all documentation dealing with the operation of the existing administrative structures, including the lines of decision-making, personnel policies and *matériel* questions. Control *a priori* was achieved through the Component's authority to obtain prior knowledge of decisions reached by the structures, as well as the authority to change decisions dealing, for instance, with personnel, finance and the sale of assets. Control by appraisal was achieved through the proposal of improvements in the operations of the existing administrative structures. On a day-to-day basis, these three means of direct control were exercised in various ways, including the physical presence of civil administration personnel alongside their highest-ranking counterparts in the existing administrative structures, regular meetings between UNTAC staff and these officials and the establishment of clear lines of decision-making.

Highlights. On 1 July 1992, the Civil Administration Component began to exercise full control over the five key areas in the Phnom Penh administration, as specified in the Paris Agreements: foreign affairs, national defence, public security, finance and information By 15 July, UNTAC civil administration offices had been established in all 21 provinces. Like the other Components of UNTAC, civil administration personnel were denied access to the PDK-controlled areas. In addition, UNTAC established optional control over other admin-

istrative structures identified as having direct influence over the outcome of elections.

In accordance with the implementation plan, the Civil Administration Component requested the four Cambodian parties to submit a list of their current laws for review by UNTAC. With the exception of PDK, all parties complied. At the initiative of UNTAC, the SNC adopted laws enshrining the rights of freedom of association and of assembly, and approved a set of principles relating to the legal system, penal law and penal procedure with a view to establishing uniform standards for the judiciary and for substantive law that would be applicable throughout Cambodia.

Among its activities in the area of foreign affairs, the Component supervised policies of the existing administrative structures regarding passports and visas. It also exercised control over the various border functions, such as immigration, customs and the implementation of the SNC moratoriums on timber, gems and minerals. A Border Control Unit was established with responsibility for liaison between UNTAC components and the existing administrative structures, civilian field operations, civilian logistical support and other activities. The Component also established control over the receipt and distribution of foreign aid.

In the area of defence, UNTAC inspected the defence structures of the three parties and established other modalities, including the monitoring of incoming and outgoing correspondence, in order to control any actions that might impair the neutrality of the political environment. The leaders of the armed forces of the three factions complying with the Paris Agreements signed the directive prepared by UNTAC regulating the political activity of military personnel. At the request of UNTAC, the SOC "ministry of defence" established a committee to investigate allegations of illegal activity on the part of CPAF armed forces.

UNTAC's activities with regard to public security included the training of judges, prosecutors and police officers of the existing administrative structures in the implementation of the Penal Code adopted by the SNC on UNTAC's initiative, and a programme of regular prison visits. Working groups on road safety and banditry were established. The Special Representative issued a directive prohibiting the illegal possession and carrying of weapons and explosives.

In the area of finance, UNTAC worked with the administrative structures to put in place controls over expenditure, sources of revenue, central bank functions and the sale of public assets. The SNC adopted a financial control directive prepared by the Special Representative on the transfer of public assets in order to introduce orderly and transparent procedures into the process of privatization of property owned by the existing administrative structures. Another dimension of UNTAC's work was the effort to stabilize the country's economy in order to reduce possible causes of unrest that might have an adverse effect on the electoral environment. Control Teams were set up to supplement the regular supervision that UNTAC exercised over the existing administrative structures, particularly outside Phnom Penh. Each Team was headed by an Inspector assisted by Finance and Public Security Services staff, representatives of the Military and Civilian Police components, and analysts and interpreters from the Information/Education Division.

In the area of information, UNTAC published media guidelines aimed at lifting legal restrictions and encouraging the operation of a free and responsible press, and launched a Cambodian Media Association of all Cambodian journalists. It pursued efforts to exercise control over the administrative structures dealing with information. The Special Representative issued a directive on fair access to the media during the electoral campaign. UNTAC made its own television/video, radio and other information facilities available to the 20 political parties participating in the elections.

Following the elections, the Component streamlined its activities to help ensure a smooth transition from the existing administrative structures to the new Government. At the provincial level, Civil Administration staff maintained their contacts with the personnel of the existing administrative structures, promoted dialogue and national reconciliation, monitored any sale, transfer or disposal of public assets, followed up on allegations of human rights violations or political intimidation, and facilitated the work of United Nations agencies. On the national level, civil administration staff focused their efforts on the judiciary and the administration of justice, on monitoring the implementation of the SNC moratoria on timber, gems and minerals, on border and customs control, and on the control and safeguarding of public funds and State assets. Financial control activities continued through the transitional period at both the national and provincial levels.

Civilian Police Component

Function. UNTAC civilian police monitors supervised or controlled the local civil police in order to ensure that law and order were maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms were fully protected. The UNTAC Civilian

Police Component included a policy and management unit at headquarters, 21 units at the provincial level and 200 district-level units. The strength of the Component was 3,600 civilian police monitors. This gave an estimated ratio of one UNTAC police monitor in the field to approximately 15 local civil police, or one UNTAC police monitor to some 3,000 Cambodians.

Highlights. Much of the daily work of the Component focused on supervision or control of local police activities. In accordance with the implementation plan and in order to ensure effective supervision by UNTAC of the police forces of the parties, the Component undertook a comprehensive study of the size, organization and equipment of the police forces of the three Cambodian factions complying with the Paris Agreements. The Component conducted courses which included basic training, operational training, traffic control, human rights, criminal law, criminal investigation, the roles of UNTAC and the Civilian Police Component, crime prevention, demonstration and riot control and the code of conduct. Training took place in Phnom Penh and in the provinces. Basic training also took place in the FUNCINPEC zone and in the zone controlled by KPNLF. A number of police officers from PDK participated in this training.

CIVPOL supervised investigations carried out by local police and undertook independently investigations into serious crimes, particularly those which were considered to be politically or ethnically motivated. In a number of cases, the Special Prosecutor had enough evidence to issue a warrant. In cases where the crime involved political or ethnic considerations, the Special Representative raised the matter in the SNC or at other appropriate meetings.

Following the Special Representative's directive prohibiting the possession and carrying of firearms and explosives by unauthorized persons, CIVPOL jointly staffed checkpoints with local police. It also directed other efforts of the local police force against banditry. CIVPOL cooperated with the Military Component in supervising the checkpoints and patrols of the existing police forces in sensitive areas.

The Component joined with other components in promoting a neutral political environment in Cambodia. Following a steep rise in attacks against offices of political parties, CIVPOL, in collaboration with other UNTAC components, launched a special operation to curb the attacks. It instituted the static guarding of political party offices considered most likely to be attacked after dark. During the campaign period, it monitored political rallies and meetings. During the elections, CIVPOL was present at all polling stations.

Repatriation Component

Function. Some 365,000 Cambodian refugees and displaced persons from camps on the Thai border and elsewhere were repatriated under United Nations auspices in an inter-agency effort under the overall authority of UNTAC. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which acted as the lead agency, oversaw the movement of returnees, the provision of immediate assistance and food, and a reintegration programme. The Repatriation Component of UNTAC was headed by a Director, appointed by the Secretary-General and reporting to the Special Representative as well as to the High Commissioner for Refugees.

Highlights. The repatriation exercise began on 30 March 1992; on 30 March 1993, the largest and last of the refugee camps, Site 2, was closed at an official ceremony presided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Some 365,000 refugees and displaced persons had returned to Cambodia under United Nations auspices.

The monthly rate of return rose from 4,000 in April 1992 to 20,000 in June 1992. By July, some 30,000 Cambodians were returning home each month. Although the rains made travelling conditions difficult, this was largely overcome by the use of rail and, in some cases, waterways. The rate of return rose to 35,000 a month by November and reached a peak of 40,000 in the months of January and February 1993. Though the great bulk of the returnees came from Thailand, some 2,000 were also repatriated from Indonesia, Viet Nam and Malaysia.

Most refugees chose to settle in areas controlled by the Phnom Penh authorities. Of the rest, about 33,000 chose to settle in the KPNLF zone, while several thousand settled in the PDK and FUNCINPEC zones. In addition to rations for 400 days and a domestic kit, returnees had the choice of several forms of assistance, including agricultural land, a housing plot and a cash grant in lieu of building materials. Most returnees, some 88 percent, chose the cash grant. UNHCR advised returnees on the situation prevailing in their communes of final destination, particularly when they were unsafe or inaccessible.

In cooperation with other UNTAC components, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, UNHCR established a country-wide mechanism for monitoring the condition of returnees. Quick-impact projects were also implemented to help communities absorb the returnees. These included road and bridge repair, mine-clearance, agricultural development, digging of wells and water ponds and

improvement and construction of sanitation, health and education facilities.

All eligible returnees were given the opportunity to register to vote, either in their final destination along with the local population or in the six reception centres. In January 1993, as the deadline for the end of the electoral registration period was approaching, a special arrangement was made between the Repatriation and Electoral Components to enable registration of the remaining eligible population in the border camps whereby they were temporarily "listed" in Thailand and received their registration cards upon return to Cambodia.

Rehabilitation Component

Function. The Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia was one of the three instruments comprising the Paris Agreements. Chronologically, the rehabilitation phase ran from the signing of the Agreements and the establishment of UNTAC until the formation of a new Cambodian Government following free and fair elections.

The Rehabilitation Component of UNTAC focused on food security, health, housing, training, education, the transport network and the restoration of Cambodia's basic infrastructure, including public utilities. The Component's Director, appointed by the Secretary-General and reporting to the Special Representative, ensured effective coordination of rehabilitation activities, and made ongoing assessments of needs. In addition, the Director had responsibilities related to raising resources through donor contributions.

Highlights. Shortly after the establishment of UNTAC in Cambodia, a Technical Advisory Committee of the SNC was set up under the chairmanship of the UNTAC Director of Rehabilitation in order to facilitate the approval of projects by the Cambodian parties. At the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, held in Tokyo in June 1992, the international community pledged nearly $880 million in aid to Cambodia.

However, the Secretary-General reported that the actual level of disbursements by early 1993 stood at no more than $95 million. Further, the lack of funding for certain specific sectors, including training and maintenance of essential social services, also gave rise to concern that these deficiencies might compromise the overall rehabilitation effort. These issues of concern were discussed at a meeting of donors in Phnom Penh on 25 February 1993. The participants recognized the need for speedy disbursement of the commitments made in Tokyo; reviewed the emerging priority needs; and agreed that arrangements be made for meetings, following the elections, of the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) — a consultative body envisaged under the Paris Agreements to monitor the international community's contributions to the reconstruction of Cambodia. As of mid-August, approximately $200 million had been disbursed. A meeting of the ICORC was held in Paris on 8 and 9 September 1993. At that meeting, new pledges amounting to $120 million were made. ICORC is scheduled to hold another meeting in the first quarter of 1994.

Towards the end of the transition period, the Rehabilitation Component concentrated on the implementation of small-scale rehabilitation projects yielding quick results. These projects involved the repair and maintenance of public utilities and education and health facilities. Most projects were highly labour-intensive, thus creating jobs. Donor response to the Component's initiative to implement these projects was relatively positive after the elections had taken place.

In the area of Cambodia's natural resources management, the SNC established on 23 July 1992 a Technical Advisory Committee, as suggested by UNTAC, for reviewing and examining the different contractual arrangements relating to the exploitation of natural resources such as timber stock and gem mines. On the Committee's recommendation, the SNC, on 22 September, instituted a country-wide moratorium on the export of logs — a decision supported by the Security Council in its resolution 792 (1992). Compliance with the moratorium was monitored by the Rehabilitation Component, in close coordination with UNTAC military observers, Civil Administration and Civilian Police personnel deployed at border checkpoints. On 10 February 1993, the SNC adopted supplementary measures aimed at discouraging further tree felling by reducing the volume of sawn timber allowed to be exported from Cambodia.

In March 1993, the SNC approved the UNTAC draft action plan on the implementation of the Declaration on Mining and Export of Minerals and Gems from Cambodia. The Declaration placed a moratorium on the commercial extraction of mineral resources on land and offshore and on the export of minerals and gems from Cambodia, effective 28 February 1993.

Also in 1993, the SNC approved the proposal made by UNTAC in collaboration with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for the establishment of a National

Heritage Protection Authority of Cambodia to coordinate efforts aimed at protecting and administering the physical cultural heritage of Cambodia.

Information/Education Activities

The Information/Education Division of UNTAC was the production point and conduit for information disseminated to the Cambodian people by UNTAC. The Division informed the Cambodians of the essence of the Paris Agreements and UNTAC's role, objectives and activities. After two decades of fighting and isolation, many Cambodians were little aware of the international community's efforts to assist their country. Many were sceptical about the applicability in Cambodia of basic concepts of human rights, including free and fair elections and multi-party political campaigning. The flow of information between UNTAC and the grass roots, therefore, was considered essential to UNTAC operation.

UNTAC established its own radio station and, on 9 November 1992, it began broadcasting from a Phnom Penh-based transmitter loaned by SOC for UNTAC's exclusive use. By April 1993, relay stations brought the UNTAC message to all parts of the country and, by early May, programming had expanded to 15 hours per day. In addition, under arrangements made with the Thai Foreign Ministry and Voice of America (VOA), UNTAC materials were broadcast via a VOA transmitter in Thailand at prime time twice daily. The broadcasts concentrated on information regarding the electoral process, human rights and other aspects of the UNTAC mandate. During the electoral campaign particular emphasis was given to the secrecy of the ballot.

In accordance with the directive of the Special Representative on fair access to the media during the electoral campaign, Radio UNTAC offered weekly segments to each political party for the broadcast of political material and allowed a "right of response" where a political party, its candidate or official believed it had been unfairly attacked or its public statements misrepresented.

The Division produced a variety of videos, posters, information leaflets, flyers, banners, billboards and advertisements for public display to illustrate the work of UNTAC and to inform Cambodians of the events of the electoral process and encourage their full participation in it. Activity during the campaign included disseminating information on various political party platforms, building confidence in the secrecy of the ballot and instructing voters in voting procedures. Information videos, including round-table discussions involving representatives of the 20 political parties contesting the elections, were shown in Phnom Penh and distributed throughout the country.

Translations and analyses of the Khmer-language radio and print output of all four Cambodian parties signatory to the Paris Agreements were provided to the Special Representative and all UNTAC components. Information officers conducted regular opinion surveys among Cambodians to assess the impact of UNTAC's information programme and to monitor the attitude of the people towards UNTAC and its implementation of the peace process.

COMPOSITION OF UNTAC

UNTAC military and/or civilian police personnel were provided by Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay. Other components of UNTAC consisted of staff members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, United Nations Volunteers, staff seconded from Member States, and local staff.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The total cost of UNAMIC and UNTAC for the period from 1 November 1991 to 24 September 1993 was approximately $1,500 million. Initially, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of some $840 million for the expenses of UNAMIC and UNTAC, through 31 October 1992. On 22 December 1992, the General Assembly decided to appropriate a further amount of some $484 million for the continued UNTAC operation for the period from 1 November 1992 to 30 April 1993. To meet the additional requirements of UNTAC for the period 1 May to 31 July 1993 and from 1 August 1993 until the end of its mandate, the Assembly decided on 14 September 1993 to appropriate an amount of $85 million.

As at 31 October 1993, contributions outstanding to the UNAMIC and UNTAC Special Accounts amounted to approximately $231 million.

In addition, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, as well as rehabilitation assistance, are funded from voluntary contributions. At

the June 1992 Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, some $880 million was pledged for these activities. New pledges totalling $120 million were made at the September 1993 meeting of ICORC. (See Rehabilitation Component above).

Notes

[1] On 4 November 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 880 (1993), decided to extend the period of withdrawal of the mine clearance and training unit of UNTAC until 30 November 1993. It also decided to extend the period of withdrawal beyond 15 November 1993 for elements of the military police and medical components of UNTAC as follows:

71 Military Police Officers between 16 and 30 November 1993;

30 Military Police Officers between 1 and 31 December 1993;

10 members of the medical unit between 16 November and 7 December 1993; and

8 members of the medical unit between 8 and 31 December 1993.

The Council also decided to establish a team of 20 military liaison officers for a single period of six months with a mandate to report on matters affecting security in Cambodia, to maintain liaison with the Government of Cambodia and to assist the Government in dealing with residual military matters relating to the Paris Agreements. These liaison officers are separate from UNTAC. On 21 November 1993, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he proposed to form the Military Liaison Team of 20 military liaison officers from contributions offered by 15 nations: Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, China, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, and Uruguay. The Secretary-General also proposed to appoint Col. A.N.M. Muniruzzaman (Bangladesh) as Chief Military Liaison Officer.

PS/DPI/16/Rev.3 — October 1993

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

ONUMOZ

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

LOCATION: Mozambique

HEADQUARTERS: Maputo

DURATION: December 1992 — to date

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: between 7,000 and 8,000 military and civilian personnel

FATALITIES: 6 (as of 14 October 1993)

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. Aldo Ajello (Italy)

FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Lélio Gonçalves Rodrigues da Silva (Brazil)

BACKGROUND

On 4 October 1992, after 14 years of devastating civil war, Mr. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique, and Mr. Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, President of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), signed in Rome a General Peace Agreement establishing the principles and modalities for the achievement of peace in Mozambique. The Agreement called for United Nations participation in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement, in providing technical assistance for the general elections and in monitoring these elections.

Under the Agreement, negotiated with the help of a number of mediators and observers including United Nations representatives, a cease-fire was to come into effect not later than 15 October 1992, referred to as E-Day. The Agreement itself and its seven protocols called for the cease-fire to be followed rapidly by the separation of the two sides' forces and their concentration in certain assembly areas. Demobilization was to begin immediately thereafter of those troops who would not serve in the new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM). Demobilization would have to be completed six months after E-Day. Meanwhile, new political parties would be formed and preparations would be made for elections, scheduled to take place not later than 15 October 1993. A 16 July 1992 Declaration by the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO on guiding principles for humanitarian assistance, a Joint Declaration signed in Rome on 7 August 1992, as well as a Joint Communiqué of 10 July 1990 and an Agreement of 1 December 1990, form integral parts of the General Peace Agreement.

The United Nations was requested to undertake a major role in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement and was asked to perform specific functions in relation to the cease-fire, the elections and humanitarian assistance. The implementation of the Agreement was to be supervised by a Supervisory and Monitoring Commission chaired by the United Nations.

On 9 October 1992, United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted to the Security Council a report on the proposed United Nations role in Mozambique, in which he recommended an immediate plan of action and stated his intention, subject to the Council's approval, to appoint an interim Special Representative to oversee United Nations activities in that country.

On 13 October, the Security Council adopted resolution 782 (1992), by which it welcomed the signature of the General Peace Agreement between the Mozambican Government and RENAMO and approved the appointment by the Secretary-General of an interim Special Representative and the dispatch to Mozambique of a team of up to 25 military observers.

AGREEMENT ENTERS INTO FORCE

On the same day, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Aldo Ajello as his interim Special Representative for Mozambique[1], and asked him to proceed to Mozambique to assist the parties in setting up the joint monitoring machinery, in finalizing the modalities and conditions for the military arrangements and in carrying out the various

other actions that were required of them at the very beginning of the peace process.

The interim Special Representative and the team of 21 military observers, drawn from existing United Nations peace-keeping missions, arrived in Mozambique on 15 October 1992, the day the General Peace Agreement entered into force. On 20 October, two teams of military observers were also deployed to Nampula and Beira. Later, two additional outposts were established to verify the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique,[2] which is an important element of the General Peace Agreement.

Both Mozambican parties committed themselves to undertake, immediately after, and in some instances before, the entry into effect of the Agreement, specific action to set in motion the joint mechanisms to monitor and verify its implementation. However, no such action had been initiated at the time when the interim Special Representative arrived in Mozambique. Upon arrival, he started extensive discussions with the parties concerned in an effort to ensure the early start of implementation of the Agreement.

Meanwhile, major violations of the cease-fire were reported in various areas of the country, and the parties presented official complaints to the interim Special Representative. He urged the two parties to refrain from any type of military operation and to discuss and settle all disputes through negotiations.

The Secretary-General reported on the situation to the President of the Security Council on 23 October. The President, in a statement dated 27 October, expressed the Council's deep concern about the reports of major violations of the cease-fire, called upon the parties to halt such violations immediately and urged them to cooperate fully with the interim Special Representative.

SETTING UP OF MONITORING MECHANISM

In an attempt to avoid further escalation of hostilities, the interim Special Representative called for an early informal meeting of the Government and RENAMO. The initiative was successful, and both parties sent high-level delegations to attend their first meeting in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique. Thereafter, the two delegations met on numerous occasions, both bilaterally and together with the interim Special Representative. On 4 November 1992, the interim Special Representative appointed the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC). CSC was to guarantee the implementation of the Agreement, assume responsibility for authentic interpretation of it, settle any disputes that might arise between the parties and guide and coordinate the activities of the other Commissions. It is chaired by the United Nations and was initially composed of Government and RENAMO delegations, with representatives of Italy (the mediator State), France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States (observer States at the Rome talks) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In December, Germany also became a member of CSC.

CSC held its first meeting on 4 November and appointed the main subsidiary commissions: the Cease-fire Commission (CCF), the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel (CORE), as well as the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM).

ESTABLISHMENT OF ONUMOZ

On 3 December 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his further report, in which he presented a detailed operational plan for the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Describing the difficulties of the operation, he referred to the size of the country, the devastated state of its infrastructure, the disruption of its economy by war and drought, the limited capacity of the Government to cope with the new tasks arising from the General Peace Agreement and the complexity of the processes envisaged in the Agreement. He also referred to the breadth of responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations under the Agreement.

The Secretary-General expressed his conviction that it would not be possible to create the conditions for successful elections in Mozambique unless the military situation had been brought fully under control and that the Agreement would not be implemented unless the Mozambican parties made a determined effort in good faith to honour their commitments.

In recommending to the Security Council the establishment and deployment of ONUMOZ, the Secretary-General stated that "in the light of recent experiences elsewhere, the recommendations in the present report may be thought to invite the international community to take a risk. I believe that the risk is worth taking; but I cannot disguise that it exists."

On 16 December, the Security Council, by its resolution 797 (1992), approved the Secretary-General's report and decided to establish ONUMOZ until 31 October 1993. The Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation that the elections not take place until the military aspects of the General Peace Agreement had been fully implemented. It called upon the Mozambican Government and

RENAMO to cooperate fully with the United Nations and to respect scrupulously the cease-fire and their obligations under the Agreement.

ONUMOZ'S MANDATE

In accordance with the General Peace Agreement, the mandate of ONUMOZ includes four important elements: political, military, electoral and humanitarian. In his 3 December 1992 report, the Secretary-General stressed that the operational concept of ONUMOZ was based on the strong interrelationship between these four components, requiring a fully integrated approach and coordination by the interim Special Representative. Without sufficient humanitarian aid, and especially food supplies, the security situation in the country might deteriorate and the demobilization process might stall. Without adequate military protection, the humanitarian aid would not reach its destination. Without sufficient progress in the political area, the confidence required for the disarmament and rehabilitation process would not exist. The electoral process, in turn, required prompt demobilization and formation of the new armed forces, without which the conditions would not exist for successful elections.

Political aspects

The Office of the Special Representative would provide overall direction of United Nations activities in Mozambique and would be responsible for political guidance of the peace process, including facilitating the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, in particular by chairing the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and its subordinate joint commissions.

Military aspects

ONUMOZ would monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces of the two parties, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons; monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces, and provide security in the four transport corridors; monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups; authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process.

ONUMOZ's verification of the arrangements for the cease-fire and other military aspects of the peace process in Mozambique would be carried out mainly by teams of United Nations military observers at the 49 assembly areas in three military regions and elsewhere in the field. Teams would also be deployed at airports, ports and other critical areas, including RENAMO headquarters.

The military aspects of the United Nations operation in Mozambique would be closely linked with the humanitarian effort. The approximately 110,000 soldiers who come to the assembly areas would be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into civil society. They would need food and other support as soon as the assembly areas were established. An ONUMOZ technical unit, staffed by civilian personnel, would assist in implementing the demobilization programme and would collaborate closely with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC) on the programme's humanitarian aspects.

The General Peace Agreement provides for the withdrawal of foreign troops to be initiated following the entry into force of the cease-fire. Simultaneously, the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, through the Cease-fire Commission, would assume immediate responsibility "for verifying and ensuring security of strategic and trading routes", of which the most important are the four transport corridors. ONUMOZ would have to assume transitional responsibility for the security of the corridors in order to protect humanitarian convoys using them, pending the formation of the new unified armed forces. Bearing this in mind, ONUMOZ infantry battalions would be deployed in the corridors.

While the Agreement does not provide a specific role for United Nations civilian police in monitoring the neutrality of the Mozambican police, the Secretary-General proposed to leave open the possibility of introducing a police component into ONUMOZ, should both Mozambican parties so request.

Monitoring of electoral process

Under the terms of the Agreement, legislative and presidential elections would be held simultaneously one year after the date of signature of the Agreement. This period might be extended if warranted by the prevailing circumstances.

ONUMOZ's Electoral Division would monitor and verify all aspects and stages of the electoral process which would be organized by the National Elections Commission. The Division would provide overall direction and maintain contacts with the Government of Mozambique, RENAMO, the National Elections Commission and the main political parties.

In addition, the Secretary-General's Special Representative would coordinate technical assistance to the whole electoral process in Mozambique, which

would be provided through the United Nations Development Programme, other existing mechanisms of the United Nations system and the bilateral channels.

Humanitarian aspects

The 1992 peace accord set out two objectives for international humanitarian assistance to Mozambique: to serve as an instrument of reconciliation, and to assist the return of people displaced by war and hunger, whether they had taken refuge in neighbouring countries or in provincial and district centres within Mozambique. ONUMOZ's humanitarian component — UNOHAC — would be established in Maputo, with suboffices at the regional and provincial levels. It would replace the office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations, which had been responsible for humanitarian assistance programmes in Mozambique. Headed by the Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator, and under the overall authority of the Special Representative, it would function as an integrated component of ONUMOZ. Operational agencies and the non-governmental aid community would be asked to provide representatives to work within UNOHAC.

UNOHAC would also make available food and other relief for distribution by a technical unit of ONUMOZ to the soldiers in the assembly areas. In order to achieve the successful reintegration of over 100,000 demobilized soldiers, UNOHAC is proposing a three-pronged strategy centred on identification of training and employment opportunities, a vocational kits and credit scheme, and a counselling and referral service.

ONUMOZ ACTIVITIES

Early difficulties

From the outset of ONUMOZ operations in Mozambique, various delays and difficulties of a political, administrative and logistical nature have seriously impeded the implementation of the General Peace Agreement. In his 2 April 1993 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that although the cease-fire had largely held, many of the timetables established in the Agreement "proved to be unrealistic". Continuing deep mistrust resulted in reluctance to begin assembly and demobilization of troops, and contributed to the delay in the deployment of United Nations military observers. Another complication was RENAMO's insistence that 65 per cent of ONUMOZ troops be deployed before the assembly process began. There were administrative delays in the deployment of ONUMOZ formed military units. A number of logistical and legal problems arose from the absence of a status-of-forces agreement with the Mozambican Government.

As to the elections, the Secretary-General stressed that the military situation in Mozambique must be fully under control for conditions to be created in which a successful election could take place. Having found it evident that the elections could not be held in October 1993 as originally scheduled, he indicated that he would continue discussions with the parties on new dates.

On 14 April, the Security Council, by adopting resolution 818 (1993), stressed its concern about delays and difficulties impeding the peace process in Mozambique, and strongly urged the country's Government and RENAMO to finalize the precise timetable for the full implementation of the provisions of the General Peace Agreement, including the separation, concentration and demobilization of forces, as well as for the elections. The Council also urged both sides to urgently comply with their commitments under the Agreement and to cooperate with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in the full and timely implementation of the mandate of ONUMOZ.

New timetable

In the following weeks, due to determined efforts undertaken by the United Nations, many of the difficulties were overcome and, by the beginning of May 1993, ONUMOZ was fully deployed and its military infrastructure established in all three operational regions.

On 30 June, the Secretary-General reported about this and a number of other positive developments which resulted in forward movement of the peace process in Mozambique. Those included the establishment of the voluntary trust fund to assist RENAMO, the resumption of the work of the Joint Commissions, massive international effort in the humanitarian field, with a sharp increase in the return of refugees and displaced persons. The withdrawal of Zimbabwean and Malawian troops, as provided for in the General Peace Agreement, was successfully completed. Also, a status-of-forces agreement was signed between the Government and the United Nations, which facilitated the entire range of work of ONUMOZ.

However, the establishment of the National Elections Commission and the Commission of State Administration was still pending, cantonment and demobilization of troops as well as the formation of the new army had not commenced. The Secretary-General stated that unless the major provisions of the

General Peace Agreement were implemented, the future of the country would remain uncertain. There should be no further delay in finalizing a new and realistic timetable for the implementation of the peace plan. The cantonment and demobilization of troops should start soon and be completed early in 1994, and the training of a new Mozambican army should be initiated as soon as possible. To assist in that process, the Secretary-General was willing to grant the request that ONUMOZ, with the consent of the Security Council, assume chairmanship of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force on the understanding that it would not entail any obligation on the part of the United Nations for training or establishing new armed forces.

The revised timetable, presented by the Secretary-General at that time, took as its point of departure the resumption of the work of the Joint Commissions beginning on 3 June 1993 and concluding 16 months later with the holding of elections in October 1994. The concentration and demobilization of Government and RENAMO troops, to be carried out in stages, was expected to take eight or nine months. The concentration of troops was scheduled to begin in September 1993 and would be followed a month later by the beginning of demobilization. It was expected that 50 per cent of the soldiers should have been demobilized by January 1994, and the demobilization of troops should be completed by May 1994.

Approximately 30,000 soldiers were to be absorbed into the new army and the rest were to return to civilian life. Half the new army was to be operational by May 1994 and formation of the new army should be completed by September 1994. Home transportation of soldiers who would not be part of the new army was to start in October 1993, after demobilization began, and was to be concluded by April 1994 in order to enable the demobilized soldiers to register for the elections. Voter registration was expected to take three months and is scheduled to be carried out from April to June 1994. The repatriation of refugees and displaced persons was expected to be largely completed by April 1994 so that the resettled population might register in time for the elections.

The Secretary-General stated that although the general parameters of the new timetable were thoroughly discussed, he was still awaiting final agreement from both parties.

By adopting resolution 850 (1993) of 9 July, the Security Council welcomed the progress made in the implementation of the General Peace Agreement but expressed concern over continuing delays, particularly in the assembly and demobilization of forces, the formation of the new unified armed forces, and the finalizing of election arrangements. It approved the Secretary-General's recommendation that ONUMOZ should chair the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force. Further, the Council invited the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO to agree without delay to the revised timetable to implement the provisions of the General Peace Agreement based on the general parameters described by the Secretary-General.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

In his progress report presented to the Security Council on 30 August 1993, the Secretary-General stated that the "recent developments in the Mozambican peace process have been encouraging". The most significant development was the "long overdue" start of direct talks between the President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, and the President of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama. The talks began on 23 August in Maputo. The Secretary-General strongly urged the parties to turn their current dialogue into an ongoing and action-oriented process aimed at bringing the peace process to a successful conclusion. As to the revised timetable, the Secretary-General indicated that although it had not yet been formally approved by the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, important progress had been made in key areas. The Government has explicitly agreed to the October 1994 deadline for the holding of the elections, while RENAMO has also expressed its implicit agreement. The Secretary-General reported that he had instructed his Special Representative to follow as closely as possible the revised timetable for assembly and demobilization of forces and the formation of the unified armed forces.

In his report, the Secretary-General also described the activities of ONUMOZ in implementing the military, humanitarian, electoral and political aspects of its mandate.

Demobilization

Progress had been made by that time in the establishment of assembly areas for the cantonment of the Government and RENAMO troops prior to their demobilization. Of the 49 assembly areas, 36 had been accepted by all sides and approved by the Cease-fire Commission. Teams of ONUMOZ military observers had been deployed in 23 of these 36 approved assembly areas so that the cantonment might

begin as soon as possible. Five infantry battalions of ONUMOZ have been fully deployed in the four transport corridors and along National Highway No. 1.

Cease-fire

By the end of August, there had been 53 complaints of cease-fire violations all of which had been investigated by the Cease-fire Commission with the active participation of ONUMOZ. The Commission approved the results of almost half these investigations; some complaints had been dropped, while the remaining cases, which relate primarily to the question of control and administration of territory, had been transferred to the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission for consideration.

Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force

On 22 July, the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force, functioning under United Nations chairmanship, approved the Lisbon Declaration by which France, Portugal and the United Kingdom set out a programme aimed at assisting in the formation of the new unified army. The Commission decided to initiate the training of instructors for the new Mozambican army by sending 100 officers (50 each from the Government and RENAMO) to a training facility at Nyanga (Zimbabwe) where they arrived on 3 August. Another group of 440 officers was dispatched to Nyanga in October.

On 13 August 1993, the Joint Commission approved three documents: the timetable for the formation of the new army; the rules and criteria for the instructors to be trained in Nyanga; and the structure of the High Command of the new army. On 26 October, the Commission adopted and signed additional documents, including rules of military discipline of the new Mozambican Defence Force, the staffing table for the Forces' High Command and the structure of the Force's Joint General Staff.

Humanitarian programme

A major goal of the ONUMOZ humanitarian assistance programme is to respond effectively to the reintegration needs of all Mozambicans, particularly those returning to resettle in their original communities. It is projected that approximately 6 million Mozambicans will resettle during the next two years, including about 4.5 million internally displaced persons, 1.5 million refugees and 370,000 demobilized soldiers and their dependants. This situation has necessitated the programme's shift in emphasis from emergency humanitarian relief towards reintegration and rehabilitation.

Providing humanitarian assistance in the environment created by the peace accord promotes communication needed to solidify the peace. Humanitarian assistance committees convened by UNOHAC's Field Officers in the provinces are expanding contacts among all concerned parties. Support for the repatriation process, the demobilization of armed forces, emergency relief and the restoration of essential services, and mine clearance are the main components of the consolidated humanitarian assistance programme for 1993-1994. The implementation of this programme will require some $610 million for the twelve-month period May 1993 — April 1994. About $560 million has been committed by donors to date.

About 30 per cent of Mozambique's 1.5 million refugees have returned. A similar third of the 4.5 million displaced persons within the country when the peace accord was signed have also moved back to their home areas. Over 2 million more people are expected to be resettled in the coming year. Although mine clearance programmes have been slow to reach the implementation stage, major hurdles have been overcome and a National Mine Clearance Plan is coordinating efforts to clear 4,000 km of roads in the initial phase, develop mine awareness programmes, and train 1,500 Mozambican nationals in mine clearance and related techniques.

Electoral process

On 26 March 1993, the Government of Mozambique prepared and distributed a draft electoral law to RENAMO and other political parties. A multiparty consultative conference to discuss this document was convened on 27 April 1993. However, initially RENAMO refused to attend the meeting on the grounds that it had not had sufficient time to study the text. Smaller parties did attend, but walked out after having presented a declaration demanding material and financial support and alleging that there had been insufficient time for them to analyse the draft.

Although the conference resumed its work on 2 August 1993, with the presence of all political parties including RENAMO, it reached a deadlock over an article on the composition of the National Electoral Commission, meant to be the representative and impartial body responsible for organizing the parliamentary and presidential elections. This led to a breakdown of discussions.

TWO MAJOR AGREEMENTS SIGNED

On 10 September 1993, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that two major agreements had been signed between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO on 3 September — the outcome of the first meeting between the President of Mozambique and the President of RENAMO after the signing of the General Peace Agreement in October 1992.

By the first agreement, the Government and RENAMO agreed to integrate into the state administration all areas that had been under RENAMO control. This agreement, the Secretary-General believed, would contribute to stability in the country and promote national reconciliation.

By the second agreement, concerning the impartiality of the national police, the parties agreed to request the United Nations to monitor all police activities in the country, public or private, to monitor the rights and liberties of citizens and to provide technical support to the Police Commission (COMPOL). The proposed United Nations police contingent would be responsible for verifying that all police activities in the country were consistent with the General Peace Agreement. The Secretary-General planned to send to Mozambique a small survey team of experts and, based on their findings, make recommendations concerning the size of the police component; while awaiting those recommendations, preparations would commence to deploy the 128 police observers already authorized by resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMENDS AGREEMENTS

On 13 September 1993, the Security Council, by resolution 863 (1993), strongly urged the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO "to apply, without further postponement" the revised timetable for implementing the General Peace Agreement, and encouraged the President of Mozambique and the President of RENAMO to continue their direct talks. Further, it urged RENAMO to join the Government in authorizing immediate assembly of forces, and urged both parties to begin demobilizing troops, in accordance with the revised timetable and without preconditions.

Deploring the lack of progress in the multiparty consultative conference, the Security Council urged RENAMO and other political parties to join with the Mozambican Government in quickly agreeing on an electoral law, which should include provision for an effective National Election Commission. The Council called on the Government and RENAMO to make operational, without further delay, the National Commission for Administration, the National Information Commission and the Police Affairs Commission. The Council requested the Secretary-General to examine expeditiously the proposal of the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO for United Nations monitoring of police activities in the country, and welcomed his intention to send a survey team of experts in that connection.

FURTHER PROGRESS REPORTED

In an attempt to break the stalemate in the peace process, the Secretary-General visited Mozambique from 17 to 20 October 1993. He met with President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama as well as with leaders of other political parties and representatives of the international community.

On 20 October, the Secretary-General announced a breakthrough in the peace process. Major agreements had been reached between the Government and RENAMO on, among other things, the assembly and demobilization of RENAMO and Government troops as well as the simultaneous disarmament of paramilitary forces, militia and irregular troops; the composition of the National Elections Commission and the system and timetable for finalizing the Electoral Law; and the creation of local National Police Affairs Commission subcommittees to monitor the activities of the Mozambican Police. Following these and other agreements, the revised timetable for the implementation of the Peace Agreement was approved by the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission on 22 October 1993.

On 29 October 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 879 (1993), decided to extend ONUMOZ's mandate for an interim period terminating on 5 November 1993, pending examination of the Secretary-General's report due under resolution 863 (1993).[3]

COMPOSITION OF ONUMOZ

The authorized strength of ONUMOZ is between 7,000 and 8,000 military and civilian personnel.

Currently, the military component includes 302 military observers and some 6,250 infantry and support personnel. They are provided by the following States: Argentina, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain,

Sweden, Zambia and Uruguay. In addition, the following States have expressed their readiness in principle to make the necessary personnel available: Republic of Congo and United States.

The Office of the Special Representative is comprised of a small number of international professional and support staff as well as an adequate number of locally recruited personnel.

The ONUMOZ Electoral Division will include up to 148 international electoral officers, supported by a number of United Nations Volunteers and international and local support staff. During the polling itself, the Electoral Division will require the services of up to 1,200 international observers. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance has a small number of international professional staff to coordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance in Mozambique; it is assisted by an ONUMOZ technical unit in the humanitarian aspects of the demobilization process.

In addition, up to 28 international professional staff, up to 100 United Nations Volunteers, up to 124 international support staff and an adequate number of local staff are required to provide secretariat functions and administrative support to the military, electoral and humanitarian components of ONUMOZ, as well as to the Commissions chaired by the United Nations.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The rough annual cost of ONUMOZ to the United Nations is approximately $290 million. The costs of the operation are met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 31 October 1993, contributions outstanding to the ONUMOZ Special Account amounted to approximately $92 million.

Notes

[1] Subsequently, in March 1993, Mr. Aldo Ajello was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mozambique.

[2] As the civil war intensified, Malawi and Zimbabwe, with the agreement of the Government of Mozambique, deployed troops in the transport corridors to assist the Government's forces in keeping them open. These corridors, which run across Mozambique from the Indian Ocean to land-locked countries to the north and west, are of critical importance for southern Africa.

[3] The Secretary-General submitted his report on 1 November 1993. On 5 November, the Security Council, by resolution 822 (1993), decided, *inter alia*, to renew ONUMOZ's mandate for a period of six months, subject to a proviso that the Council would review the status of the mandate within 90 days based on the further report of the Secretary-General. The Council requested the Secretary-General to report by 31 January 1994 and every three months thereafter on whether the parties had made "sufficient and tangible progress" towards implementing the General Peace Agreement and meeting the timetable.

PS/DPI/20/Rev.1 — October 1993

Note: Data effective 18 November 1993

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA II

LOCATION: Somalia

HEADQUARTERS: Mogadishu

DURATION: April 1992 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: Approximately 28,000 military personnel and some 2,800 civilian staff

FATALITIES: 81 (as of 14 October 1993)

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (retired) (United States)

FORCE COMMANDER: Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir (Turkey)

BACKGROUND

The downfall of President Siad Barre in January 1991 resulted in a power struggle and clan clashes in many parts of Somalia. In November, the most intense fighting since January broke out in the capital, Mogadishu, between two factions — one supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other supporting the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Aidid. Since then, fighting persisted in Mogadishu and spread throughout Somalia, with heavily armed elements controlling various parts of the country. Some declared alliance with one or the other of the two factions, while others did not. Numerous marauding groups of bandits added to the problem.

The hostilities resulted in widespread death and destruction, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes and causing a dire need for emergency humanitarian assistance. Almost 4.5 million people in Somalia — over half of the estimated population — were threatened by severe malnutrition and malnutrition-related disease, with the most affected living in the countryside. It was estimated that perhaps 300,000 people died since November 1991, and at least 1.5 million lives were at immediate risk. Almost one million Somalis have sought refuge in neighbouring countries and elsewhere.

The political chaos, deteriorating security situation, widespread banditry and looting, and extent of physical destruction compounded the problem and severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Furthermore, the conflict threatened stability in the Horn of Africa region, and its continuation occasioned threats to international peace and security in the area.

EARLY UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS

Despite the turmoil that ensued after the overthrow of President Siad Barre, the United Nations continued its humanitarian efforts in Somalia and, by March 1991, was fully engaged in that country. Over the following months, the volatile security situation forced the United Nations on several occasions to temporarily withdraw its personnel from Somalia, but it continued its humanitarian activities to the fullest extent possible, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The deteriorating and appalling situation in Somalia led the United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), to become actively involved with the political aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

On 27 December 1991, then Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar informed the President of the Security Council that he intended to take an initiative in an attempt to restore peace in Somalia. Accordingly, after consulting incoming Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he asked Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs James O.C. Jonah to visit the area.

In early January 1992, despite continued fighting in Mogadishu, Mr. Jonah led a team of senior United

Nations officials into Somalia for talks aimed at bringing about a cessation of hostilities and securing access by the international relief community to civilians caught in the conflict. During that visit, support for a cease-fire in Mogadishu was expressed by all faction leaders, except General Aidid. Unanimous support was expressed, however, for a United Nations role in bringing about national reconciliation.

The results of the visit were reported to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who then consulted with the members of the Security Council on the appropriate course of action. On 23 January, by its resolution 733 (1992), the Security Council urged all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, and decided that all States should immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. The Council requested the Secretary-General to increase humanitarian assistance to the affected population and to contact all parties involved in the conflict to seek their commitment to the cessation of hostilities, to promote a cease-fire and to assist in the process of a political settlement of the conflict.

On 31 January, the Secretary-General invited LAS, OAU and OIC, as well as Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid, to send their representatives to participate in consultations at United Nations Headquarters from 12 to 14 February. The talks succeeded in getting the two factions in Mogadishu to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of the cease-fire, and to a visit to Mogadishu by a joint high-level delegation composed of representatives of the United Nations and the three regional organizations to conclude a cease-fire agreement.

The joint delegation arrived in Mogadishu on 29 February 1992. On 3 March, after four days of intensive negotiations, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed an "Agreement on the Implementation of a Cease-fire". This Agreement also included the acceptance of a United Nations security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance, and the deployment of 20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the cease-fire. At the same time, the joint delegation undertook consultations regarding a national reconciliation conference to which all Somali groups would be invited.

On 17 March, the Security Council adopted its resolution 746 (1992), supporting the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch to Somalia a technical team to prepare a plan for a cease-fire monitoring mechanism. The Council also requested that the team develop a high-priority plan to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The team visited Somalia from 23 March to 1 April. Following discussions with the team, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed on 28 and 27 March 1992, respectively, Letters of Agreement on the mechanisms for monitoring the cease-fire and on arrangements for equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNOSOM

On 24 April 1992, in response to a recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council adopted resolution 751 (1992), by which it decided to establish a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The Council also asked the Secretary-General, in cooperation with LAS, OAU and OIC, to pursue consultations with all Somali parties towards convening a conference on national reconciliation and unity. It also called on the international community for financial and other support for the Secretary-General's 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia. The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's intention to appoint a Special Representative for Somalia to provide overall direction of United Nations activities in that country. Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun of Algeria was appointed Special Representative on 28 April 1992 and left for the area on 1 May.

UNOSOM'S ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

In accordance with the agreements reached with the two main Somali factions in Mogadishu, the cease-fire in the capital was to be monitored by a group of 50 unarmed uniformed United Nations military observers. As regards humanitarian assistance, the security personnel envisaged in the agreements was to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in the city and its immediate environs.

In its resolution 751 (1992), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to deploy immediately 50 observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu. It also agreed, in principle, to establish a security force to be deployed as soon as possible, and requested the Secretary-General to continue his consultations with the parties in Mogadishu in this regard.

On 23 June, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that both principal factions in Mogadishu had agreed to the immediate deployment

of the unarmed observers. The observers would be drawn from Austria, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco and Zimbabwe. The Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen of Pakistan, and the advance party of UNOSOM observers arrived in Mogadishu in early July 1992. On 12 August, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, after considerable delays and difficulties, agreement had been reached with the principal faction leaders in Mogadishu to deploy 500 United Nations security personnel in the capital as part of UNOSOM. The Government of Pakistan had agreed to contribute a unit for the purpose. The first group of security personnel arrived in Mogadishu on 14 September 1992.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Between 4 May and 19 July 1992, the Secretary-General's Special Representative undertook extensive consultations with various Somali leaders and Elders and other personalities throughout the country. On 22 July, the Secretary-General reported to the Council on the complex political and security situation in Somalia, as well as the desperate situation the country faced in terms of needs for humanitarian assistance, recovery programmes and institution-building. The Secretary-General concluded that the United Nations must "adapt" its involvement in Somalia and that its efforts needed to be enlarged in order to bring about an effective cease-fire throughout the country, while at the same time promoting national reconciliation.

On 27 July, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report and urged all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate United Nations efforts to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population. The Council strongly supported the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch another technical team to Somalia.

ENLARGEMENT OF UNOSOM

Following the technical team's visit to Somalia from 6 to 15 August 1992, the Secretary-General submitted his further report, dated 24 August, to the Security Council, in which he described a number of urgent steps, being planned or already taken, to mitigate the widespread starvation in the areas of Somalia most seriously affected by the civil war and drought and to prevent the incidence of hunger escalating in other parts of the country. Noting that the United Nations and its partners were ready and had the capacity to provide substantially increased assistance, the Secretary-General stated that they were prevented from doing so by the lawlessness and lack of security prevailing throughout Somalia. Looting, by heavily armed gangs, of supplies from delivery and distribution points, as well as attacks on incoming and docked ships and on airports and airstrips, prevented the assured delivery of humanitarian assistance by overland transport.

Given the difficulties, the Secretary-General concluded that the airlift operations — already being carried out by the World Food Programme and the United Nations Children's Fund, as well as by ICRC — needed to be enhanced substantially, with priority given to central and southern Somalia. In addition, a "preventive zone" on the Kenya-Somali border should be established for special deliveries of food and seed, in an attempt to reduce famine-induced population movements.

The Secretary-General recommended the deployment of four additional United Nations security units, each with a strength of up to 750, to protect the humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia. Also, in accordance with his earlier proposal, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of four zone headquarters of UNOSOM. Each would be headed by a civilian official who would assist the Secretary-General's Special Representative in all aspects of his duties.

On 28 August, the Security Council, by its resolution 775 (1992), approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the increase in strength of UNOSOM. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue, in close cooperation with LAS, OAU and OIC, his efforts to seek a comprehensive solution to the crisis in Somalia.

On 8 September, the Security Council also approved the Secretary-General's plan to deploy three logistic units totalling up to 719 personnel to support the enhanced UNOSOM operation. Consequently, the total strength of UNOSOM was to be 4,219 all ranks, including the unit of 500 authorized in Mogadishu and 719 for logistic units.

100-DAY ACTION PROGRAMME

There have been six main United Nations organizations at work in Somalia coordinating overall humanitarian efforts: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Pro-

gramme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, more than 30 NGOs have been working in Somalia as "implementing partners" of the United Nations. Moreover, ICRC has continued to provide assistance under the most difficult of situations. There are also many local NGOs that work with the United Nations and the international NGOs.

Between 10 and 12 September 1992, as part of the overall effort to accelerate humanitarian relief activities, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Jan Eliasson, led a high-level inter-agency mission to Somalia. A major outcome of the mission was the decision to develop a 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance, for the period until the end of 1992. The 100-Day Programme was reviewed at the First Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held in Geneva on 12 and 13 October 1992 under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia.

The Programme sought to highlight priority actions which were needed to prevent famine and the unacceptably high levels of death and deprivation in Somalia. The emphasis was placed on those areas and populations of the country needing priority attention. The Programme also identified the additional resources required to meet its eight main objectives: massive infusion of food aid; aggressive expansion of supplementary feeding; provision of basic health services and mass measles immunization campaign; urgent provision of clean water, sanitation and hygiene; provision of shelter materials, including blankets and clothes; simultaneous delivery of seeds, tools and animal vaccines with food rations; prevention of further refugee outflows and promoting returnee programmes; building institutions and civil society rehabilitation and recovery. Donor response to the Programme was generally prompt and generous. Of the $82.7 million requested for the implementation of the Programme, $67.3 million was received.

From 3 to 5 December 1992, the Secretary-General convened the Second Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, at the Conference Centre of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Meeting was attended by representatives of donor countries and other Governments, Somali political and community leaders, and Somali NGOs, as well as regional and subregional organizations, United Nations agencies and international NGOs. The Meeting provided an opportunity to review the progress achieved in the implementation of the 100-Day Action Programme, the obstacles encountered and the work that remained to be done. The discussion also went beyond the scope of the Action Programme to address further relief activities, as well as the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia. One of the conclusions of the meeting was that the 100-Day Programme should be followed by a new plan for 1993. Subsequently, it was decided that a United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia would be held in Addis Ababa in March 1993 to review the Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for 1993 and receive pledges from donors.

SITUATION DETERIORATES

In October and November 1992, despite all efforts by the international community, the United Nations Secretary-General and his new Special Representative for Somalia, Mr. Ismat Kittani,[1] the situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate. Somalia remained without a central government with which to negotiate. Mogadishu was divided by rival militias. Throughout the country, a dozen or more factions — some torn by internal divisions — were active. The resulting political chaos and the extensive physical destruction severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Widespread looting of aid supplies, robbery, armed banditry, and general lawlessness compounded the situation.

Several of the Somali de facto authorities refused to agree to the deployment of United Nations troops to secure delivery of aid in areas of greatest need. UNOSOM troops in Mogadishu were fired upon and their vehicles and arms taken. Relief ships were prevented from docking, threatened and even shelled. Airports and seaports came under fire. Large sums of cash and relief aid were being extorted from donor agencies and organizations, and the lives of their personnel attempting to distribute supplies to starving people were being put in danger.

The net result was that, while relief supplies were ready and in the pipeline, only a trickle was reaching those in need. According to some estimates, as many as 3,000 persons a day were dying of starvation in Somalia, while warehouses remained stocked. Unless the problems relating to security and protection of relief supplies were resolved, it was believed that United Nations agencies and NGOs would be unable to provide

the assistance in the amounts and on the urgent basis needed.

SECRETARY-GENERAL SUGGESTS FIVE OPTIONS

In a letter to the Security Council on 24 November 1992, the Secretary-General reported on the deteriorating situation in Somalia, with particular reference to the factors preventing UNOSOM from implementing its mandate. The Secretary-General stated that he did not exclude the possibility that it might become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort there. He cited the lack of government in Somalia, the failure of various factions to cooperate with UNOSOM, the extortion, blackmail and robbery to which the international relief effort was subjected and the repeated attacks on the personnel and equipment of the United Nations and other relief agencies.

The members of the Council discussed the Secretary-General's letter during informal consultations on 25 November. They expressed the view that the situation in Somalia was intolerable and asked the Secretary-General to present specific recommendations on how the United Nations could remedy the present situation.

In response, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a further letter, dated 29 November, in which he outlined, for the Council's consideration, five options for creating conditions for the uninterrupted delivery of supplies to the starving people of Somalia. The Secretary-General also informed the Council of a visit he received on 25 November from Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, then Acting Secretary of State of the United States, who indicated that, should the Security Council decide to authorize Member States to ensure the delivery of relief supplies, the United States would be ready to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in which a number of other Member States would also participate.

According to the Secretary-General's letter, the first option would be to continue and intensify efforts to deploy UNOSOM in accordance with its existing mandate. The second option suggested that the idea of using international military personnel to protect relief activities be abandoned, and that humanitarian agencies make the best arrangements they could with the various faction and clan leaders. However, the Secretary-General considered neither of these two options to be an adequate response to the crisis.

As to the other three options, the Secretary-General stated that their purpose would be to ensure, on a lasting basis, that the current violence against the international relief effort was brought to an end.

The first of those three options would be for UNOSOM troops to undertake a show of force in Mogadishu in an attempt to discourage those abusing the relief efforts. However, the Secretary-General contended that a countrywide operation would be required to have the desired deterrent effect.

The next option would entail a countrywide action by a group of Member States authorized to do so by the Security Council. The Secretary-General mentioned in this connection the offer by the United States to organize and lead such an operation. In such a case, the Secretary-General would advise the Council and those Members taking part in the operation that they find a way to recognize the Security Council's legitimate interest in the manner in which it was carried out.

The remaining option was also for a countrywide enforcement action, but one carried out under United Nations command and control. This would be consistent, the Secretary-General stated, with the recent enlargement of the Organization's role in the maintenance of international peace and security, and would strengthen its long-term evolution as an effective system of collective security. However, the United Nations Secretariat did not currently have the capability to command and control an enforcement operation of the size required. He concluded that there was no alternative but to resort to the enforcement provisions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

The Secretary-General stressed that whether an action was taken under United Nations command, or by Member States with Security Council authorization, it should be precisely defined and limited in time, "in order to prepare the way for a return to peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building".

SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES USE OF FORCE

On 3 December, the Security Council adopted, unanimously, its resolution 794 (1992), authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized the Secretary-General and the participating Member States to make arrangements for "the unified command and control" of the military forces that would be involved. It called on all Member States that were in a position to do so to provide military forces and to make contributions in cash or in kind, and

requested the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the contributions could be appropriately channelled to the States or operations concerned.

The Security Council requested the Secretary-General and Member States contributing troops to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and their military forces, and invited the Secretary-General to attach a small liaison staff of UNOSOM to the field headquarters of the unified command. Further, the Council requested the Secretary-General and the States concerned to report regularly to it on the progress in establishing a secure environment in Somalia. It requested the Secretary-General to submit a plan to ensure that UNOSOM would be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command.

As to the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Somalia, the Security Council decided that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel of UNOSOM, authorized by resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August, should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground.

UNIFIED TASK FORCE DEPLOYED

The first elements of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), spearheaded by the United States, were deployed in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992. In the following weeks UNITAF forces[2] expanded their operations to all major relief centres in Somalia and to the countryside. UNITAF's principal goal was to establish in Somalia a secure environment for urgent humanitarian assistance. Once that was accomplished, the military command would then be turned over to the United Nations. In the meantime, UNOSOM remained fully responsible for the political aspects and for humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Good coordination on the ground and at United Nations Headquarters was established between UNITAF and the United Nations. UNOSOM remained in the capital, and continued to liaise with UNITAF and plan for the transition to normal peace-keeping functions.

On 19 December, the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a report in which he described actions taken to implement resolution 794 (1992) and set out his thinking on a new mandate for UNOSOM and the transition from UNITAF to continued peace-keeping operations. The Secretary-General recommended that the Council defer its decision on such a transition until it became clear whether UNITAF had achieved its goal. He suggested that it should await the establishment of a cease-fire, the control of heavy weapons, the disarming of lawless gangs and the creation of a new police force.

In his further report to the Council, dated 26 January 1993, the Secretary-General congratulated UNITAF for rapidly and successfully securing major population centres and ensuring that humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed without impediment. As to UNOSOM, he indicated that its major preoccupation at that juncture was the planning for the transition from the operations of UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The planning exercise, the Secretary-General pointed out, was proceeding smoothly in close cooperation and consultation with the Command of UNITAF.

PEACE AGREEMENTS

In the meantime, the Secretary-General convened an informal preparatory meeting at ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January 1993, for a national reconciliation conference envisaged under United Nations auspices. A total of 14 Somali political movements took part in the meeting, along with the Secretaries-General of LAS, OAU and OIC and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn, as well as the representatives of the current Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

The following three agreements were concluded and signed at the meeting: (a) General Agreement of 8 January 1993; (b) Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament; and (c) Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to help resolve the criteria for participation at, and the agenda for, the conference on national reconciliation, as well as any other issues pending from the informal meeting. Among other things, the informal meeting agreed on the convening of a conference on national reconciliation in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993. The Somali parties requested the United Nations, in consultation with the relevant regional and subregional organizations, to provide logistic support both prior to and during the conference.

TRANSITION TO UNOSOM II PROPOSED

On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report containing his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He indicated that since the adoption of Council resolution 794 (1992) in December 1992,

UNITAF had deployed approximately 37,000 troops in southern and central Somalia, covering approximately 40 per cent of the country's territory. The presence and operations of UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. He pointed out, however, that despite the improvement, a secure environment had not yet been established in Somalia and incidents of violence continued to occur. There was still no effective functioning Government in the country, no organized civilian police force and no disciplined national armed force. The security threat to personnel of the United Nations and its agencies, UNITAF, ICRC and NGOs was still high in some areas of Mogadishu and other places in Somalia. Moreover, there was no deployment of UNITAF or UNOSOM troops to the north-east and north-west, or along the Kenyan-Somali border, where security continued to be a matter of grave concern.

The Secretary-General concluded, therefore, that, should the Security Council determine that the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the latter should be endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter so as to be able to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia. To that end, UNOSOM II, under the mandate recommended by the Secretary-General, would seek to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.

The mandate of UNOSOM II, covering the whole territory of Somalia, would include the following military tasks: (a) monitoring that all factions continued to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they had consented; (b) preventing any resumption of violence and, if necessary, taking appropriate action against any faction that violated or threatened to violate the cessation of hostilities; (c) maintaining control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which would have been brought under international control pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly constituted national army; (d) seizing the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements and assisting in the registration and security of such arms; (e) securing or maintaining security at all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; (f) protecting the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, ICRC as well as NGOs, and taking such forceful action as might be required to neutralize armed elements that attacked, or threatened to attack, such facilities and personnel, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which could assume this responsibility; (g) continuing the programme for mine-clearing in the most afflicted areas; (h) assisting in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia; (i) carrying out such other functions as might be authorized by the Security Council.

Concerning disarmament, the Secretary-General stated that on the basis of the Addis Ababa agreements, a planning committee composed of senior officers from both UNITAF and UNOSOM developed a "Somalia cease-fire disarmament concept". This concept would require the establishment of cantonment, for storage of heavy weapons, as well as transition sites for temporary accommodation of factional forces while they turned in their small arms, registered for future governmental and non-governmental support and received training for eventual reintegration into civilian life. Cantonment and transition sites would be separated from each other to prevent any possibility of factions or groups seizing the heavy weapons. Those failing to comply with timetables or other modalities of the disarmament process would have their weapons and equipment confiscated and/or destroyed.

According to the Secretary-General, UNOSOM II military operations would be conducted in four phases. Phase I would concentrate on the transition of operational control from UNITAF. Military support to relief activities and the disarming of factions would continue throughout the transition. Phase II would be designed to consolidate United Nations operational control and would conclude when UNOSOM II was deployed and operating effectively throughout Somalia and the border regions. In phase III, major efforts would be made to reduce UNOSOM II's military activity and assist civil authorities in exercising greater responsibility. That phase would end when a Somali national police force became operational and major United Nations military operations were no longer required. Phase IV would concern redeployment or reduction of the UNOSOM II forces. The exact timing of transition from phase to phase would be determined to a large extent by political reconciliation efforts and rehabilitation programmes.

The deployment of UNOSOM II would be at the discretion of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the Force Commander acting under the authority of the Security Council; the deployment would not be subject to the agreement of any local faction leaders.

The Secretary-General estimated that it would be necessary to deploy a military component of 20,000 all ranks to carry out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel to provide the logistic support. In addition, the United States Government agreed in principle to provide a tactical quick reaction force in support of the Force Commander of UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II would also include civilian staff of approximately 2,800 individuals.

The Secretary-General suggested 1 May 1993 as the date of transfer of budgetary and administrative control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. It was subsequently decided that the transfer of the military command would take place on 4 May.

On 5 March 1993, the Secretary-General appointed Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (retired) of the United States as his new Special Representative for Somalia for an initial period of three months, effective 9 March 1993. He was asked to oversee the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, in addition to continuing the tasks of "promoting political reconciliation, coordinating humanitarian assistance and paving the way for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country". Earlier, the Secretary-General had appointed Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir of Turkey as Force Commander of UNOSOM II.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTS

On 26 March, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, adopted resolution 814 (1993), by which it decided to expand the size and mandate of UNOSOM in accordance with the Secretary-General's recommendations. It authorized the mandate for the expanded UNOSOM II for an initial period through 31 October 1993. The Council demanded that all Somali parties comply fully with the commitments they had undertaken, and in particular with the Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament, and that they ensure the safety of the personnel of all organizations engaged in humanitarian and other assistance to Somalia. All States, in particular neighbouring ones, were called upon to cooperate in the implementation of the arms embargo established under resolution 733 (1992).

In other provisions of the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation. Such assistance should include economic relief and rehabilitation of Somalia, the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia, the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country, the re-establishment of Somali police, mine-clearance and public information activities in support of the United Nations activities in Somalia.

CONFERENCE ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

As noted above, the deployment of UNITAF forces improved the security situation and facilitated the flow of food and other emergency relief supplies into the neediest areas of Somalia. The level of malnutrition and death from starvation fell dramatically in many areas. In spite of the improvements, however, the humanitarian and political situation in many parts of the country remained complex and tense. In the southern and central parts of Somalia, large numbers of people remained destitute and totally dependent on relief food assistance. Measles, diarrhoea and other infections continued to take a heavy toll, particularly on small children. Lack of access to clean water sources and poor sanitation continued to present major health threats.

In his 3 March 1993 report, the Secretary-General pointed out that a secure environment remained essential for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the reconstruction of Somalia. He identified three major challenges facing the United Nations in 1993: facilitating the voluntary return of approximately 300,000 refugees and internally displaced persons; providing jobs and work for the many millions of unemployed Somalis, including members of armed gangs, militias and various private armies; and helping the Somalis in rebuilding their society and rehabilitating the decayed infrastructure.

To achieve these objectives, the United Nations, with the active paricipation of the Somalis, United Nations agencies, ICRC and NGOs, put together a new Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for the war- and drought-ravaged country. The Programme was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, held from 11 to 13

March 1993 in Addis Ababa under the chairmanship of the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. The Conference was attended by some 190 Somali representatives, as well as senior representatives of donor Governments, international agencies, regional organizations and NGOs.

The Programme, covering the period from March to December 1993, includes activities in 10 priority areas: re-establishment of local administrative capacity; re-establishment of national and local police forces; support services for women, particularly those victimized by violence and trauma; return of some 300,000 refugees and over 1 million displaced persons within Somalia; development of a food security system; establishment of a basic health care system; increasing the availability of potable water and of sanitation; expansion of agriculture and enhancement of livestock; work opportunities for the unemployed; and re-establishment of primary education and vocational training.

At the Addis Ababa Conference, over $130 million was pledged by international donors towards the implementation of the Programme, which is estimated to cost some $166.5 million. It is anticipated that further resources would be forthcoming as the implementation of the various projects gained momentum.

CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

As the Secretary-General indicated in his 3 March report, ultimately all the efforts undertaken by the United Nations in Somalia were directed towards one central goal: to assist the people of Somalia to create and maintain order and new institutions for their own governance.

The Secretary-General and his Special Representative continued to give high priority to national reconciliation in Somalia. As agreed at the January 1993 informal meeting and following considerable preparatory work, the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia was convened on 15 March 1993 in Addis Ababa. The Conference was chaired by the Secretary-General's Deputy Special Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate of Guinea, and attended by the leaders of 15 Somali political movements, as well as the representatives of LAS, OAU, OIC, the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn and the Non-Aligned Movement.

After almost two weeks of intensive negotiations, the leaders of all 15 Somali political movements signed, on 27 March 1993, an Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia. At the closing session of the Conference on 28 March, the agreement was unanimously endorsed by all the participants, including representatives of women's and community organizations, as well as elders and scholars.

The Agreement comprises four parts: disarmament and security, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property and settlement of disputes, and the establishment of a Transitional National Council (TNC).

In the agreement, the Somali parties resolved to put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile their differences through peaceful means. They also agreed to consolidate and carry forward advances in peace, security and dialogue made since the beginning of 1993. They reaffirmed their commitment to comply fully with the cease-fire agreement that was signed in Addis Ababa in January 1993, including the handing over of all weapons and ammunition to UNITAF and UNOSOM II.

The agreement provides for a transitional period of two years, effective 27 March 1993. The transitional mechanism consists of the following four basic organs of authority:

—TNC, to act as the repository of Somali sovereignty and serve as the prime political authority having legislative functions during the transitional period. TNC will consist of 74 members — three (two men and one woman) from each of the 18 regions of the country, one from each of the 15 political movements, and five from Mogadishu.

— Central administrative departments, to be responsible for the re-establishment and operation of departments of civil administration and social, economic and humanitarian affairs, thus preparing for the restoration of a formal Government;

— Regional councils, to be established in all 18 existing regions of Somalia, comprising 3 representatives from each district council in the region;

— District councils, to be established in the existing districts in every region. Members will be appointed through election or through consensus-based selection in accordance with Somali traditions.

The agreement also provides for the appointment by TNC of a Transitional Charter Drafting Committee, to draft a transitional charter, guided by the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Somalia's traditional ethics.

In the agreement, the Somali parties invited the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to extend all necessary assistance to the people of Somalia for its implementation.

The Secretary-General welcomed the agreement as an important achievement of the Somali people and noted that it represented the first positive step following the adoption by the Security Council on 26 March of resolution 814 (1993). He urged the Somali leaders to proceed without any delay to work out the practical arrangements for implementing the Agreement.

UNOSOM II ACTIVITIES

The 5 June 1993 incident

As required under the Addis Ababa agreement and mandated by the Security Council, one of the crucial tasks that fell to UNOSOM II after it took over from UNITAF on 4 May 1993 was the disarmament of all Somali factions and armed groups who terrorized the people and obstructed humanitarian activities. The priority that UNOSOM II gave to disarmament generated the hostility of a few clan leaders, fearful of losing their power, towards UNOSOM. They had not only refused to disarm, but they had resorted to violence in order to frustrate efforts of UNOSOM II to bring relief, peace and development to Somalia. On 5 June, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 were missing and 54 were wounded in a series of ambushes and armed attacks against UNOSOM II troops throughout south Mogadishu by Somali militiamen, apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid. The bodies of the victims were mutilated and subjected to other forms of degrading treatment.

The Secretary-General, on 6 June, strongly condemned this "treacherous act" against peace-keepers "who were on a mission of peace, reconciliation and reconstruction", and urged "prompt and firm action" against "the perpetrators of this crime". The Secretary-General's Special Representative stated that the soldiers were "murdered as they sought to serve the neediest people in the city". He said that 12 of the soldiers were helping unload food at a feeding station "when they were foully attacked by cowards who placed women and children in front of armed men".

The Security Council, having heard the Secretary-General report on the incident, adopted its resolution 837 (1993) on 6 June. By that resolution, the Council strongly condemned the unprovoked armed attacks against UNOSOM II which "appear to have been part of a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate". It reaffirmed that the Secretary-General was authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks and for publicly inciting them, including their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment. The Council requested him to investigate the incident, particularly on the role of the factional leaders involved.

The Council demanded that all Somali parties comply fully with their commitments regarding political reconciliation, cease-fire and disarmament. It re-emphasized the crucial importance of the early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties and of neutralizing radio broadcasting systems that contributed to the violence and attacks against UNOSOM II.

On 8 June, 11 Somali parties condemned the attacks against UNOSOM II personnel and expressed support for Security Council resolution 837 (1993).

UNOSOM II acts

Immediately following the adoption of resolution 837 (1993), UNOSOM II began preparations for its implementation. On 12 June 1993, UNOSOM II initiated decisive military action in south Mogadishu. In a series of air and ground military actions, UNOSOM II removed Radio Mogadishu from control of USC/SNA, and disabled or destroyed militia weapons and equipment in a number of storage sites and clandestine military facilities. The Secretary-General, in a statement released on the same day, said that the objective of the action was to restore peace to Mogadishu "so that the political reconciliation, rehabilitation and disarmament process can continue to move forward throughout Somalia". He stated that this should be seen in the context of the international community's commitment to the national disarmament programme endorsed by all Somali parties at Addis Ababa on 27 March 1993.

The actions undertaken by UNOSOM II were strongly supported by the Security Council in a Presidential statement issued on 14 June. At the same time, the Council expressed deep regret at any civilian casualties caused, adding that an investigation was under way into the incident on 13 June which had involved such casualties among the Somalis. Preliminary reports indicated that General Aidid and his supporters had used civilians, including women and children, as human shields for attacks on UNOSOM II.

On 18 June, the Security Council condemned the practice of "some Somali factions and movements in using women and children as human shields to perpetrate their attacks against UNOSOM", and deplored the civilian deaths that had resulted "despite the timely measures adopted to prevent this from happening".

In parallel with its disarmament operations, UNOSOM II instituted an investigation of the 5 June incident, as requested by Security Council resolution 837 (1993). On 17 June, with mounting evidence implicating SNA militia in the attack, the Secretary-General's Special Representative called on General Aidid to surrender peacefully to UNOSOM II and to urge his followers to surrender their arms. He directed the UNOSOM Force Commander to detain General Aidid for investigation of the 5 June attack, and of the public incitement of such attacks. General Aidid would be treated "decently, fairly and with justice", the Special Representative said. However, attacks on UNOSOM II by General Aidid's militia continued.

In his 17 August 1993 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General pointed out that the short-sighted attitude of leaders of a few factions aggravated the already difficult situation. The ambushing of UNOSOM personnel on 5 June and on subsequent occasions left UNOSOM II with no choice but to take forceful action to effect the disarming required by all Somali factions under the Addis Ababa agreement.

The Secretary-General again pointed out that effective disarmament of all the factions and warlords was a pre-condition for implementing other aspects of UNOSOM's mandate, be they political, civil, humanitarian, rehabilitation or reconstruction. He also added that Somalia would not enjoy stability unless and until the criminal elements were apprehended and brought to justice as demanded by Security Council resolution 837 (1993).

Resolution 865

On 22 September 1993, the Security Council, in resolution 865 (1993), reaffirmed the importance it attached to the successful fulfilment, on an urgent and accelerated basis, of UNOSOM II's objectives — facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of law and order and of national reconciliation in a free, democratic and sovereign Somalia — so that the mission could be completed by March 1995. In that context, the Council requested the Secretary-General to direct urgent preparation of a detailed concerted strategy with regard to UNOSOM II's humanitarian, political and security activities. The Security Council also approved the Secretary-General's recommendations relating to the re-establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems.

Humanitarian programmes

The primary responsibility of UNOSOM II is to ensure the safe distribution of humanitarian assistance, and to carry out an extensive programme for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia. Despite the deliberate attempts to prevent UNOSOM II from performing its tasks, the overall situation in Somalia has undergone a major transformation: humanitarian assistance is reaching its destinations protected from attacks and banditry; starvation has largely been eradicated; nutrition and immunization programmes have been successful in significantly reducing the number of deaths from preventable diseases; return and repatriation programmes for refugees have been initiated; schools, closed for three or four years, have been reopening. Staff attached to the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM II have been deployed in all the regions of Somalia and are working together with Somalis, United Nations agencies and NGOs in expanding rehabilitation schemes.

Children and education. As a result of the protracted civil war, schools and educational institutions have been closed for long periods, an entire generation of Somali children has been denied access to education, and many teenagers and orphans have joined the militia or gangs of looters and armed robbers.

In the last six months, United Nations agencies, UNOSOM II and NGOs have provided substantial assistance in rehabilitating the education sector. A large number of schools have been rehabilitated with military assistance. NGOs have re-opened schools and are paying incentives to school teachers, as well as providing school supplies. United Nations agencies are assisting in re-opening schools, supplying food for work and school lunches, providing education kits and textbooks.

Health. Some 32 hospitals are now operating throughout the country as well as 81 maternal and child health centres. One hundred and three mobile vaccination teams are covering the country, working towards sustainable immunization coverage. It is estimated that about 75 per cent of children under 5 years of age have received vaccination against measles. Medicines, supplies, and other equipment are being made available to hospitals, health centres and pharmacies through United Nations agencies and NGOs.

City water supply systems in a number of other cities, including Mogadishu, have been rehabilitated United Nations agencies and NGOs are continuing to pursue sanitation and employment projects with food-for-work programmes. In Mogadishu alone, there are 120 such projects that provide food for

teachers, hospital and sanitation workers. Similar projects are supported throughout Somalia.

Agriculture. Agriculture, historically, has been responsible for two thirds of Somalia's employment and nearly three quarters of the country's foreign exchange earnings. A good measure of success has been achieved in reactivating food production and the livestock sector. The provision of seeds and agricultural tools, together with good precipitation, has resulted in a substantial increase in the rainy season harvest. The delivery of relief food aid has been adjusted to take into account the availability of local food supplies. In the livestock sector, the supply of veterinary drugs and the vaccination of animals has facilitated the resuscitation of exports. An estimated quarter of a million head of livestock have been exported since April 1993.

Commerce. Commercial and trading activities are showing encouraging signs of recovery. Commercial traffic at Somalia's ports has increased dramatically since December 1992. Civilian ship movements at Mogadishu port increased tenfold in the first half of 1993. Joint ventures between Somali and foreign investments are on the rise. Telecommunication services are now available in parts of Mogadishu. Local companies are also providing fuel throughout the country.

Reconstruction and recovery. A draft framework for planning of long-term reconstruction and recovery has been prepared by a task force comprising donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs, under the coordination of the World Bank. The objectives of the framework are: (a) to establish a common vision of the economic and social reconstruction, rehabilitation and development of Somalia; (b) to identify criteria and establish priorities for reconstruction and rehabilitation; (c) to construct a mechanism for coordinated action in an environment of constrained human and capital resources.

The third informal meeting of donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs, organized by the World Bank, was held in Paris on 22 October 1993. Participants reviewed the draft framework and discussed the next steps. It was also announced that a Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, which last met in March 1993, would convene in Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993 to discuss future strategies including measures to enhance the transition from relief assistance to reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. The conference will also provide an opportunity to begin consultations on more long-term developmentplanning.

Refugees and resettlement. Of some 1.7 million people displaced as a result of the turmoil and the famine in Somalia, more than 1 million crossed into Kenya and Ethiopia. Over 250,000 persons moved to Mogadishu, and about 60,000 persons to Kismayo and Baidoa. The northern regions are supporting at least 250,000 refugees and internally displaced persons.

The number of refugees returning from camps in Kenya is increasing. It is estimated that about 70,000 refugees in the Mombasa area have returned by boat to Kismayo, Mogadishu and Bossasso. Assistance is being provided to approximately 800 refugees a week returning to the Gedo region and to those spontaneously moving into the Lower and Middle Juba areas.

Political aspects

The Secretary-General's Special Representative and his staff have continued their strenuous efforts to rebuild political institutions in Somalia. Fifty-three district councils — considered to be a foundation for civil government — have been established so far out of a total of 73 districts, excluding the districts in the north-west and Mogadishu. In Mogadishu, consultations have begun on the establishment of district councils. Efforts are continuing to expedite the formation of regional councils — the next layer of political reconstruction. So far, regional councils have been established in eight areas. This has moved Somalia closer to the January 1994 goal of establishing its Transitional National Council (TNC). In the meantime, a consultative body to UNOSOM II, which will include representatives of the factions, will be formed as soon as a majority of the membership of TNC has been nominated by the regional councils.

National reconciliation

With high priority attached to the national reconciliation process in Somalia, UNOSOM II undertook to resolve conflicts at the regional level and to assist in reconciliation among the Somali people. A regional peace conference — convened in Kismayo, one of the most conflict-ridden areas of the country — brought together 152 elders from throughout the Juba region. On 6 August 1993, the conference participants signed the Jubaland peace agreement in which they committed themselves, on behalf of their clans, to end all hostilities among the more than 20 clans that inhabit

the region. A series of similar reconciliation meetings were held in other regions of Somalia.

In the north-east and central regions — from Bossasso to Galkayo — the Deputy Special Representative and UNOSOM II political affairs officers have facilitated the reconciliation of two competing wings of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) leadership in the area. Similar efforts by UNOSOM II included the reconciliation of clans in the north-west in Erigavo, and in the Gedo region. In Mogadishu, several meetings have been held between UNOSOM II officials and a 47-member supreme committee of the Hawiye sub-clan. From 30 September to 1 October 1993, an all-Somali conference attended by 600 delegates was supported by UNOSOM II. Another pan-Hawiye conference took place in Mogadishu from 14 to 16 October 1993 with the participation of Habr Gdir sub-clan.

Re-establishment of Somali police

The restoration of security and stability in Somalia requires the re-establishment of a neutral and professional Somali police force, as well as judicial and penal systems. UNOSOM II has continued to support small locally based police forces in its areas of operation. During the past six months, 5,000 former Somali policemen have been hired to assist in the performance of police functions. UNOSOM II is finalizing a basic police training programme for Somali policemen. The United States has announced a US$6 million grant for the re-establishment of the Somali judicial and penal systems, as well as a US$2 million assistance programme for the police force and up to US$25 million-worth of equipment, as required. Norway has contributed $1 million. Police experts from Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom have arrived and, in coordination with UNOSOM II, are formulating assistance programmes for their respective Governments to implement. Several other Governments have also indicated interest in providing assistance.

In order to investigate violations of international humanitarian law, UNOSOM II is planning to establish an Office of Human Rights. A team of international specialists, in cooperation with Somali police, will investigate violations such as mass murder of Somali citizens and attacks and threats made against international assistance workers and UNOSOM II personnel.

THE 3 OCTOBER 1993 INCIDENT

Following the June 1993 events (see above) and as mandated by Security Council resolutions, UNOSOM II pursued a forceful disarmament programme in south Mogadishu. Active patrolling, weapons confiscations, and operations against USC/SNA militia depots were undertaken, together with a public information campaign to ensure that the population understood UNOSOM activities. Concurrently, UNOSOM II encouraged "cooperative" or voluntary disarmament by the Somali factions. UNOSOM II also continued its efforts to apprehend those responsible for instigating and committing armed attacks against United Nations personnel.

On 3 October 1993, United States Rangers[3] launched an operation in south Mogadishu aimed at capturing a number of key aides of General Aidid who were suspected of complicity in the 5 June attack, as well as subsequent attacks on United Nations personnel and facilities. The operation succeeded in apprehending 24 suspects, including two key aides to General Aidid. During the course of the operation, two United States helicopters were shot down by Somali militiamen using automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. While evacuating the 24 USC/SNA detainees, the Rangers came under concentrated fire. Eighteen United States soldiers lost their lives and 75 were wounded. One United States helicopter pilot was captured and subsequently released on 14 October 1993. The bodies of the United States soldiers were subject to humiliating treatment.

Following the events of 3 October 1993, the United States reinforced its Quick Reaction Force with a joint task force consisting of air, naval and ground forces equipped with M1A1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. President Clinton announced the intention of the United States to withdraw its forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994.

On 9 October 1993, USC/SNA declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities against UNOSOM II forces. Since then, the situation has been generally quiet, but Mogadishu remains tense and, in the capital and elsewhere, major factions are reportedly rearming, apparently in anticipation of renewed fighting.

SECRETARY-GENERAL VISITS THE REGION

In October 1993, the Secretary-General travelled to the Horn of Africa region to consult with the leaders of the region on UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy for humanitarian, political and security activities, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 865 (1993). He discussed the situation in and relating to

Somalia with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, President Hassan Gouled of Djibouti, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. The Secretary-General also visited Baidoa and Mogadishu, where he held talks with military and civilian officials of UNOSOM II as well as with Somali elders.

On 14 October 1993, the Secretary-General attended a meeting convened in Cairo by President Hosni Mubarak, the current OAU Chairman, with the participation of the Secretaries-General of OAU, LAS and OIC, in an effort to help to promote peace and reconciliation in Somalia and to lay the groundwork for its continued reconstruction and development.

INTERIM EXTENSION OF UNOSOM II MANDATE

In a letter to the Security Council, dated 28 October 1993, the Secretary-General requested the interim extension of the UNOSOM II mandate, which was to expire on 31 October, to allow time for the preparation of an in-depth report and for "other related consultations".

The Security Council, by its resolution 878 (1993) of 29 October, extended the UNOSOM II mandate until 18 November 1993 and asked the Secretary-General to report before that date on recent developments in Somalia, so that it could decide on a further extension of the mandate. The Council reiterated its commitment to a future concerted strategy for UNOSOM II and to undertake "in-depth consideration" of the mission's humanitarian, political and security activities" on the basis of the Secretary-General's specific suggestions.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REVIEWS THE SITUATION

On 12 November 1993, the Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council, described the situation in Somalia, summarized recent events and set forth his observations and recommendations. Stating that the situation in Somalia had changed in some important aspects, he pointed to the most dramatic and visible success in reducing starvation deaths and conditions of famine in the country. Significant improvements had been made also in the fields of public health, education, agriculture and other areas.

At the same time, however, the Secretary-General stressed that UNOSOM II was at a critical juncture, as the situation in Somalia was continuously evolving. There was still no effectively functioning government in the country, no disciplined national armed force, and no organized civilian police force or judiciary, although impressive progress had been achieved in initiating the recreation of the police and judiciary.

UNOSOM II's record of general progress throughout most of Somalia, the Secretary-General went on, was seriously marred by the incidents that had taken place between 5 June and 3 October 1993. Those incidents challenged the cause of disarmament and reconciliation in Somalia, created a situation of instability in south Mogadishu, and stimulated factional elements elsewhere to prepare for a future of renewed fighting.

The Secretary-General reiterated his firm belief that "without effective disarmament of all the factions and warlords in Somalia, it would not be possible for the country to enjoy lasting peace and stability". He stated that comprehensive disarmament would require the cooperation of the Somali people and of neighbouring countries, and would have to be conducted in phases, beginning with the demobilization and rehabilitation of the heavily armed militias. At the same time, disarmament must not des' ilize the security balance and must equitably reduce the threat to all segments of the population.

The Secretary-General noted that voluntary disarmament did succeed to some extent both during UNITAF and in the early weeks of UNOSOM II. It was only after 5 June 1993 that it became necessary for UNOSOM II to resort to coercive methods to enforce disarmament in south Mogadishu. In this connection, he welcomed the unilateral declaration of cessation of hostilities by USC/SNA with effect from 9 October 1993 and invited USC/SNA to join the other factions in a meaningful dialogue.

The situation in Somalia, the Secretary-General observed, would continue to remain complex and complicated for the foreseeable future, and the Security Council would have to display flexibility as well as firmness in any decision that it would take while renewing the mandate of UNOSOM II.

Before presenting his recommendations on a renewed mandate for UNOSOM II, the Secretary-General pointed out that, following the events of 3 October 1993, the United States had announced its intention to withdraw all its combat troops and the bulk of its logistics support troops by 31 March 1994. He stressed that the troop-contributing countries could not be expected to maintain their generosity forever, nor could Member States be expected to maintain funding on the present scale. The Governments of Belgium, France and Sweden had earlier announced their decisions to withdraw their contingents from UNOSOM II

The Secretary-General wrote to 42 Member States inviting them to contribute, or to increase their contribution, in terms of troops and logistics support.

In light of the changing circumstances, the Secretary-General went on to present three options for the Security Council to consider in re-examining the mandate of UNOSOM II. Although it was not necessary for the Council to choose one of the options at the present stage, the time might soon come for the Council to respond to prevailing conditions and choose an appropriate course of action.

In the first option, the present mandate of UNOSOM II would remain essentially unchanged as laid down by the Security Council in its resolutions 814 (1993), 837 (1993), 865 (1993) and 878 (1993). UNOSOM II would not take the initiative to resort systematically to coercive methods to enforce disarmament. It was hoped that all factions, including USC/SNA, would cooperate to ensure peaceful conditions in the country. In Mogadishu, USC/SNA would have to remove its roadblocks and strong points throughout the city so that UNOSOM II could escort humanitarian convoys from and into the city. Should these expectations not be met, UNOSOM II must retain the capability for coercive disarmament and retaliation against attacks on its personnel. UNOSOM II would also pursue its present plans to re-establish an impartial and professional Somali police force and judicial system. The objective would be to create and maintain secure conditions for humanitarian assistance, foster national reconciliation, and implement other elements of the existing mandate.

Under this option, UNOSOM II would need the reauthorization of its present troop strength, as well as the deployment of an additional brigade. In addition, the Member States must fulfil their financial obligations, promptly and in full, of approximately US$ 1 billion for one year.

In the second option, the Security Council would decide that UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods anywhere in the country, rely on the cooperation of the Somali parties in discharging its mandate, and use force only in self-defence. Disarmament would be entirely voluntary. Under this option, UNOSOM II would have to retain some capability to defend its personnel should inter-clan fighting resume. The emphasis would be on ensuring the unimpeded flow of humanitarian assistance, the rehabilitation of the Somali infrastructure, the repatriation of refugees, political reconciliation, the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system and keeping secure the main supply routes between Mogadishu and outside areas.

The troop requirement under this option would be approximately 16,000 all ranks, with one brigade deployed in Mogadishu, one assigned to convoy duty and one for the security of refugees and of critical areas in need of assistance. A Force Logistics Supply Command of about 2,500 all ranks would also be needed to be established. The financial requirements for this option would be considerably less than the first option.

Under the third option, UNOSOM II would be limited to keeping secure the airport and port in Mogadishu, as well as important ports and airports in other parts of the country, to maintain open supply routes for humanitarian purposes. It would assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid, help development agencies and programmes, and continue training a Somali police force. That option would presuppose cooperation of local authorities and would focus on the regions, rather than on Mogadishu. It would call for the deployment of about 5,000 all ranks and a financial requirement substantially less than the other two options.

The Secretary-General further noted that, in the meantime, UNOSOM II troop strength was adequate for the present purpose. UNOSOM II will not use coercive methods to ensure a secure environment which, by and large, is lacking mainly in south Mogadishu. UNOSOM II will continue its efforts to initiate a political dialogue with all the factions, including USC/SNA. In this, UNOSOM II will seek and welcome support from Somalia's neighbours, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, and from OAU, LAS and OIC. At the same time, UNOSOM II will stand ready to protect its own personnel as well as the personnel of other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. UNOSOM II might also have to be prepared to use force to keep open the lines of communication and supply routes in Mogadishu and elsewhere.

On 16 November 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 885 (1993). The resolution authorized the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry, in further implementation of its resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to appoint the Commission at the earliest possible time. Soon thereafter, the Security Council, based on the recommendations of the Secretary-General, established a three-member Commis-

sion of Inquiry. In accordance with the decision of the Council, pending the completion of the report of the Commission, UNOSOM II suspended arrest actions against those suspected, and, by the end of November 1993, all but eight detainees of General Aidid's faction had been released.

UNOSOM II'S MANDATE EXTENDED

On 18 November 1993, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, renewed the mandate of UNOSOM II for a period of six months, expiring on 31 May 1994. By adopting resolution 886 (1993), the Council decided fundamentally to review that mandate by 1 February 1994 in light of a report to be submitted by the Secretary-General on or before 15 January, on the progress made by the Somali people towards national reconciliation. The Council further requested the Secretary-General to supply, as part of his report, an updated plan for UNOSOM II's future humanitarian, political and security strategies.

Affirming that the Addis Ababa agreements of 8 January and 27 March 1993 established a sound basis for resolving the problems in Somalia, the Council urged all parties, including movements and factions, to accelerate political reconciliation and immediately to abide by the cease-fire and disarmament agreements, particularly the cantonment of heavy weapons. It also reminded all the parties that continued United Nations involvement in Somalia depended on their active cooperation and tangible progress towards a political settlement.

The Council underscored the importance of the early and effective functioning of all district and regional councils and an interim national authority. It also stressed the importance attached to the provisions in resolution 865 (1993) regarding the establishment of an operational police, penal and judiciary system at the regional and district level as soon as feasible.

Emphasizing the relationship between rehabilitation and progress in national reconciliation, the Council encouraged donor countries to make contributions particularly to rehabilitation projects in those regions where progress on political reconciliation and security had been made. Member States were also urged to make funds available directly or through the Somalia Trust Fund for priority projects, including the re-establishment of the Somali police and removal of land mines. The Council welcomed the forthcoming convening of the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993.

The Council called on all Member States that had not yet done so to contribute troops and financial support to UNOSOM II on an urgent basis. It also called on donor nations to contribute to short-term, high impact development projects to establish links between political progress and reconstruction assistance.

Expressing concern at the destabilizing effects of cross-border arms flows in the region, the Council called for the cessation of such flows and reaffirmed the obligation of all States to fully implement the embargo on weapons and military equipment to Somalia.

In addition, the Council condemned the continued armed attacks against persons engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping efforts and paid tribute to those troops and humanitarian personnel who had been killed or injured while serving in Somalia.

Also by the text, the Council welcomed and supported the ongoing diplomatic efforts made by Member States and regional organizations in bringing all parties in Somalia to the negotiating table.

COMPOSITION OF UNOSOM II

The authorized strength of UNOSOM II is approximately 28,000 military personnel and some 2,800 civilian staff. Military personnel are currently provided by the following countries: Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States and Zimbabwe. The civilian component of UNOSOM II consists of staff members of the United Nations and of personnel seconded from Member States.

In addition, there are approximately 17,700 troops in the United States Joint Task Force in Somalia, which do not form part of UNOSOM II and are not under the operational command of the UNOSOM II Force Commander. This number includes the Quick Reaction Force, which is deployed in support of UNOSOM II.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

As to the financing of UNOSOM II, the rough annual cost of the operation to the United Nations is approximately $977 million. The costs of the operation are met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 31 October 1993, contributions outstanding to the UNOSOM Special Account

(UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II) amounted to approximately $142 million.

The Security Council, by resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, requested the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which contributions could be channelled to States or operations involved in establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. The total contributions to the Fund established as "The Trust Fund for Somalia — Unified Command", were $105 million. In its resolution 814 (1993), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to maintain the Fund for the additional purpose of receiving contributions for the maintenance of UNOSOM II forces following the departure of UNITAF forces and for the establishment of a Somali police force. The contributions received so far in this regard amount to $7 million.

Notes

[1] Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Mr. Ismat Kittani (Iraq) as his Special Representative for Somalia on 3 November 1992, to replace Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun who had resigned.

[2] In addition to the United States forces, UNITAF included military units from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

[3] United States forces (United States Rangers and the Quick Reaction Force) were deployed in Mogadishu in support of the UNOSOM II mandate, but were not under United Nations command or authority.

PS/DPI/18/Rev.3 — November 1993

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA

LOCATION: Uganda side of the Uganda-Rwanda border

HEADQUARTERS: Kabale

DURATION: June 1993 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 81 military observers, 17 international staff and 7 locally recruited personnel

ACTING CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER: Colonel Ben Matiwaza (Zimbabwe)

BACKGROUND

Fighting between the Armed Forces of the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) first broke out in October 1990 across the border between Rwanda and its northern neighbour, Uganda. Despite a number of cease-fire agreements thereafter, hostilities resumed in the northern part of the country in early February 1993. These interrupted comprehensive negotiations between the Government of Rwanda and RPF, which were supported by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and facilitated by the United Republic of Tanzania.

In support of resumption of the negotiations, Rwanda and Uganda, in separate letters to the President of the Security Council on 22 February 1993, called for the deployment of United Nations military observers along the 150-kilometre common border in order to prevent the military use of the area, especially the transportation of military supplies. RPF control of the border has been extensive.

Following consultations in the Security Council on 24 February concerning these letters, the Secretary-General decided to send a goodwill mission to Rwanda and Uganda. He instructed the mission to examine all major aspects of the peace process including the possibility of deploying military observers along the border. The goodwill mission carried out this mandate from 4 to 18 March 1993.

Meanwhile, efforts by OAU and Tanzania led to a meeting between the Government of Rwanda and RPF from 5 to 7 March at Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of Tanzania. In a closing joint communiqué, the Government of Rwanda and RPF pledged their commitment to a negotiated settlement and agreed to reinstate the cease-fire on 9 March and to the resumption of peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania. They also committed themselves to providing adequate security and protection to displaced persons.

On 12 March 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 812 (1993), called on the Government of Rwanda and RPF to respect the renewed cease-fire, to resume negotiations, to allow the delivery of humanitarian supplies and the return of displaced persons; and to fulfil the obligations and commitments the parties had made in the past. The Council also welcomed the goodwill mission the Secretary-General had sent to Rwanda and Uganda. Finally, it asked him to examine the requests of those two countries for the deployment of observers along their common border.

Following the adoption of the Council resolution, the Secretary-General decided to send a technical mission to the area. The mission visited Uganda from 2 to 5 April and Rwanda on 6 April. It reported that it would be possible to deploy United Nations military observers to monitor the border between Uganda and Rwanda and verify that no military assistance — lethal weapons, ammunition and other material of possible military use — was being provided across it. It was decided that deployment of the observers would be on the Uganda side of the border only.

OBSERVER MISSION IS AUTHORIZED

On 22 June 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 846 (1993), authorized the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) on the Uganda side of the common border, for an initial period of six months, subject to review every six months. The Council decided that the verification

would focus primarily on transit or transport, by roads or tracks which could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material which could be of military use.

The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to support the peace-keeping efforts of OAU by putting two military experts at its disposal to help expedite the deployment of OAU's expanded Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) to Rwanda. It also urged the Government of Rwanda and RPF to conclude quickly a comprehensive peace agreement, and requested the Secretary-General to report on the contribution the United Nations could make to assist OAU in implementing this agreement and to begin contingency planning in the event that the Council decided that such a contribution was needed.

As requested by resolution 846 (1993), the United Nations undertook consultations with the Government of Uganda with a view to concluding a status of mission agreement. The agreement was finalized and entered into force on 16 August 1993. This opened the way to deployment of an advance party which arrived in the mission area on 18 August. By the end of September, UNOMUR had reached its authorized strength of 81 military observers and was fully operational.

FUTURE OF UNOMUR

The Arusha peace talks, which had resumed on 16 March 1993, were successfully concluded on 4 August 1993. The Government of Rwanda and RPF called for the establishment of a neutral international force to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement. On 5 October, the Security Council, by resolution 872 (1993), established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)[1]. The Council also approved the proposal that UNOMUR be integrated into UNAMIR. On 22 October, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that he was consulting the Government of Uganda on the modalities of this integration, on the understanding that it would be "without prejudice to the mandate of UNOMUR as set out in resolution 846 (1993)".

COMPOSITION OF UNOMUR

The authorized strength of UNOMUR is 81 military observers, 17 international and seven local civilian support staff. Military observers are provided by the following countries: Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Hungary, Netherlands, Senegal, and Zimbabwe. In addition, Fiji and Slovak Republic have expressed their readiness in principle to make the necessary personnel available.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The cost of UNOMUR for a six-month period has been estimated at approximately $4 million. The costs of the operation are met by the assessed contributions of United Nations Member States.

Notes

[1] For more information on UNAMIR, see "United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda".

PS/DPI/22 — October 1993

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

UNOMIG

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA

LOCATION: Georgia

HEADQUARTERS: Sukhumi

DURATION: August 1993 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 88 military observers, 56 international and 46 local civilian staff

SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. Edouard Brunner (Switzerland)

CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER: Brigadier-General John Hvidegaard (Denmark)

BACKGROUND

The conflict in Abkhazia, strategically located on the Black Sea in the northwestern region of the Republic of Georgia, began with social unrest and the attempts by the local authorities to separate from the Republic. It escalated into a series of armed confrontations in the summer of 1992 when the Government of Georgia, concluding that the railway and certain communication links had to be protected, deployed 2,000 Georgian troops in Abkhazia. Fierce fighting broke out on 14 August 1992 when the Georgian troops entered Abkhazia, resulting in some 200 dead and hundreds wounded. The Abkhaz leadership abandoned the Abkhaz capital of Sukhumi and retreated to the town of Gudauta.

The relations between the Abkhaz and the Georgians have been tense for decades. Historically, the Abkhaz attempted many times to separate from the Republic of Georgia. Most recently, in August 1990, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet declared Abkhazia a sovereign republic of the Soviet Union independent of Georgia. This was immediately annulled by the Georgian Supreme Soviet. As a compromise for remaining in the Republic of Georgia, the Abkhaz were given disproportionate representation in the Supreme Council of Abkhazia. At that time, of the total population in Abkhazia of 540,000, only about 18 percent were Abkhaz. The majority was Georgian (about 47 per cent), and others included Armenians (about 18 per cent) and Russians (about 13 per cent). In December 1991, a new Supreme Council was elected, which allocated 28 seats to the Abkhaz, 26 seats to the Georgians and 11 seats to the remaining 35 per cent of the population. This did not ease the tension between the Abkhaz and Georgians. The Supreme Council split into two opposing factions, and for all intents and purposes, it ceased to function.

THE 1992 CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

A cease-fire agreement was reached on 3 September 1992 in Moscow by the Republic of Georgia, the leadership of Abkhazia and the Russian Federation. The agreement stipulated that "the territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia shall be ensured". It also set out, as the basis of the peace settlement, a cease-fire to take effect as of 5 September 1992; the establishment of a Monitoring and Inspection Commission composed of representatives of Georgia, Abkhazia and the Russian Federation to ensure compliance with the agreement; the disarming and withdrawal of all illegal armed formations that had come from outside Georgia; the reduction of the armed forces of Georgia in Abkhazia to an agreed number required to protect railway and certain other installations; the exchange of detainees, prisoners and hostages by 10 September 1992; the removal of all impediments to the free movement of goods and persons; the return of refugees to their homes; the search for missing persons; and the resumption of the normal functions by the legitimate authorities of Abkhazia by 15 September 1992. The agreement also included an appeal to the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to assist in the implementation of the peace settlement.

In a related development, on 10 September 1992, the Security Council asked the Secretary-General to inform the Council periodically of the developments in Abkhazia.

SITUATION DETERIORATES

The agreement was never fully implemented. Both sides accused one another of continuing to violate the cease-fire. The situation remained very tense, as confirmed by the United Nations mission to the region from 12 to 20 September 1992. On 1 October 1992, the cease-fire collapsed, and the fighting resumed in all areas. The Abkhaz forces, supported by fighters from the North Caucasus region, quickly captured the major towns, and threatened to bring nearly 80 per cent of Abkhazia, including the capital city of Sukhumi, under their control. The raging fighting forced some 30,000 civilians to flee across the border to the Russian Federation. The parties to the conflict accused one another of human rights violations committed against the civilian population.

By November 1992, the outbreak of inter-ethnic fighting in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation added another dimension to the already tense situation in the area.

UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS

The United Nations sought to revive the peace process by diplomatic means. In carrying out peacemaking efforts, the United Nations consulted with the CSCE so as to ensure effective coordination of activities. The Secretary-General sent a second mission in mid-October 1992 to explore specific ways in which the United Nations could support the implementation of the 3 September agreement, including the possible deployment of civilian and/or military observers. Two United Nations civilian personnel remained on the spot to provide an initial United Nations presence.

In November 1992, an integrated United Nations office opened in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, further strengthening the local United Nations presence. The office, which was initially composed of development and public information components, was to provide an integrated United Nations approach in the region and to assist in all aspects of the peacemaking efforts of the Secretary-General.

Furthermore, following a request from the Government of Georgia, a United Nations inter-agency humanitarian assessment mission visited Georgia from 30 January to 16 February 1993. The mission, which was coordinated by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, included representatives of the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Food Programme, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Based on the findings of the inter-agency mission, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs issued a consolidated appeal for emergency humanitarian assistance for Georgia with total requirements of $20.9 million through December 1993.

On 11 May 1993, the Secretary-General stated that dispatching another United Nations mission at that time "would not be an adequate approach in attempting to revive the peace process", adding that "a more concentrated effort is needed for the establishment of a lasting cease-fire and for the resumption of a process of political negotiation".

SECRETARY-GENERAL APPOINTS SPECIAL ENVOY

On the same day, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Edouard Brunner, a national of Switzerland, as his Special Envoy for Georgia for an initial period of three months. Mr. Brunner's tasks, based on the 1992 agreement, were to obtain agreement on a cease-fire; to assist the parties in reviving the process of negotiations to find a political solution to the conflict; and to enlist the support of neighbouring countries and others concerned in achieving the above objectives. The Special Envoy was to consult closely with the Chairman-in-Office of CSCE.

DEPLOYMENT OF UN MILITARY OBSERVERS IS RECOMMENDED

The mission undertaken by the Special Envoy for Georgia, from 20 to 31 May 1993, reaffirmed that all parties supported an active role by the United Nations in reaching a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Abkhazia. The Secretary-General held the view, endorsed by the Security Council, that an integrated peace package should be implemented, which pursued a solution on three tracks: consolidation of the cease-fire; the launching of a political negotiating process; and support for these two processes by the neighbouring countries, particularly the Russian Federation, which had been active in mediating the conflict.

To this end, the Secretary-General proposed the deployment of United Nations military observers, as well as the holding of a peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations. When the Special Envoy presented the Secretary-General's approach during his mission, it was determined that the Republic of Georgia fully supported all aspects of the approach, the Abkhaz side favoured the conference but not, at the time, the deployment of military observers; and the Russian Federation favoured the deployment of United Nations military observers, but had reservations about the conference.

In his report to the Security Council on 1 July 1993, the Secretary-General, while acknowledging the risks

"of dangers inherent in deploying United Nations personnel to an area where an agreed cease-fire is not being respected", asserted that such a move "is justified in the present case given the urgent need to get the conflict in Abkhazia under control", thereby seeking the authorization of the Security Council to deploy United Nations military observers as soon as practicable.

Meanwhile, the situation on the ground deteriorated even further. A cease-fire had been agreed to on 14 May 1993 and came into effect on 20 May 1993, but it held for only two weeks. Between 2 and 7 July 1993, hospitals in the area of fighting reported that 77 Georgian soldiers were killed and 481 wounded; during the same period 6 civilians were killed and 43 wounded. Two hundred fifty wounded Abkhaz were reportedly counted in one hospital in Gudauta by an independent observer.

The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that "given this very serious deterioration in the military situation, I believe that it would not be wise to proceed with the actual deployment of 50 military observers, as proposed in my report, until the cease-fire has been re-established and is being respected".

On 9 July 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 849 (1993), by which it approved the deployment of military observers as soon as the cease-fire was implemented. The Secretary-General, who was asked to make necessary preparations and to notify the Council when conditions permitted the deployment of the observers, announced, on 19 July, that he was sending a technical planning mission to the area.

CEASE-FIRE IS REACHED

On 27 July 1993, a new agreement was concluded, through the mediation efforts of the Russian Federation, between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities in Gudauta, which re-established a cease-fire as of 28 July. The agreement provided for the immediate commencement of phased demilitarization of the conflict zone. To monitor this process, international observers were to be deployed within 10 to 15 days of the date of the cease-fire. On 6 August, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that "conditions now prevail which permit the deployment of the proposed military observer mission". Based on the report of the technical planning team which had been in Georgia from 19 to 26 July, the Secretary-General concluded that an expanded mandate and additional military observers than had been previously envisaged "would strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations observation mission considerably", and recommended the deployment of 88 military observers and supporting staff without delay. On the same day, the Security Council, by resolution 854 (1993), unanimously authorized the Secretary-General's 4 August request to send an advance team of up to 10 observers to help verify compliance with the cease-fire.

ADVANCE TEAM IS DEPLOYED

An advance team of 9 military observers and 8 civilian support staff arrived in Abkhazia on 8 August 1993 and established its headquarters in the city of Sukhumi. Soon after its arrival, and in agreement with both parties, the advance team initiated regular road patrols in the conflict area in order to monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreed upon on 27 July. As envisaged in the cease-fire agreement, the observers conducting these patrols established liaison with the tripartite Georgian-Abkhaz-Russian interim monitoring groups responsible for the supervision of the cease-fire on the ground. Following the establishment of the tripartite "Joint Commission" on 5 August, the leader of the team participated in its work on a regular basis in an observer capacity. The initial reports received from the team during the month of August confirmed that the cease-fire was holding.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNOMIG

On 24 August, the Security Council, by its resolution 858 (1993), decided to establish the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), comprising up to 88 military observers, plus minimal civilian staff necessary to support the Mission, with the following mandate: to verify compliance with the cease-fire agreement of 27 July with special attention to the situation in the city of Sukhumi; to investigate reports of cease-fire violations and to attempt to resolve such incidents with the parties involved; and to report to the Secretary-General on the implementation of its mandate, including, in particular, violations of the cease-fire agreement.

The Council also decided that UNOMIG was established for a period of six months subject to the proviso that it would be extended beyond the initial 90 days "only upon a review by the Council based on a report from the Secretary-General whether or not substantive progress had been made towards implementing measures aimed at establishing a lasting peace". It requested the Secretary-General, through his Special Envoy, to pursue efforts to facilitate the

peace process and negotiations towards the achievement of a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict.

CEASE-FIRE BREAKS DOWN

While UNOMIG was still in the early stages of deployment, the cease-fire broke down on 16 September, when Abkhaz forces, with armed support from outside Abkhazia, launched attacks on Sukhumi and Ochamchira. Notwithstanding the call by the President of the Security Council in his statement of 17 September for the immediate cessation of hostilities and his condemnation of the violation of the cease-fire by the Abkhaz side, fighting continued. As a result of the intensity of the shelling and other hostilities, the UNOMIG observers were obliged to suspend all patrols as of 17 September.

In the next few days, the military situation developed rapidly, with loss of life among the local civilian population. The Georgian authorities made appeals for assistance to the Russian Federation, to CSCE and to the United Nations Secretary-General. The Abkhaz side ignored all calls to halt the military action, and occupied the city of Sukhumi on 27 September.

Following the breakdown of the cease-fire, further deployment of UNOMIG was suspended. The strength of UNOMIG in Sukhumi is limited to four military observers, including the Chief Military Observer, and four civilians. Seven observers remain in Sochi, a city on the territory of the Russian Federation where they were when the hostilities resumed. One observer remains in Tbilisi.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

The fighting in and around Sukhumi resulted in a massive displacement of civilians. It was reported that as many as 100,000 people were displaced. The Georgian authorities issued an urgent appeal to Governments for humanitarian assistance. The United Nations Representative in Tbilisi convened a meeting of representatives of the United Nations system, diplomatic community and non-governmental organizations to review the situation and arrange assistance. On 1 October, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs made an emergency appeal, calling particular attention to the need for food, warm clothing, medical supplies and logistic support for the transport of relief supplies. A United Nations relief flight was then organized. The head of the United Nations interim office and a second United Nations official maintain a United Nations presence in Tbilisi to monitor the delivery of humanitarian relief.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REVIEWS SITUATION

The Secretary-General, in his 7 October report to the Security Council, stated that UNOMIG's mandate had been invalidated as a result of the general breakdown of the cease-fire and the collapse of the tripartite machinery responsible for its implementation. He also reported that, as a matter of priority, he was exploring with the parties and with the Russian Federation the possible need for and usefulness of the continuing presence of UNOMIG with a "revised mandate adapted to the radically changed circumstances".

In the meantime, the Secretary-General proposed maintaining the present strength of UNOMIG in Sukhumi, where the Chief Military Observer had already established contact with Abkhaz military and civilian officials. He was assured of their cooperation and that UNOMIG would enjoy freedom of movement in monitoring the situation there.

The Secretary-General intended to consult with the parties and with the Russian Federation, and to present to the Security Council his recommendations relating both to the future of UNOMIG and to the political aspects of the United Nations role in trying to end the conflict in Abkhazia.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTS

By its resolution 876 (1993) adopted on 19 October, the Security Council reaffirmed its condemnation of the violation by Abkhaz forces of the cease-fire agreement, and their subsequent violations of international humanitarian law. It also condemned the killing of the Chairman of the Defence Council and Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, and demanded that all parties to the conflict refrain from the use of force and from any violations of international humanitarian law. The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to send a fact-finding mission to Georgia, in particular to investigate reports of "ethnic cleansing".

The Council reiterated its support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy, in cooperation with the CSCE Chairman-in-Office and with the assistance of the Government of the Russian Federation as a facilitator, to promote efforts to achieve an overall political settlement. While welcoming the humanitarian assistance already provided to victims of the conflict, the Council urged Member States to contribute to relief efforts being carried out by international aid agencies.

THREE-MONTH EXTENSION PROPOSED

The Secretary-General further reported on the situation in Abkhazia on 27 October. He informed the Security Council that his Special Envoy for Georgia, Edouard Brunner, had had discussions in Geneva with Abkhaz and Georgian representatives. He had also been invited for discussions in early November with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister. In view of those developments, the Secretary-General said that he was planning for his Special Envoy to hold a first round of discussions with both parties in late November 1993, under the auspices of the United Nations and with the Russian Federation present as facilitator. The CSCE would also be invited to attend as a participant. The discussions would focus on the question of a political settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia.

As for UNOMIG, the Secretary-General recommended that the Mission be continued at its present strength of four military observers with minimal support staff in Sukhumi for a further three months. A fifth military observer would continue to provide liaison services in Tbilisi. He observed that UNOMIG had established good relations with Abkhaz officials in Sukhumi and had been able to conduct patrols in the city. The Mission's continued presence in its present form and size would give the population visible evidence of international concern.

Since UNOMIG's original mandate had been invalidated by the fighting in Abkhazia in September, the Secretary-General recommended that the Mission have an interim mandate to maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and with Russian military contingents, and to monitor and report on the situation, with particular reference to developments relevant to United Nations efforts to promote a comprehensive political settlement.[1]

COMPOSITION OF UNOMIG

The original authorized strength of UNOMIG was 88 military observers. The following States have expressed their readiness in principle to make the necessary personnel available: Austria, Bangladesh, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Poland, Sierra Leone, Sweden and Switzerland. The military observers were to be supported by 56 international and 46 local civilian staff.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The annual cost to the United Nations of UNOMIG in its original form and size was estimated at approximately $23 million. The costs of the observer mission were to be met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States.

Notes

[1] On 4 November 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 881 (1993), welcomed the Secretary-General's report of 27 October 1993 and approved the continued presence of UNOMIG in Georgia until 31 January 1994. It also decided that UNOMIG would not be extended beyond that date unless the Secretary-General reported that substantive progress had been made towards implementing measures aimed at establishing a lasting peace or that the peace process would be served by the prolongation of its mandate.

PS/DPI/21 — October 1993

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

UNOMIL

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA

LOCATION: Liberia

HEADQUARTERS: Monrovia

DURATION: September 1993 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 303 military observers, 20 military medical personnel, 45 military engineers, 58 United Nations volunteers, 89 international civilian and 136 local civilian staff

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. Trevor Livingston Gordon-Somers (Jamaica)

FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Daniel Ishmael Opande (Kenya)

BACKGROUND

The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) is the first United Nations peace-keeping mission undertaken in cooperation with a peace-keeping operation already set up by another organization. Established in September 1993 by the Security Council, UNOMIL will work with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a subregional organization, in assisting the Liberians to establish peace in the country.

The civil war in Liberia broke out in 1990, when the government headed by President Samuel Doe was overthrown, causing a complete breakdown of law and order in the country. Since then, the war has claimed the lives of between 100,000 and 150,000 civilians, and displaced scores of others both internally and beyond the borders, resulting in some 700,000 refugees in the neighbouring countries. At present, Liberia remains divided, with the Interim Government of National Unity, headed by President Amos Sawyer, administering Monrovia, the country's capital, and its environs; the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Mr. Charles Taylor, controlling the majority of the country; and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), led by Mr. Alhaji Kromah, having taken control of the remaining areas.

Since the outset of the conflict, ECOWAS[1] has taken various initiatives aimed at a peaceful settlement. These included creating a Military Observer Group (ECOMOG)[2] in August 1990, and mediating a series of agreements which became the basis for the peace plan of November 1990. On 30 October 1991, ECOWAS brokered the Yamoussoukro IV Accord which outlined steps to implement the peace plan, including the encampment and disarmament of warring factions under the supervision of an expanded ECOMOG, as well as the establishment of transitional institutions to carry out free and fair elections.

The United Nations, from the beginning of the conflict, has supported the efforts of the ECOWAS member States. In addition, it has provided humanitarian assistance to the affected areas through coordinated activities of the United Nations Development Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Population Fund, the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Food Programme and the World Health Organization. The United Nations Special Coordinator's Office (UNSCOL) opened in December 1990; its operation, initially focusing on the desperate situation in the Monrovia area, was expanded in 1991 to respond to the needs of Liberians throughout the country. Regional arrangements were also made to assist those who fled to the neighbouring countries, mainly Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone.

UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS ON LIBERIA

The Security Council first took up the question of Liberia on 22 January 1991, when the President of the Council made a statement commending the efforts of the heads of State of ECOWAS and called upon the parties to the conflict to respect the cease-fire agreement. On 7 May 1992, the Council again commended ECOWAS and indicated that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord offered the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Liberia.

On 19 November 1992, the Security Council, by adopting resolution 788 (1992), imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia—except for those destined for the sole use of the peace-keeping forces of ECOWAS. The Council also called on the Member States of the United Nations to exert self-restraint in their relations with all parties to the conflict in Liberia, and to refrain from taking any action that would be inimical to the peace process. Further, it requested the Secretary-General to dispatch urgently a special representative to Liberia who would evaluate the situation and make recommendations as soon as possible.

On 20 November 1992, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Trevor Livingston Gordon-Somers, a national of Jamaica, as his Special Representative for Liberia. Following his appointment, the Special Representative visited Liberia as well as Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone.

On 12 March 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the discussions his Special Representative had held with the parties concerned, including the Executive Secretary and member States of ECOWAS, indicated the existence of general consensus that the United Nations should assume a larger role in the search for peace in Liberia. Reaffirming his commitment to a "systematic cooperation between the United Nations and a regional organization, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter" and stating his intention to continue working with ECOWAS in the peace process, the Secretary-General outlined three areas in which the United Nations could play a role in Liberia: political reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and electoral assistance.

Further, the Secretary-General proposed that ECOWAS convene a meeting at the Summit level where the President of the Interim Government and the warring factions in Liberia would conclude and sign an agreement, reaffirming their commitment to promptly implementing the peace process as envisaged in the Yamoussoukro IV Accord.

On 26 March, the Security Council, by resolution 813 (1993), requested the Secretary-General to consider the possibility of convening a meeting of the Liberian parties to reaffirm their commitment to the implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, and also to discuss with ECOWAS and the parties concerned the contribution which the United Nations could make in support of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, including the deployment of United Nations observers.

MASSACRE OF CIVILIANS THREATENS TO DERAIL THE PEACE PROCESS

On the morning of 6 June 1993, nearly 600 Liberians, mainly displaced men, women, children and the elderly, were killed in an armed attack near Harbel, Liberia. In response, the Security Council strongly condemned the killings and warned that those responsible would be held accountable for the serious violations of international humanitarian law, and requested the Secretary-General to commence immediately an investigation into the massacre.

After a preliminary investigation by his Special Representative, the Secretary-General, on 7 August, appointed a Panel of Inquiry composed of Mr. Amos Wako of Kenya as Chairman, and Mr. Robert Gersony of the United States and Mr. Mahmoud Kassem of Egypt as Members, to undertake a more comprehensive investigation. In a report dated 10 September, the Panel concluded that the killings were planned and executed by units of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and that NPFL, to which the act of violence had initially been attributed, had no role in it. The Panel named three AFL soldiers who had participated in the massacre, and recommended that criminal investigations be undertaken with a view to prosecuting them. The Panel added, however, that this finding did not mitigate or diminish the responsibility of NPFL, ULIMO and others alleged to have engaged in similar atrocities against unarmed, innocent civilians throughout the conflict. It further recommended investigations into a number of major atrocities attributed to all parties to the Liberian conflict.

PEACE ACCORD IS REACHED

On 25 July 1993, after a three-day meeting held in Cotonou, Benin, under the co-chairmanship of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, President Canaan Banana of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Mr. Abass Bundu, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, the parties to the conflict in Liberia signed the Cotonou Peace Agreement. The Agreement laid out a continuum of action, from the cease-fire through disarmament and demobilization to the holding of national elections.

On military aspects, the Agreement provided for a cease-fire to take effect on 1 August 1993, and outlined steps for the encampment, disarmament and demobilization of military units. To ensure against any violation of the cease-fire between 1 August and the arrival of the additional ECOMOG troops as well as the main body of a United Nations observer contin-

gent, the parties agreed to establish a Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee, comprising representatives of the three Liberian sides, ECOMOG and the United Nations.

For that period, the United Nations was asked to consider dispatching 30 advance military observers to participate in the work of the Committee.

On the political side, the parties reaffirmed the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. They agreed that there should be a single Liberian National Transitional Government which would have three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. The Agreement also provided for general and presidential elections to take place within seven months from the signing of the Agreement, and set out the modalities for the elections which will be supervised by a reconstituted Electoral Commission.

On humanitarian issues, the parties asked that all efforts be made to deliver such assistance throughout Liberia, using the most direct routes and monitoring compliance with the embargo provisions of the Agreement. The United Nations, in particular the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, was requested to facilitate the speedy return of refugees and their reintegration into their communities.

In his 4 August report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General, while recognizing the difficulties ahead, welcomed the Agreement as offering the "hope that the violent and destructive civil war which has afflicted Liberia may at long last be brought to an end." On 10 August, the Security Council, by resolution 856 (1993), authorized the Secretary-General to dispatch an advance team of 30 United Nations military observers to Liberia.

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA IS ESTABLISHED

On 22 September 1993, the Security Council, by resolution 866 (1993), established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). For a period of seven months, UNOMIL will work with ECOMOG in the implementation of the Cotonou Peace Agreement.

STRUCTURE OF UNOMIL

As in the case of all United Nations peace-keeping operations, UNOMIL is under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. It is led in the field by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Gordon-Somers, and is composed of military and civilian components. Command of the military component is entrusted to the Chief Military Observer, Major-General Daniel Ishmael Opande (Kenya) reporting to the Secretary-General through the Special Representative. The military component is to be comprised, initially, of personnel from Austria, Bangladesh, China, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Slovakia and Uruguay. The civilian component includes humanitarian and development assistance and electoral assistance, as well as the necessary political and administrative staff. UNOMIL is to be comprised of 303 military observers, 20 military medical personnel, 45 military engineers, as well as 58 United Nations volunteers, 89 international personnel and 136 local staff. The Mission will operate out of its headquarters in Monrovia, as well as four regional headquarters, co-located with ECOMOG's four sector headquarters, each in the Eastern, Northern and Western Liberia, and Greater Monrovia.

RELATIONSHIP WITH ECOMOG

UNOMIL and ECOMOG work closely together in facilitating the implementation of the military aspects of the Cotonou Peace Agreement. In accordance with the Agreement, ECOMOG has primary responsibility for ensuring the implementation of the Agreement's provisions, and UNOMIL's role is to monitor the implementation procedures in order to verify their impartial application. While UNOMIL and ECOMOG have separate chains of command, the missions consult formally, through the established committees, as well as informally, on matters affecting them both.

Under Security Council resolution 866 (1993), UNOMIL's mandate includes, in addition to military aspects, the coordination of humanitarian and development assistance, observation and verification of elections, and reporting on any major violations of humanitarian law. UNOMIL keeps ECOMOG informed, as necessary, of the activities it undertakes in pursuance of these aspects of its mandate.

Citing that the cooperation of ECOMOG is critical to UNOMIL's success, the Secretary-General warned that the failure to deploy additional ECOMOG troops or their premature withdrawal will gravely jeopardize the peace process. "In such an event," he declared, "I shall immediately bring the situation to the attention of the Security Council; depending on the prevalent circumstances, I might be obliged to recommend the withdrawal of UNOMIL." The Secretary-General, in his 9 September report to the Security Council, announced his intention to conclude with ECOWAS a formal agreement defining the relationship between

UNOMIL and ECOMOG. Such an agreement has now been concluded.

UNOMIL MILITARY COMPONENT

The military component of UNOMIL will monitor and verify compliance with the cease-fire, the embargo on delivery of arms and military equipment, as well as the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants. In addition, it will report on major violations of international humanitarian law to the Secretary-General, train and assist ECOMOG engineers in mine clearance, and assess the financial requirements for the demobilization of combatants.

As a way of providing ECOMOG sufficient means to ensure the implementation of the Agreement, and with the support of the Security Council, the Secretary-General has established a trust fund, under the auspices of the United Nations, that can be utilized to enable African countries to send reinforcements to ECOMOG, to provide necessary assistance to countries already participating in ECOMOG, and for humanitarian assistance, elections and demobilization. The fund has received contributions in excess of $20 million.

UNOMIL CIVILIAN COMPONENT

The civilian component includes humanitarian and development assistance and electoral assistance. The humanitarian and development assistance element will work closely with the United Nations Special Coordinator's Office in assisting relief activities and facilitating the return of refugees, the resettlement of displaced persons and the reintegration of ex-combatants.

The electoral assistance element will observe and verify the entire election process, from the registration of voters until the voting itself. The work is to be carried out by 13 Professionals, 40 United Nations Volunteers and necessary support staff. The Liberian National Transitional Government, through the Liberian Elections Commission consisting of representatives of the three Liberian parties, will be responsible for organizing and holding elections, which is scheduled for February/March 1994. Several potential bottlenecks to the holding of elections include operationalizing the Electoral Commission, repatriating refugees, settling internally displaced population, and completing demobilization. Expressing concern over whether the electoral process could be completed in time, the Secretary-General called on the Liberian parties to cooperate fully with ECOMOG and UNOMIL, and to work together in a spirit of national reconciliation. "Only under these conditions," he added, "will it be possible to hold the elections on schedule in February/March 1994, and to enable the people of Liberia to begin the arduous task of rebuilding their ravaged country and to look forward to a future of peace, stability and well-being."

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The Secretary-General, in his initial assessment, estimated that the total cost of UNOMIL would amount to $40 million for a seven-month period. A portion of these costs may be absorbed through utilizing certain surplus equipment and supplies of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, which completed its mission in September 1993. The remaining costs are to be met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States.

Notes

[1]ECOWAS membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

[2]The original membership of ECOMOG: Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal (withdrew January 1993) and Sierra Leone. In accordance with the Peace Agreement, ECOMOG is planning to expand its forces by additional troops, contributed by other members of the Organization of African Unity.

PS/DPI/25 — October 1993

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

UNMIH

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

LOCATION: Haiti

HEADQUARTERS: Port-au-Prince

DURATION: September 1993 to present

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 700 military personnel, 567 police monitors, 99 international and 271 local civilian staff

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND HEAD OF MISSION: Mr. Dante Caputo (Argentina)

BACKGROUND

The President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was democratically elected on 16 December 1990 by 67 per cent of Haitian voters. He took office on 7 February 1991. The validity of the election was upheld by the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Caribbean community. It was hoped that the election would put an end to a long period encompassing the dictatorship of François and Jean-Claude Duvalier followed by five years of political instability under five different regimes, and mark the beginning of an era of democracy and economic and social progress. However, on 30 September 1991, President Aristide was overthrown in a *coup d'état*, headed by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras, and forced into exile.

EARLY REGIONAL EFFORTS

The violent and unconstitutional actions of the Haitian military forces were immediately and strongly condemned by the international community. On the same day, while the whereabouts of President Aristide were still unknown, the Permanent Council of OAS condemned the *coup d'état* and its perpetrators; demanded adherence to the Constitution and respect for the legitimate Government, the physical safety of the President and the rights of the Haitian people; and called for the reinstatement of the President.

That same day, then United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar made a statement in which he expressed the hope that calm would soon be restored and that the democratic process would be pursued in accordance with the Constitution. The President of the Security Council associated himself with the statement.

Meeting on 2 October, the OAS Ministers for Foreign Affairs heard a statement by President Aristide, and on 3 October they adopted a resolution demanding his immediate reinstatement. The Ministers recommended the diplomatic, economic and financial isolation of the de facto authorities and the suspension of any aid except that provided for strictly humanitarian purposes. They decided to dispatch a mission to Haiti and urged the United Nations to consider the spirit and aims of the resolution.

On 3 October, President Aristide addressed the United Nations Security Council. The President of the Council made a statement condemning the *coup*, calling for the restoration of the legitimate Government, supporting the efforts of OAS and expressing the hope that the President of Haiti would soon return to his country and resume his functions.

On 4 October, a high-level OAS delegation arrived in Haiti and met with representatives of various groups within the country. The delegation's negotiations with the High Command of the Haitian Armed Forces were interrupted on 7 October, when soldiers ordered the delegation members to leave the country.

On 7 October, the two Chambers of the Haitian Parliament, under pressure from the military, named an "Acting President", who in turn appointed, on 10 October, a "Prime Minister".

The OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted, on 8 October, a second resolution in which they condemned the decision to replace the President illegally and declared unacceptable any Government that might result from that situation. They urged OAS member States to freeze the financial assets of the Haitian State and to impose a trade embargo on Haiti, except for humanitarian aid. The Ministers called upon

the Member States of the United Nations to adopt the same measures. They also decided to constitute, at the request of President Aristide, a civilian mission, known as OEA/DEMOC, to re-establish and strengthen constitutional democracy in Haiti.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTS

On 11 October 1991, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 46/7, in which it condemned the illegal replacement of the constitutional President of Haiti, the use of violence and military coercion and the violation of human rights in Haiti; affirmed as unacceptable any entity resulting from that illegal situation; and demanded the immediate restoration of the legitimate Government of President Aristide, the application of the Constitution and thus the full observance of human rights in Haiti. The Assembly appealed to Member States to take measures in support of the OAS resolutions and emphasized that, when constitutional order was restored in Haiti, increased cooperation would be necessary to support the country's development efforts in order to strengthen its democratic institutions. The Assembly also requested the United Nations Secretary-General to consider providing the support sought by the OAS Secretary-General in implementing the mandates arising from the OAS resolutions.

SPECIAL ENVOY APPOINTED

The United Nations Secretary-General actively supported the intensive efforts by OAS and its mediator at the time, Mr. Ramírez Ocampo, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, aimed at finding a political solution to the Haitian crisis.

On 15 July 1992, newly elected Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali informed the Security Council that he had accepted the offer of the Secretary-General of OAS, Mr. João Baena Soares, to include a United Nations participation in a mission to Haiti. The high-level mission led by the OAS Secretary-General visited Haiti from 18 to 21 August 1992. On 10 September, the United Nations Secretary-General informed the Council that his representative had taken part in the OAS mission and that the Haitian parties did not seem to have come closer together. He also reported that OAS was planning to deploy a first group of observers in Haiti and that it had decided to maintain the economic embargo. He concluded by saying that he intended to continue cooperating with OAS and stood ready to lend any other assistance.

On 3 November, the Secretary-General, in a report to the General Assembly, reviewed the efforts made by the international community to resolve the Haitian crisis. He also cited reports of a pattern of gross and widespread human rights abuses during the year since the *coup d'état* in Haiti. As a result of the deteriorating political, economic and humanitarian situation, thousands of Haitians were fleeing their country.

On 24 November 1992, the General Assembly adopted resolution 47/20, in which, *inter alia*, it again demanded the restoration of the legitimate Government of President Aristide, together with the full application of the National Constitution and the full observance of human rights, and requested the Secretary-General to take the "necessary measures", in order to assist, in cooperation with OAS, in the solution of the Haitian crisis.

Following the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General, on 11 December 1992, appointed Mr. Dante Caputo, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, as his Special Envoy for Haiti. On 13 January 1993, the OAS Secretary-General also appointed Mr. Caputo as his Special Envoy.

FURTHER DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

The Special Envoy held a series of preliminary consultations between 17 and 22 December 1992 in Washington, D.C., with President Aristide, and at Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, with the Coordinator and members of the Presidential Commission, with the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras, with the then Prime Minister of the de facto Government, Mr. Marc Bazin,[1] and with the Presidents of the two Chambers of the National Assembly of Haiti. Further discussions were held with President Aristide in early January 1993.

On 8 January 1993, President Aristide, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, requested, among other things, the following: (a) the deployment by the United Nations and OAS of an international civilian mission to monitor respect for human rights and the elimination of all forms of violence; and (b) the establishment of a process of dialogue among the Haitian parties, under the auspices of the Special Envoy, with a view to reaching agreements for the solution of the political crisis, the designation of a Prime Minister by the President to lead a Government of national concord aimed at the full restoration of dem-

ocratic order in Haiti; agreements for the rehabilitation of Haitian institutions, including the reform of the judicial system, the professionalization of the armed forces and the separation of the police from the armed forces; international technical assistance for national reconstruction; and a system of guarantees to ensure a lasting solution. An identical letter was addressed to the Secretary-General of OAS.

After further meetings at Port-au-Prince on 16 and 17 January 1993, the Special Envoy received two letters, one from Lieutenant-General Cédras and the other from Mr. Bazin, accepting in principle an international civilian mission and a dialogue among the Haitian parties to resolve the political crisis in the country.

In a letter dated 18 January 1993 to President Aristide, the Secretary-General agreed to the United Nations participation in the International Civilian Mission for verifying respect for human rights and the eradication of all forms of violence in Haiti, subject to the approval of the General Assembly and under terms to be agreed jointly with OAS.

In the mean time, faced with the announcement by the de facto Government of Haiti that it was proceeding with the holding of elections for a third of the Senate, the Permanent Council of OAS adopted, on 13 January 1993, a declaration repudiating the proposed elections and declaring them to be "illegitimate" and obstructive of the efforts under way by OAS and the United Nations towards restoring the democratic institutional framework in Haiti. The United Nations Secretary-General supported the OAS declaration. However, his request to the de facto Haitian authorities that the elections be cancelled was not heeded.

CIVILIAN MISSION ESTABLISHED

Following the Special Envoy's consultations with the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and of OAS concerning the mandate of the International Civilian Mission and the modalities of its operation, the joint ideas were presented to and agreed upon by President Aristide. The terms of the agreement regarding the Mission were subsequently incorporated in an exchange of letters between the de facto Prime Minister, Mr. Bazin, and the Special Envoy on 9 February 1993.

Under the agreement, the International Civilian Mission would verify respect for human rights as laid down in the Haitian Constitution and in the international instruments to which Haiti is a party, in particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. The Mission would devote special attention to the observance of the rights to life, to the integrity and security of the person, to personal liberty, to freedom of expression and to freedom of association. The Mission would be entitled to receive communications relating to alleged human rights violations, to visit freely any place or establishment, to enjoy entire freedom of movement within Haitian territory, to interview anybody freely and privately, to make recommendations to the authorities and verify their follow-up, to undertake a public information and education campaign on human rights and to use the mass media to the extent useful for the fulfilment of its mandate. It would be understood that the Mission is authorized to resort to other international procedures for the promotion and protection of human rights.

The agreement also provided that once the Mission had been deployed, the Special Envoy would undertake discussions regarding ways and means through which the United Nations and OAS might assist in reinforcing democracy, accelerating economic development and professionalizing national institutions, in particular, the judicial system, the armed forces and the police.

In his 24 March 1993 report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General recommended that the Assembly establish the United Nations component of the joint International Civilian Mission in Haiti. The United Nations component of the Mission would comprise some 200 international staff, including 133 human rights observers. OAS would provide another 133 international observers, plus other required personnel for its component. The report also contained the proposals submitted by the team of three international human rights experts, which had visited Haiti from 15 to 22 February 1993, including its recommendations on the deployment of the Mission throughout Haiti, the modalities of its operation and its needs in terms of personnel and resources.

On 20 April 1993, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, its resolution 47/208 approving the Secretary-General's report and authorizing the United Nations participation, jointly with OAS, in the International Civilian Mission to Haiti. The Assembly reiterated the need for an early return of President Aristide to resume his constitutional functions as President and strongly supported the process of political dialogue under the auspices of the Special Envoy with a view to resolving the political crisis in Haiti. It reiterated that any entity resulting from actions of the de facto regime, including the partial elections to the Parliament in January 1993, was illegitimate.

By other provisions of the resolution, the General Assembly considered that any modifications regarding the economic measures recommended by the ad hoc meeting of the OAS Foreign Ministers should be considered according to progress in the observance of human rights and in the solution of the political crisis. It reaffirmed the international community's commitment to increased technical, economic and financial cooperation when constitutional order is restored in Haiti, in order to strengthen institutions responsible for dispensing justice and guaranteeing democracy, political stability and economic development.

Pending the General Assembly's approval, the United Nations Secretary-General dispatched to Haiti on 13 February 1993 an advance team and a survey group to prepare for the deployment of the United Nations component of the Mission. On 14 February, an initial group of 40 observers from OAS arrived in Haiti, where they joined forces with a small team of OAS observers that had been in Port-au-Prince since September 1992.

The Mission operates under a Head of Mission, appointed jointly by the United Nations and OAS and reporting to the Special Envoy. Its headquarters has been established at Port-au-Prince with 14 regional offices and sub-offices across the country. Deployment in the provinces began on 5 March 1993. By the end of March, the Mission had a team in each of the nine departments of the country. It has been estimated that the financial requirements for the United Nations participation in the Mission in 1993 would amount to approximately $24 million.

On 3 June 1993, the Civilian Mission submitted its first report on the human rights situation in Haiti. The report, which was of an interim nature, concentrated on such issues as violations of the right to integrity and security of person linked to violations of the right to freedom of expression and association; deaths in detention, disappearances and arbitrary executions; and other violations of the right to physical integrity and individual security.

OIL AND ARMS EMBARGO IMPOSED

In the mean time, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy conducted consultations with the parties concerned aimed at seeking a political solution to the Haitian crisis. The immediate objective of those consultations was to achieve agreement on three main issues, namely the return of President Aristide to Haiti, the appointment of a Prime Minister to head a Government of national concord and the resolution of the question of amnesty. Other critical issues included technical assistance for the economic and institutional reconstruction of the country, the nature and duration of the international presence in Haiti, coupled with international guarantees to ensure compliance with the agreements.

Despite the mounting international pressure, however, the negotiating process undertaken by Mr. Caputo was rejected by the de facto authorities and the military command in Haiti when they refused to accept the key elements of the proposed framework for a settlement.

On 7 June 1993, the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council, in which he stated that despite the efforts of the international community, constitutional order had not yet been re-established in Haiti because the de facto authorities continued to obstruct all initiatives. In light of that situation, the letter went on, the Government of Haiti requested the Security Council to make universal and mandatory the sanctions against the de facto authorities adopted at the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of OAS and recommended in the General Assembly resolutions, giving priority to an embargo on petroleum products and the supply of arms and munitions.

On 16 June, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, unanimously adopted resolution 841 (1993), by which it decided to impose an oil and arms embargo against Haiti as part of the continuing international effort to restore constitutional rule to that country. The President of the Council, in a statement on behalf of its members, said that the adoption of the resolution was warranted by the unique and exceptional situation in Haiti and should not be regarded as constituting a precedent.

The Council decided that the sanctions would enter into force on 23 June 1993 unless the Secretary-General, having regard to the views of the Secretary-General of OAS, reported to the Council that, in the light of the results of negotiations, the measures were no longer warranted. At any time after such reporting, should the de facto authorities in Haiti fail to comply in good faith with their undertakings in those negotiations, the sanctions measures would enter into force immediately.

The resolution obliged States to prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of petroleum or petroleum products or arms and related *matériel* including military vehicles, police equipment and their spare parts, to any person or body in Haiti. States were also to prevent any activities by their nationals or in their

territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply. States were also required to freeze all funds in the name of the Government of Haiti or the de facto authorities there, as well as those funds controlled directly or indirectly by the two wherever located or organized.

GOVERNORS ISLAND AGREEMENT

On 21 June 1993, the Special Envoy, Mr. Caputo, received a letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, Lieutenant-General Cédras, accepting the Special Envoy's earlier invitation to him to initiate a dialogue with President Aristide with a view to resolving the Haitian crisis.

On 3 July, after almost a week of talks on Governors Island, New York City, President Aristide and Lieutenant-General Cédras signed an agreement containing arrangements which the parties felt paved the way to a "satisfactory solution to the Haitian crisis and the beginning of a process of national reconciliation".

Under the Agreement, President Aristide was to appoint a new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to replace Lieutenant-General Cédras, who would take early retirement. President Aristide was to return to Haiti on 30 October 1993. The parties agreed to a political dialogue, under the auspices of the United Nations and OAS, between representatives of political parties represented in the Parliament, with the participation of representatives of the Presidential Commission. The objectives of the political dialogue were to reach a political truce and promote a social pact to create conditions necessary to ensure a peaceful transition; to establish procedures to enable the Haitian Parliament to resume its normal functioning; to reach an agreement enabling the Parliament to confirm the Prime Minister as speedily as possible; and to reach an agreement permitting the adoption of the laws necessary for ensuring the transition. The parties further agreed that the President would nominate a Prime Minister, to be confirmed by the legally reconstituted Parliament. Following his confirmation and assumption of office, all United Nations and OAS sanctions were to be suspended. Other provisions dealt with issues of amnesty, the creation of a new police force and international cooperation.

The Agreement specifically requested the presence of United Nations personnel in Haiti to assist in modernizing the armed forces and establishing the new police force. The Secretary-General, after consultations with the constitutional Government of Haiti, was to report to the Security Council with his recommendations on that aspect of the implementation of the Agreement. The United Nations and OAS were called upon to verify the fulfilment of all the commitments set out in the Agreement. The Secretary-General entrusted the verification to his Special Envoy and asked him to report regularly to him and to the Secretary-General of OAS.

NEW YORK PACT

On 14 July 1993, representatives of political forces and parliamentary blocs, together with the members of the Presidential Commission which represents President Aristide in Haiti, began the inter-Haitian political dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations and OAS.

At the conclusion of the talks in New York on 16 July, the parties signed a new document, known as the New York Pact, which provided for a six-month truce "to guarantee a smooth and peaceful transition" in their country. In agreeing to the truce, the parties undertook to promote and guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to refrain from any action that might lead to violence or disrupt the transition to democracy. They also undertook not to table motions of no-confidence against the new Government of national concord, in so far as it respected the Constitution and the laws of the Republic, or to obstruct the work of the Parliament.

The signatories invited President Aristide to appoint a new Prime Minister as soon as possible, and undertook to ensure that laws necessary for the transition of power were passed on the basis of an emergency procedure. They agreed that the members of Parliament elected as a result of the contested elections of 18 January 1993 would voluntarily refrain from occupying their parliamentary seats until the Conciliation Commission had rendered its verdict on this issue.

The United Nations and OAS agreed to make two experts available to help prepare and implement an act establishing the Conciliation Commission.

SUSPENSION OF THE SANCTIONS

In his letter to the Secretary-General on 15 July, the President of the Security Council confirmed the readiness of the Council to suspend the sanctions imposed against Haiti under Security Council resolution 841 (1993) immediately after the Prime Minister had been ratified and had assumed the functions of that office in Haiti. It was agreed that provisions would be made for the automatic termination of such suspension if the parties to the Agreement or any authorities in Haiti failed to comply

in good faith with the Agreement. The Council also declared its readiness to terminate the sanctions, upon receipt of a report from the United Nations Secretary-General immediately after the return of President Aristide to Haiti.

On 25 August 1993, the Haitian Parliament ratified the appointment by President Aristide of Mr. Robert Malval as Prime Minister-designate. This led the Security Council, on the Secretary-General's recommendation, to suspend immediately oil and embargo sanctions against Haiti. The Council did so by unanimously adopting resolution 861 (1993) of 27 August in which it also confirmed its readiness to reimpose sanctions if the terms of the Governors Island Agreement were not fully implemented.

PEACE-KEEPING MISSION PROPOSED

The Governors Island Agreement included provision for United Nations assistance for modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a new police force. In his 25 August report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General outlined his plans in this regard.

The Secretary-General recommended the dispatch to Haiti of a mission consisting of 567 civilian police monitors, 60 military trainers and a military construction unit for an initial period of six months.

Although the Haitian Constitution provides for a police force separate from the Armed Forces, the responsibilities of the Armed Forces of Haiti have included both military and police functions. The Secretary-General said that, pending the creation of a new police force, United Nations civilian police monitors would help the Government in monitoring the activities of those members of the Armed Forces involved in carrying out police functions; provide guidance and advice; monitor the conduct of police operations; and ensure that legal requirements were fully met.

As to the modernization of the Armed Forces, the Secretary-General stated that the military training teams would provide training to officers and non-commissioned officers in non-lethal skills in order to prepare them for what would become their primary mission, including disaster relief, search and rescue, and surveillance of borders and coastal waters.

The military construction unit will work with the Haitian military in such areas as conversion of certain military facilities to civilian use and renovation of medical facilities.

The Secretary-General said that the mission would be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, namely the Special Envoy, Mr. Dante Caputo, who would also oversee the activities of the International Civilian Mission and who would coordinate the activities of the two missions.

On 31 August, the Security Council, by its resolution 862 (1993), approved the dispatch of an advance team to prepare for the possible deployment of the proposed United Nations mission to Haiti.

UNMIH ESTABLISHED

An advance team, headed by Mr. Caputo, travelled to Haiti on 8 September. On the basis of the team's findings, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council, on 21 September, a report containing further clarifications, including an estimate of the cost and scope of the mission, a time-frame for its implementation and conclusion, as well as recommendations on ensuring coordination between the United Nations and OAS.

In analysing the political situation in Haiti, the Secretary-General noted that both sides continued to be divided by deep mistrust and suspicion. The political and social climate in the country continued to be characterized by widespread violations of human rights and by other instances of violence. The Secretary-General shared the view of his Special Envoy that in these circumstances there was an "urgent need to demonstrate through concrete steps the commitment of the international community to the solution of the Haitian crisis". He recommended, therefore, that the Security Council approve the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for an initial period of six months.

On 23 September, the Security Council, by its resolution 867 (1993), authorized the establishment and immediate dispatch of UNMIH for a period of six months. An extension of the mandate of the Mission beyond the seventy-five days was made contingent upon a review by the Council of substantive progress towards the implementation of political agreements reached. The Council called upon all factions in Haiti to renounce publicly violence as a means of political expression.

DEPLOYMENT PREVENTED

In accordance with resolution 867 (1993) and after necessary preparations and consultations, the advance unit of UNMIH was deployed in Haiti in early October. However, when the ship carrying 220 personnel of the United Nations military contingent arrived in Port-au-Prince on 11 October, armed civilians (known as "attachés") created the disturbances in the area of the

seaport and prevented the ship from landing. In addition, they threatened journalists and diplomats waiting to meet the contingent.

On the same day, the Security Council issued a statement "deeply deploring" the events of 11 October and reiterating that serious and consistent non-compliance with the Governors Island Agreement would prompt it to reinstate the oil and arms embargo against Haiti. In this context, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report urgently whether the incidents of 11 October constituted such non-compliance by the Armed Forces of Haiti.

SANCTIONS REIMPOSED

The Secretary-General, in accordance with the Council's request, reported back on 13 October. He called attention to the "repeatedly observed lack of will on the part of the command of the Armed Forces of Haiti to facilitate the deployment and operation of UNMIH" and to administrative obstacles created to delay the start of the Mission. He also cited incidents demonstrating a lack of will to act against "attachés" who were terrorizing the population through such actions as assassinations, attacks on the offices of the Prime Minister and the general strike against UNMIH. Moreover, police had facilitated and, in some cases, participated in the actions of the armed civilians.

The Secretary-General went on to say that most of the instructions issued by the Government of Haiti to the Haitian Armed Forces and police had not been carried out. That was a "clear violation of the principle of the subordination of military forces to civilian authority", which was a central feature of the Governors Island Agreement. The incidents described in the report reflected a lack of will to cooperate fully with the peaceful transition to a democratic society, as well as the "clear and explicit intent to prevent the democratic process, as accepted in that Agreement, from taking its course".

The Secretary-General stated that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti and the police chief and commander of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area "have failed to fulfil the commitments entered into by General Cédras in his capacity as co-signatory of the Governors Island Agreement". The Secretary-General declared it necessary to terminate the suspension of the oil and arms embargo first imposed by resolution 841 (1993).

The Security Council, by its resolution 873 (1993) of 13 October, decided to reimpose its oil and arms embargo against Haiti as of 2359 hours Eastern Standard Time on 18 October unless the parties to the Governors Island Agreement and other authorities in Haiti implemented in full the agreement to reinstate the legitimate Government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and enable UNMIH to carry out its mandate. The Council said it would also consider additional sanctions if they continued to impede the activities of UNMIH or to refuse to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions and the Governors Island Agreement.

Despite diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis and mounting international pressure, the military leaders in Haiti continued to defy the Governors Island Agreement. Moreover, on 14 October, the Minister of Justice in the Government of President Aristide, François-Guy Malary, was assassinated. In a letter dated 15 October, President Aristide requested the Security Council to call on Member States to take the "necessary measures to strengthen the provisions of resolution 873 (1993)".

On 16 October, the Security Council, by its resolution 875 (1993), called upon Member States to ensure the strict implementation of the oil and arms embargo against Haiti, and in particular to halt and inspect ships travelling towards Haiti in order to verify their cargoes and destinations. The Council also confirmed that it was prepared to consider further necessary measures to ensure full compliance with the provisions of relevant Council resolutions.

Reaffirming that, in "these unique and exceptional circumstances", the failure of the military authorities in Haiti to fulfil their obligations under the Governors Island Agreement constituted a threat to peace and security in the region, the Council called on Member States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements and in cooperation with the legitimate Government of Haiti, to use appropriate measures to implement the sanctions called for under resolutions 841 (1993) and 873 (1993).

On 30 October 1993, after the deadline for the return of President Aristide to Haiti had passed, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, condemned the fact that Lieutenant-General Cédras and the Haitian military authorities had so far not fulfilled their obligations under the Governors Island Agreement, and deplored their fostering and perpetuation of a political and security environment which prevented the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti as provided for in the Agreement.

The Council reaffirmed that the Governors Island Agreement remained fully in force as the only valid framework for the solution of the crisis in Haiti. It further reaffirmed its determination to maintain and enforce

sanctions on Haiti until the Agreement's commitments were honoured, and to consider strengthening them if the military authorities continued to interrupt the democratic transition.

COMPOSITION OF UNMIH

The authorized strength of UNMIH is 700 military personnel and 567 police monitors. Military personnel are to be provided by Argentina, Canada and the United States. Police personnel will be contributed by Algeria, Austria, Canada, France, Indonesia, Madagascar, Russian Federation, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia and Venezuela.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The Secretary-General has estimated that the total cost of UNMIH for a six-month period would amount to approximately $50 million. The costs of the operation are to be met by the assessed contributions of United Nations Member States.

Notes

[1] Mr. Bazin resigned on 8 June 1993.

PS/DPI/24 — October 1993

Note: Data effective 31 October 1993

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

LOCATION: Rwanda

HEADQUARTERS: Kigali

DURATION: October 1993 to present

AUTHORIZED PEAK STRENGTH: 2,548 military personnel, 60 police officers, 110 international and 61 locally recruited civilian staff

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HEAD OF MISSION: Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh (Cameroon)

FORCE COMMANDER: Brigadier-General Romeo A. Dallaire (Canada)

BACKGROUND[1]

The Arusha talks on a comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) reconvened on 16 March 1993. The talks were supported by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and facilitated by the United Republic of Tanzania. United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was represented by Mr. Macaire Pédanou, head of the United Nations goodwill mission sent to Rwanda in March 1993.

The talks covered military issues, refugees and displaced persons, and outstanding political matters, including the amendment of the constitution, as well as the duration of the transitional period. Early in the talks, the parties also began to discuss an international neutral force to oversee the implementation of key aspects of the peace agreement and to create confidence during the transition period.

The talks in Arusha were successfully concluded on 4 August 1993 with the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement, which called for a democratically elected government and provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government until the elections. The two parties called for a neutral international force to help implement the agreement.

In a joint request to the Security Council from Arusha on 11 June, the two parties called on the United Nations to send a reconnaissance mission to Rwanda. This mission would prepare for the quick deployment of a neutral international force as soon as the peace agreement under negotiation was signed. The request welcomed the decision made in consultations between the United Nations and OAU that the United Nations should assume responsibility for and command of such a force. The parties asked that the force should guarantee public security, especially for the delivery of humanitarian aid. It would also assist in searches for weapons caches, neutralization of armed bands, demining, civilian disarmament and the cessation of hostilities. The parties also requested that the international force oversee the demobilization of existing armed forces and of all aspects of the formation of the new National Army and National Gendarmerie.

UNAMIR IS RECOMMENDED

A United Nations reconnaissance mission visited Rwanda from 19 to 31 August 1993. Its senior officials also visited Dar-es-Salaam on 1 and 2 September and Addis Ababa on 3 September for consultations with the Government of Tanzania and the Secretary-General of OAU.

On the basis of the mission's findings, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council, on 24 September, a report, in which he recommended the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), with the mandate of "contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional Government".

According to the Secretary-General, the principal functions of UNAMIR would be to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the cease-

fire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone (DMZ) and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate leading up to elections; and assist with mine-clearance. The Mission would also investigate alleged non-compliance with any provisions of the peace agreement and provide security for the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and displaced persons. In addition, it would be asked to escort and protect humanitarian activities until relieved by the new Defence Forces and Gendarmerie of Rwanda.

The Secretary-General proposed that the military observers of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) — an operation established by Security Council in June 1993 — come under the command of the new Mission, while maintaining their monitoring tasks on the Uganda-Rwanda border. The Mission would also incorporate elements of the Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II) which was mandated by OAU to supervise the cease-fire until 31 October 1993[2].

The Secretary-General recommended to conduct the operation in four phases.

The first phase would commence on the day the Security Council establishes UNAMIR and would end on D-Day, the day on which the transitional government is installed. It is estimated that the transitional government may not be installed until the end of 1993. The objective of the Mission would be to establish conditions for the secure installation of such a government. By the end of that phase, the strength of UNAMIR would total 1,428 military personnel.

During phase two, expected to last 90 days or when the process of disengagement, demobilization and integration of the Armed Forces and Gendarmerie begins, the build-up of the Mission would continue to a total of 2,548 military personnel. During this phase, UNAMIR would continue to monitor the DMZ, to assist in providing security in Kigali and in the demarcation of the assembly zones, and to ensure that all preparations for disengagement, demobilization and integration are in place.

During phase three, which would last about 9 months, the Mission would establish, supervise and monitor a new DMZ. Security would also continue to be provided in Kigali. The disengagement, demobilization and integration process would be completed in this stage, and the Mission would reduce its staff to approximately 1,240 personnel.

Phase four, which would last about four months, would see a further reduction of the Mission's strength to the minimum level of approximately 930 military personnel. UNAMIR would assist in ensuring the secure atmosphere required in the final stages of the transitional period leading up to the elections.

In order to verify that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially, the Secretary-General proposed to deploy a small United Nations civilian police unit in Kigali and the nine prefecture capitals of Rwanda and in specific police installations.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTS

UNAMIR was established on 5 October by Security Council resolution 872 (1993) for an initial period of six months subject to the proviso that it would be extended beyond the initial 90 days only upon a review by the Council based on a report from the Secretary-General as to whether or not substantive progress had been made towards the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement.

The Council approved the Secretary-General's proposal that the deployment and withdrawal of UNAMIR should be carried out in stages and noted that UNAMIR's mandate would terminate following national elections and the installation of a new government in Rwanda, events which were scheduled to occur by October 1995, but no later than December 1995. In that context, it authorized the Secretary-General to deploy a first contingent to Kigali, which, when fully in place, would permit the establishment of the transitional institutions and implementation of the other relevant provisions of the peace agreement. The Council further approved the proposal that UNOMUR be integrated within UNAMIR.

The Council urged the parties to implement the Arusha agreement in good faith and called upon Member States, United Nations specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to provide and intensify their economic, financial and humanitarian assistance in favour of the Rwandese population and of the democratization process in Rwanda.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

On 15 April 1993, the United Nations launched an inter-agency appeal for international assistance covering a period from April to December 1993 amounting to $78 million to meet the needs of over 900,000 war-displaced people, or approximately 13 per cent of the nation's population. The appeal was the result of a

request by the President of Rwanda to the Secretary-General earlier in 1993 following a three-fold increase in the number of the displaced persons whose emergency needs had overwhelmed the local capacity to supply them.

Most of the displaced were living in and around 30 camps where serious malnutrition and disease were prevalent. The situation was exacerbated by Rwanda's already precarious economic condition, overpopulation and rapidly declining agricultural production.

An inter-agency mission, led by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), was fielded between 18 and 25 March to prepare a consolidated appeal with all concerned United Nations agencies. The appeal presents priority emergency relief projects focusing on food, nutrition, health, water and sanitation, shelter and household items and education.

With the signing of the Arusha peace agreement, it is estimated that some 600,000 individuals have already returned home and, thus easing the emergency situation that had prevailed earlier in the year; as a result, the emphasis of the humanitarian assistance efforts has shifted to meeting the needs of the displaced returning home. At the same time, some 300,000 people who remain displaced continue to rely on emergency assistance in the camps.

In recommending the establishment of UNAMIR, the Secretary-General stated that humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons, as well as to demobilized soldiers, would have to be coordinated with the Mission's activities. Mine-clearance had been earmarked as a priority to ease the threat to displaced persons and to humanitarian agencies seeking to deliver assistance. The United Nations Resident Coordinator would continue to serve as the coordinator for humanitarian assistance.

COMPOSITION OF UNAMIR

The authorized peak military strength of UNAMIR is 2,548 military personnel, including 2,217 formed troops and 331 military observers. They are to be provided by the following countries: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay and Zimbabwe. In addition, the Mission will comprise 60 civilian police monitors, 110 international civilian staff and 61 locally recruited personnel.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

It has been estimated that the annual cost of UNAMIR to the United Nations would be approximately $98 million. The costs of the operation will be met by the assessed contributions from United Nations Member States.

Notes

[1]For more background information on the conflict in Rwanda, see "United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda".

[2]From July 1992 to July 1993, the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG I), made up of 50 observers from OAU countries, monitored the cease-fire in Rwanda. In early August 1993, it was replaced by an expanded NMOG II force, composed of some 130 personnel.

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